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Over the past forty years, government at all levels has shifted from a managerial to an 
entrepreneurial style of governance, to varying degrees.  This neoliberal shift in rule, 
which espouses market deregulation, corporate tax reduction, funding cuts, privatization 
of public services, increased competition for global capital, and the clawback of social 
assistance programs, has been promoted as a cure for the ailing economy.  At the 
municipal level, expansion of the economic development agenda and an “open for 
business” mentality has dominated the local planning agenda for many years.  ‘If it’s 
good for the economy, it’s good for the city’ is increasingly the basis on which 
development projects are planned, subsidized and constructed. 
 
However, the negative externalities that are caused by these large, often publicly 
funded, projects are forcing citizen groups to seek innovative ways to have their voices 
heard.  Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs) are becoming an ever more popular 
tool for community coalitions who desire more input and participation in the planning 
and development process.  CBAs are negotiated agreements between parties involved 
in a development project which ensures the direct delivery of some of the economic 
benefits that are often advertised, but rarely materialize, in large-scale development 
projects.   
 
This work looks at ten U.S. CBAs and explores the themes of representation, 
collaboration, and the role of government within the individual cases.  Comparing the 
academic and practical literature that is emerging, this research demonstrates that the 
success of any given CBA is tied to a community organization's ability to mobilize the 
local and non-local resources and alliances that can best support their context-specific 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In 2005, the City of Montréal introduced a new economic development plan that 
actively seeks investment from public and private firms and developers.  Known as 
Montréal 2025, this extensive program is “much more than a simple vision for the future” 
(City of Montreal [a]).  According to the City, it is also an offer of partnership, extended 
to national and international firms that choose Montréal as a place to grow and succeed, 
a facilitative tool for accessing funding sources from the three levels of government, and 
a support centre for potential investors (City of Montreal [a]).  As the plan outlines there 
are “more than 130 private, institutional and public projects” (Montreal Strategic and 
Tactical Task Force) connected with Montreal 2025 in various stages of planning and 
development.  Some of the highlights include a six billion dollar multi-site public private 
partnership known as the Montreal Technopole, redevelopment of the Montreal 
Harbourfront at $6.4 billion involving all levels of government and private investment, 
and the well promoted nod to the creative class, the Quartier des Spectacles intended 
to “provide an international showcase for Montreal’s creative community in the areas of 
innovation, production and performance through a series of gentrification projects in the 
core – boosting “the real estate market along St. Laurent Boulevard,” (Montreal 
Strategic and Tactical Task Force) among other things.  The plan further boasts that 
Montreal is the number one city in the world for giving “research and development tax 
incentives” (ibid.). 
Municipal strategies to attract and partner with investors to stimulate economic 
growth, as articulated by the City of Montréal 2025 strategy, are demonstrative of a shift 
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in governance that emerged in the early 1970s as a remedy for economic recession and 
the problems of the deindustrializing city (Hall, 2002).  Many scholars have highlighted 
this shift in governance, perhaps none more thoroughly than David Harvey.  In his 
seminal 1989 article “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism,” Harvey closely 
examines this transformation, outlining the shift in governance and the role that these 
new policies have played, and continue to play, in the shaping of urban society.  The 
article elaborates on the phenomenon, of ‘advanced capitalist’ governments “taking an 
entrepreneurial stance to(ward) economic development” (1989, p. 7) in their hopes to 
secure beneficial outcomes in the struggle to secure a better future.  This urban-
entrepreneurialism has come to be embodied in a set of neoliberal “best practices” 
(Brenner & Theodore, 2002) which promotes economic growth, in and of itself, as ‘good’ 
regardless of the externalities.   
One prominent mark of entrepreneurial governance is the devotion to what 
McLeod (2002, p. 604) describes as, “highly speculative flagship projects undertaken to 
enhance the imageability of the city,” to attract the investors and workers based on the 
image of the place.  The physical expression of these entrepreneurial pursuits, often in 
the form of mega-projects created through a partnership between the public and private 
sector, produces a direct impact not only on the built form of the city but also on urban 
social institutions.  Unfortunately, it has been demonstrated that these policies, 
partnerships and projects rarely produce the positive effects that they espouse 
(Flyvbjerg, 2005; Oliver-Smith, 2010).  Yet despite redistributive shortfalls and general 
social inequities, governments continue to pursue a policy doctrine which restricts 
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participation, manages debate (Smith, 2007) and favours corporate welfare strategies 
(Hellegers, 2001). 
Those sectors of society which are not benefitting from the pro-development 
policies are forced to pursue ever more resourceful means for having their voices heard.  
My work focuses on the community benefits agreement - a particular strategy being 
employed by community groups, neighbourhood associations and various other 
grassroots coalitions throughout the United States.  The community benefits agreement 
(CBA) is generally defined as a negotiated agreement between a community and 
developer that seeks to ensure that those affected by development projects share in 
their benefits (Gross, LeRoy, & Janis-Aparicio, 2005; Salkin & Lavine, 2008a; Wolf-
Powers, 2010).  Emerging in the late 1990’s (Salkin & Lavine, 2008b), the CBA has 
become a model strategy for community organizers and local coalitions.  The CBA is an 
interesting counterpoint to entrepreneurial governance because it does not try to stop 
continued growth, mega-projects and public-private partnerships.  CBAs seek to ensure 
that those benefits that are promoted as the raison d’etre of the growth, mega-projects 
and partnerships – such as job creation, local economic improvements, housing, etc. – 
actually appear and assist those populations that are most affected by the project.   
CBA literature has focused primarily on the legal aspects of the agreements and 
contracts themselves (Wolf-Powers, 2010), what constitutes a CBA (Gross, 2008) and 
the documentation of some of the cases and struggles as examples for future reference. 
However, authors such as Bornstein (2007a and b), Ho (2008), Baxamusa (2008), Wolf-
Powers (2010), and others are considering CBAs through the lenses of sociology, urban 
studies and planning, pushing analysis of the CBA process beyond just the technical 
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aspects.  These newer works are examining the involvement of trade unions and the 
composition of community coalitions (Bornstein, 2007b), the role of government in the 
CBA process (Been, 2010) and collaboration and partnerships across different strata 
(Klein & Tremblay, 2010), among other topics. 
Examining multiple cases this work seeks to highlight various CBA processes 
and explore a variety of ways that community coalitions, through negotiated 
agreements, are creating opportunities for positive outcomes within a “command and 
control” process that restricts the input of the general public (Camacho, 2005a), and 
favours pro-growth policies and the ‘inalienable’ rights of the private property owner.  My 
work seeks to understand how these groups of citizens come together and stay together 
during the lengthy CBA process, what role the government plays in the process, and the 
influence that national partner organizations have on the various local struggles.  This 
research shows that the success of CBAs is tied to a community organization's ability to 
mobilize the local and non-local resources and alliances that can best support their 
context-specific needs, and it illustrates the varied means by which this mobilization is 
achieved.  
The following chapter explores some of the reasons for and outcomes of 
neoliberal urban governance regimes and how this change corresponds to the rise of 
the ‘new economy’.  This will set the stage for my literature review, provide some 
background and help contextualize how and why community benefits agreements have 
‘appeared’ as a response to the change in governance.  The literature review that 
follows provides an overview of participatory challenges and practices under the reality 
of this mode of governance, with particular interest on how community input is managed 
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in the ‘new economy.’  My review highlights the negative externalities that arise from 
entrepreneurial strategies and mega-projects, primarily in the form of displacement, and 
some strategies and coping mechanisms that have emerged to combat these problems.  
Finally I examine the academic and applied literature surrounding the Community 
Benefits Agreement as an innovative and thus far successful strategy for addressing 
some of the negative economic and social aspects of development projects under 
entrepreneurial governance regime.  
Research objectives and methodology are addressed next.  Generally I have 
used the semi-structured interview and multiple case study analysis as the basis for 
analysis.  The Case Studies chapter outlines the ten cases that were selected for this 
study, with a focus on either completed or ongoing U.S. examples.   
The final chapter looks at the case studies across three specific themes identified 
in the literature; representation, collaboration, and the role of government.  The cases 
are examined against these three broad themes to compare how the literature is 
supported or contradicted by the CBA campaigns. The case studies demonstrate that 
representation and collaboration are key elements of any CBA campaign, and that 
government can play an important role in the CBA process.  I believe that it is the 
flexibility and fluidity of the community benefits agreement process that makes them an 
effective tool, and that attempts to define and categorize these efforts into narrow 
packages or disciplines can limit their effectiveness as a tool for grassroots 
organizations.  CBAs are proving to be a useful tool for community groups that desire 




Chapter 2: Entrepreneurialism and the New Economy 
 
The interval between the decay of the old and the formation and establishment of the 
new, constitutes a period of transition, which must always necessarily be one of 
uncertainty, confusion, error and wild and fierce fanaticism. (John Calhoun as cited in 
Harvey, 1989b, p. 119). 
 
This chapter seeks to set the stage and highlight the underlying milieu on which 
community benefits agreements have been built by providing an overview of the 
political-economic environment since the 1970s and the general implications for the 
governance of economic development.  This is necessary to understand better the 
context within which the CBA movement is operating.  To build a critical analysis of 
contemporary urban entrepreneurialism, and in turn community benefits agreements, 
one must concentrate on the “surface vigour of... the projects for regeneration and the 
underlying trends in the urban condition” (Harvey, 1989 p.16).  This portion of my work 
should be considered part of the “underlying trends.”  The following literature review and 
case studies will illuminate the “surface vigour.” 
Experimentation and invention of new ways to encourage local development and 
employment growth has been at the heart of urban governance over recent decades.  
According to David Harvey, most agree that this change in policy was rooted in the 
“deindustrialisation,” “structural unemployment,” and national and local financial crises, 
combined with the “rising tide of neo-conservatism” and appeal of “market rationality 
and privatisation” (Harvey, 1989, p. 5).  This was exacerbated by the dismantling of the 
‘Keynesian welfare state’ which, among other transformations, saw federal and state 
(provincial) governments cutting programs for cities and citizens (Mcleod, 2002), and 
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“downloading” of the responsibilities to impoverished cities that themselves were being 
hollowed out by deindustrialization and forced toward fiscal sobriety and market 
sensibility in place of welfare provision. 
As Brenner & Theodore (2002, p.350) discuss, beginning in the early 1970s 
following the collapse of the Fordist regime, national and local governments began 
marshalling in policies in an attempt to “extend market discipline, competition and 
commodification throughout all sectors of society.”  This decidedly neoliberal policy turn 
- emphasizing individual economic freedom in the pursuit of growth - signified a change 
in the philosophy of previous governance regimes that generally sought to provide 
collective “services, facilities and benefits to urban populations” (Harvey, 1989, p. 3).  
This change is often described as a shift - as the title of David Harvey’s paper suggests 
- from managerialism to entrepreneurialism which has pushed, enabled, ushered or 
permitted a restructuring of the capitalist system (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). 
Government’s active pursuit of economic benefits in the ‘open market’, with the 
intention of bringing prosperous investment and development to their nation, province, 
region or - increasingly – city, is the central focus of the entrepreneurial governance 
model.  In order to encourage and develop “growth factors” (Hubbard & Hall, 1998) such 
as, “external sources of funding, new direct investments [and] new employment 
sources” (Harvey, 1989, p. 7), cities have been forced to experiment with several 
strategies that heretofore were not part of their typical governance methods – to “open 
the black box of... innovation polices” (OECD, 2011a).  This has been facilitated by 
upper levels of government - typically the overseers of these tools - redefining their role 
in order to permit local decision-makers more “strategic and financial flexibility,” with 
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“reduced legal and fiscal restraint” (Hellegers, 2001, p. 917); again shifting their focus 
from social welfare programs to an “expanding economic development agenda” (ibid.).  
Market deregulation, corporate tax reduction, funding cuts and privatization of public 
services, increased competition for global capital, the clawback of social assistance 
programs, and “criminalization of the urban poor” (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, p. 350) 
are initiated to varying degrees and at various levels as cures for the ailing economies 
of the industrialized north, and are representative of this deepening reliance on the 
entrepreneurial governance model.  
As Harvey predicted, the intensifying competition for global capital investment 
has had the effect of coercing everyone to fall in line with the doctrine that 
entrepreneurial governance preaches (1989)1.  From the local economic standpoint, 
once these strategies have been embedded into particular political channels there is a 
streamlining of urban policy up and down these select and well-worn tracks that 
promote themselves as more feasible options when action-plans are being developed 
(Bradford, 2000).  There is a prevalence of proliferation of this ‘fast policy’ being 
adopted by governance bodies, according to Peck (2011).  Fast policy is the rapid 
transformation of neoliberal economic ideas into policies, based on global ‘best 
practices’, riding on the precepts of market rationality that disseminate through the 
political-economic network without the proper gestation period.  
                                                 
1
 To this end an expanding number of scholars recognize the transformation of ideas into policies 
as a chain of relationships that become institutionally embedded. (Siemiatycki, 2005).  A sort of 
“structured, structuring structure” (Crossley, 2001, p. 84) that creates and recreates a group of 
dispositions, habits, norms, established routines and rules that influence and pattern behaviour (Moulaert, 
2000, as cited in Siemiatycki, 2005).   
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A significant problem with the spread of these policies is the belief that they are 
transferable at all.  Market reforms and reformers fail to recognize the enormously 
varied outcomes and effects the policies are having when simply draped over the 
existing social and institutional structure that different neighbourhoods, cities and 
regions feature: one size does not fit all (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Brenner, Peck, & 
Theodore, 2009).  Policy makers are surprised when they “fail”, because they were 
“successful” elsewhere, which in turn subjects the geographic area receiving the initial 
policy treatment to round after round of regeneration and restructuring policies and 
projects that have had, “only a marginal impact on local economies and now present[s] 
a depressing post-industrial landscape of deepening inequalities and entrenched social 
polarization” (Jones & Ward, 2002, p. 474).  It is important to recognize that local 
institutions, characteristics, and the concept of place distinctively yet uniquely influence 
the way these policies and programs perform (Barnes & Hutton, 2009; Siemiatycki, 
2005). 
This experimentation and transfer of policies from one place to another is 
producing a rotation of implemented, observed, adjusted, re-implemented policies 
(Harvey, 1989), and a physical cycle of continuous creation, destruction and re-creation 
in the places where the policies continue to be manifested (Brenner & Theodore, 2002).  
Authors have noted that this shift is being undertaken “with particular intensity at the 
urban scale” (ibid. p367).  With fewer financial resources than national or provincial 
governments, but a greater concentration of economic activity, cities are becoming 
frequent institutional laboratories for entrepreneurial policy experiments (Brenner & 
Theodore, 2002).  Anxious to attract capital, municipalities are willing to do whatever it 
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takes to ‘land the client’; absorbing risks, trading off benefits, mimicking policies and 
projects and creating a good business climate (Harvey, 1989). Furthermore, this 
behaviour is being encouraged and reinforced by federal policies and global institutions, 
such as the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), that 
influences the national policies of its 34 member nations under the guise of promoting 
“policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the 
world” (OECD, 2011b).  
In conjunction with the shift in policy, a key element of the entrepreneurial 
governance model has been the changing nature of production itself.    “The general 
consensus in the literature today is that the driving force behind long-term economic 
growth is science, technology and innovation in its different forms and facets.” (OECD, 
2011a)  It was believed that flexible production and the instantaneous transfer of 
information would devalue place and render cities as we know them obsolete (Hall, 
2002).  While knowledge and information have replaced traditional manufacturing and 
the infrastructure that supported it (Benko, 2001), “knowledge-intensive business 
services” (Schienstock, 2004, p. 19; Castells, 1996) continue to concentrate in urban 
centres.  Cities remain the focus for these business service (Sassen, 1998), and as 
Castells & Hall (1994) suggest, this shift from industrial production to information 
gatekeeping is as historically important as any previous industrial revolutions.  
According to Peter Hall (2002), the reason cities are able to maintain their relevance is 
because they rely on interaction, networking and “buzz and fizz, which [is] more likely to 
be found” (Hall, 2002, p. 408) where economic actors are more densely concentrated. 
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More recently, local governments have revised their entrepreneurial strategies, 
focusing on creating a place that is attractive to the people who are employed in these 
new knowledge industries (Sassen, 1998); i.e. places with “buzz and fizz” (Hall, 2002, p. 
408).  The belief is that the industries themselves will choose to locate where there are 
high concentrations of highly skilled workers (Florida, 2002).  As Hubbard and Hall 
(1998, p. 8) suggest, governments are seeking to create “spectacular cities of (and for) 
consumption”, which are continuously monitoring and redefining their image in order to 
gain and maintain this perceived competitive advantage.   
Florida (2002, p. 5) advances that these highly skilled workers – the creative 
class – are “the decisive source of competitive advantage” and “the most highly prized 
commodity in our economy”.  Surprisingly, while this perspective has been subject to 
criticism (see Peck, 2005; Storper & Scott, 2009 among others) in academia, it has 
been widely adopted in policy and practice as a new economic development paradigm.  
The Creative Cities narrative is very much in line with – and reflective of – the broader 
entrepreneurial shift. 
Today entrepreneurial governance is well entrenched, and governments at 
multiple scales and in various locations continue to become further entangled in 
entrepreneurial practices and policies in the neoliberalizing world.  According to Sassen 
(1998), while the new economic model is having positive effects, it is also producing a 
new marginality.  As Florida (2002) admits, high growth rates and wealth generation 
have been realized in some places, but unless there is an equitable distribution of this 
wealth, a large number of individuals will not realize an advantage in the knowledge 
economy and will continue to create a drag on the overall system.  This systemic drag is 
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populated by citizens who are not working in the knowledge or creative industries but 
are employed in service and ‘blue-collar’ jobs – 70% of the workforce in the United 
States (Florida, 2002).  As Peck (2005, p. 766) suggests, these entrepreneurial and 
knowledge economy strategies represent a “subordination of social-welfare concerns to 
economic development imperatives”, that espouse a repackaged version of trickle-down 
economics.  These competitive entrepreneurial activities, that attempt to seduce the 
mobile capital and or itinerant workers of the new economy, have resulted in a 
“stimulating if often destructive maelstrom of urban-based cultural, political, production 
and consumption based innovations” (Harvey, 1989, p. 12), that distract from the reality 
of growing disparities between the included and excluded, the winners and losers of the 
new economy (Mcleod, 2002).   
Mega Projects & Partnerships 
One particular strategy being employed as part of the entrepreneurial toolkit is 
the concept of the mega-project.  This type of development has been reconstituted in 
the contemporary era of urban governance but has a long history as a remedy for 
troubled economic times.  Following the Second World War, ‘advanced capitalist’ 
countries undertook massive projects designed to rebuild cities that had been “damaged 
by war or suffered from out-migration and obsolescence” (Orueta & Fainstein, 2008, p. 
759).  As Lehrer (2002) writes, mega-projects in North America arrived as part of the 
“City Beautiful” movement and were then reimagined as a tool of urban renewal (as 
cited in Lehrer & Laidley, 2009).  The original ‘mega-project’ can be defined as a “large-
scale capital investment focused on a single purpose” (Lehrer & Laidley, 2009, p. 788), 
often realized as infrastructure developments such as transportation networks, power 
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facilities, airports and train stations that created a ‘modern’ urban environment in the 
name of efficiency and the removal of “substandard housing” (Orueta & Fainstein, 2008) 
(Lehrer & Laidley, 2009).   
Typical of the welfare-state or ‘managerial’ governance strategies of the pre-
1970s, development projects were oriented toward the distribution of a ‘fair share’ of 
benefits including electricity, employment, housing and transportation (Lehrer & Laidley, 
2009).  However, due to their often ‘destructive’ nature, resistance to these mega-
projects and their negative impacts on neighbourhoods and the environment began to 
be heard.  As Scott (1998) describes, the ideological ‘left’ criticised the projects as 
authoritarian (cited in Orueta & Fainstein, 2008), “displacing millions of households, 
destroying communities and generally resulting in a regressive distribution of benefits” 
(Castells, 1978; Fainstein et al.,1986; Gans, 1991; Harloe, 1995; Hall, 2002; Logan and 
Molotch, 2007, as cited in Orueta & Fainstein, 2008, p759).  And on the right, as 
Stephen Harper – then MP for the Reform Party – stated, the “industrial policy and 
sectoral strategies (that mega-projects represent) are code for taxpayer-funded 
subsidies, loans, direct investment and other forms of state intervention" (Koch, 1994).  
For many on the political right, mega-projects represented an affront to the free market 
(Anderson, 1964; as cited in Orueta & Fainstein, 2008).  The (modest) success of these 
criticisms, coupled with worldwide financial insecurity, forced a brief hiatus from the 
mega-project as it was known (Orueta & Fainstein, 2008) - time enough to prompt 
George Koch to ask, “are mega-projects dead, or just comatose?” (1994, p. 1). 
Following this brief reprieve, cities have responded to the pressures of global 
competition by undertaking ever larger and all-encompassing mixed-use developments 
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to attract multinational investment, firms and notoriety (Fainstein, 2009) and further 
entrench the neoliberal market agenda.  These exceedingly speculative mega projects – 
a key component of the place promotion and “trickle-down” economic theory that the 
new economy espouses – provide a perfect vehicle for globally competitive image 
projection and revitalisation of the central city that was especially hard-hit during the 
deindustrialization of the late 20th century (Mcleod, 2002).  At the core of this 
resurgence in mega-project planning, with the aim to stimulate - or at least simulate - 
economic growth, is the ‘public-private partnership’ where the functions of place 
marketing and promotion are “integrated with ... local government powers” (Harvey, 
1989, p. 7) in an attempt to lure the ‘growth factors’ previously mentioned; direct 
investment, employment opportunities, and new funding sources.  And this time around, 
the political right and left agree; federal programs (ie. dollars) should expand individual 
economic opportunity and cooperate with private enterprise to achieve this end (Pitegoff 
[1994] as cited in Hellegers, 2001). 
The public-private partnership mega-schemes of today are often state initiatives 
seeking private sector collaborators (finance, construction, etc.) in the hope of improving 
the city’s stock in the interconnected and competitive global marketplace (Lehrer & 
Laidley, 2009).  However, there are many examples of developer proposed projects that 
presume to provide some municipally determined ‘good’ (green space, affordable 
housing, property rights) in order to receive direct benefits (tax abatement, bonus 
zoning, cheap land) that make the project theoretically economically feasible (see 
Flyvbjerg, 2005) and socially palatable. 
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Regardless of who initiates the endeavour, one major concern is that the 
enormous financial risk (Flyvbjerg, 2005) that such large projects present is almost 
always borne by the local government (Harvey, 1989) and in turn the tax-payer.  These 
public-private partnerships are entrepreneurial in the sense of their investment seeking 
and speculative behaviours.  As opposed to the “rationally planned” and coordinated 
projects of the past, today civic officials are willing to absorb financial risks and clear the 
path for development as part of its entrepreneurial activities in order to reap the 
(presumed) rewards of economic development (Harvey, 1989).  Interestingly in the 
United States (and possibly elsewhere), certain federal funds and loans for municipal 
projects are available only where it can be demonstrated that the project cannot 
otherwise obtain the funding it requires.  Where investments are too risky for 
commercial lenders, (Hellegers, 2001) federal programs are there to assist.  Another 
problem stemming from the public private partnership is the conviction that if a project 
creates or stimulates capital accumulation, or brings (perceived) benefit to the City (be it 
jobs, knowledge or otherwise) then it is a necessarily a public good (ibid.).   
Central to this new era of mega-developments is the image of a “better future” 
(OECD, 2011b) that the projects and proponents offer.  As Koch (1994) articulates, 
there are almost as many benefits advanced in the promotion of the mega-project as 
there are projects themselves.  “Job creation, regional development, industrialization, 
self-sufficiency” (ibid., p.1), training and skill building (Fainstein, 2009), and attracting 
“tourists and place-mobile capitalists” (Mcleod, 2002) are all expressed from time to 
time as reasons for partnering in a mega-project endeavour.  The large development is 
also seen as an integral tool for making “the city ... appear as an innovative, exciting, 
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creative and safe place to live or to visit, to play or consume in” (Harvey, 1989, p. 9).  
Unfortunately, as Flyvbjerg (2005, p.18) suggests, the projects that get built are those 
“for which proponents best succeed in conjuring a fantasy world of underestimated 
costs, overestimated revenues, undervalued environmental impacts and overvalued 
regional development effects”.  Often failing to deliver on the promises made during the 
planning stages, mega-projects provide a physical example of the difficult-to-transfer 
package of entrepreneurial policies and reinforce the idea that one-size does not fit all.  
Even twenty years prior, critics argued that the economic justification for these 
taxpayer-supported arrangements (Koch, 1994) were very difficult to establish: “Either 
the ventures would eventually have been undertaken by the private sector, or they were 
economically unviable from the start and should never have been built” (ibid., p. 1). This 
is supported by Hellegers’ (2001) assessment of the financial risk and lack of formal 
evaluation of projects and programs.  However these cost oversights, broken promises 
and fiscally irresponsible behaviours do not appear to be slowing down the rate at which 
cities are pursuing the mega-project strategy with their private-sector partners in lock-
step.  Even when revealed that the urban entrepreneurial strategies may perform 
poorly, investments such as these appear to have “social and political attraction” 
(Harvey, 1989, p. 14) acting as a “loss leader” to draw other forms of investment, 
partnership and praise (ibid.).  As Flyvbjerg (2009) suggests, this “social and political 
attraction” are the product of the inflated benefits and reduced costs presented by 
mega-project proponents.  The fraudulent manner in which mega-project benefits are 
calculated is resulting in a sort of ‘survival of the unfittest’, where only the most 
economically and socially fantastic (i.e. far-fetched, implausible) of projects is approved. 
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This is not to say that public officials do not recognize that the competing 
subsidies, increased corporate welfare, partnering opportunities and relief packages 
one region is offering over another are not in their best interest.  It is more an 
acknowledgment that ceasing to participate, or dropping out of the contest altogether 
would sacrifice future opportunities to capture the mysterious benefits of capital and be 
detrimental to their political careers (Hellegers, 2001).  As Harvey (1989) highlights, the 
intensifying strength of inter-urban competition coerces city after city into line with the 
discipline and logic of capitalist development under the new economic reality simply 
because of the nature of the competition itself:  Municipalities are drawn into the 
competition due to “fear of exclusion” (Benko, 2001, p. 165).   
Corresponding suggestions as to why mega-projects get built have included the 
desire to create iconic architecture and to brand the city (Haila, 2009), political legacy, 
or as a macro-economic ‘loss leader’ (Harvey, 1989) undertaken with awareness that 
money will be lost, but which in turn will theoretically generate greater profits in another 
sector (ie. tourism or locally invested foreign capital).  As McLeod (2002) sugests, the 
entrepreneurial governance regime and the “flagship” mega-project that is its banner 
are explicitly fastened to the sway of powerful business interests expressed as public-
private partnerships.  This muscular mix of influential actors, including developers, 
landholders, local and national lobby groups (chamber of commerce, business 
associations, construction consortiums) all work to enable “economic enterprise” 
(Mcleod, 2002) in the ultimate pursuit of the open, competitive, unregulated markets 
championed by the neoliberal dogma (Brenner & Theodore, 2002).  And while these 
developments are in the end a merger of market discipline, unchecked competition, 
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image-creation, self-promotion and faith in economic benefit generation, the bottom line 
is that someone along the sequence is actually making money from these projects.  
Whether these profits are real or speculative, used as assets to access credit and 
financing for other – likely similar - projects in other places is as of now uncertain.   
Community Implications 
As discussed, mega-projects of the past were met with increasing resistance due 
primarily to the material impacts experienced by the communities in which they were 
constructed.  To counter this displacement of households and uneven distribution of 
costs and benefits (Orueta & Fainstein, 2008), citizens called for increased participation 
and decision making power (Mayer, 2003).  The contemporary mega-project is, 
theoretically, less disruptive because it is often planned and constructed on vacant or 
‘underutilized’ land.  The reality of the new economy is that the post-industrial urban 
landscape is filled with ‘marginal’ lands ripe for public-private mega-developments 
(Orueta & Fainstein, 2008).  Railway yards, underused urban ports, factories, foundries, 
and warehouses whose large complexes – now vacant or obsolete due to 
deindustrialization - provide the space for current mega-project renewal schemes.   
As Lehrer & Laidley (2009) state, today’s urban megaprojects involve immense 
physical transformations of space and due to their often enormous scale, can alter the 
social practices within their sphere of influence,  intentionally or unintentionally.  One 
could imagine that given the mammoth economic cost and sheer size of present-day 
mega-projects, combined with the acknowledgment of the externalities and social 
implications, that these projects would create more civic mistrust than we are witnessing 
 19 
 
(Orueta, 2007 as cited in Orueta & Fainstein 2008).  However, partly due to their 
marketing (Benko, 2001) as environmentally, economically and socially beneficial, and 
because of the state’s tacit approval (through partnership and financial assistance), 
debate about the real impacts of the mega-project has been somewhat weakened 
(Orueta & Fainstein, 2008).  There is a prevailing attitude, even amongst some 
potentially oppositional groups, that these projects are more socially responsive, 
inclusive, participatory, beneficial, and in a way inevitable (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; 
Harvey, 1989; Lehrer & Laidley, 2009; Orueta & Fainstein, 2008).   
As Harvey (1989, p. 14) submits, the overt competition, promotion of place and 
image-making activities of the entrepreneurial city can foster “a sense of social 
solidadrity, civic pride and loyalty to place” for residents.  However, this pride and 
positivism can be turned into a tool, “for social control”, creating an ‘us against the 
world’ mentality that serves to enhance the market rationale, bolster the entrepreneurial 
methodology and create a sense that the pursuit of growth is the only locigal course of 
action. It is within this framework that neoliberalism and urban entrepreneurial pursuits 
can take the shape of a package of (preferred) policies, a conduit of institutional 
change, an expanding bundle of political leanings, an expression of realigned 
hegemonic policies, or as any combination of these realities (Brenner, Peck, & 
Theodore, 2009).  Through the well-crafted images of holistic planning and prosperity, 
conflict and resistance are managed, de-politicized and reduced to economic arguments 
about jobs and capital.  This can have the effect of forcing even socially progressive 
actors and activities to support market forces (Mayer, 2003) and, “perform as agents of 
discipline for the very processes they are trying to resist” (Harvey, 1989, p. 5).   
 20 
 
Another possible reason for reduced opposition (and therefore the perception of 
reduced disruption) is the response of city governments to earlier protest movements 
and their willingness to acknowledge that people were being left out of the participatory 
equation:  “Urban exclusion”, as Mayer (2003) discusses, was recognized as a problem.  
To a much greater extent than before, local input and activism have been incorporated 
into the planning formula, but this new relationship has not had the desired effect for the 
community.  Instead, the effect has been the co-option of the conflicting voice of political 
and social action into the development equation (Mayer, 2003). It has weakened dissent 
while simultaneously giving the appearance of empowering local activists and 
encouraging community input, when truly the end goal is improved economic 
performance (ibid.) and a smoother development process. 
Gentrification and Displacement 
One of the most serious outcomes of a typical urban (re)development project is 
the direct and indirect displacement of people and businesses.  Usually these reasons 
for the upheaval are economic in nature; i.e. the people or enterprises just cannot afford 
to live or to business in the vicinity of the development project.  This process is often 
referred to as gentrification which, according to Blomley (2004), represents an 
unwarranted invasion of working class neighbourhoods, cloaked in the language of 
revitalization and growth.  At its most simplistic, gentrification is, “the process of 
neighbourhood change that results in the replacement of lower income residents with 
higher income ones” (Kennedy & Leonard, 2001, p. 1).  The term has been used to 
characterize many moments throughout recent urban history: urban ‘renewal’ programs 
of the 1950s, through ‘back to the city’ movements of the 1970s and 80s and to present 
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day condo and loft ‘conversions’ can all be defined as gentrification (Kennedy & 
Leonard, 2001).  Although people living in the neighbourhoods that are being ‘fixed up’ 
often hope that the effort will lead to an ‘improvement’ in the neighbourhood (ibid.), the 
effect this ‘revitalization’ often brings with it often cause more harm than anything.  
Increases in rents, house prices and property taxes, an increased police presence, 
change in the local social fabric and flat out displacement of the people who may have 
been hoping for some minor change to the neighbourhood. (Barnes & Hutton, 2009; 
Blomley, 2004; Mcleod, 2002). 
While the mega-development today may be less immediately disruptive than its 
predecessor – planned on vacant or marginal lands (Fainstein, 2009) - the projects are 
typically surrounded by residential neighbourhoods or smaller industrial and commercial 
uses often considered marginal or underutilized themselves.  Despite the fact that the 
expressed intent of a project may be to ‘revitalize’ an area, leading to ‘improved lives’, 
‘greater wealth’ or ‘economic opportunity’ for the local residents, the prospect for profit 
making on these marginal lands leads to changes in the surrounding real estate market.  
It is the speculative economic process taking place on the periphery of the project which 
can result in increased rents and displacement.  Pricing those residents or businesses 
that located there, due to the low cost, out of the market and thereby removing them 
from the area altogether.  Mega-projects can therefore be considered part of the 
broader process of displacement, which sees people with little economic and political 
power replaced by those “with greater resources and power ... who think they have a 
‘better’ use for a certain building, piece of land or neighbourhood” (Hartman, Keating & 
LeGates, 1982, as quoted in Blomley, 2004, p. 78). 
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The practice of gentrification is deeply imbedded in the “politically charged urban 
development process” (Kennedy & Leonard, 2001, p. 4) and is not simply separable 
from the larger course of action.  The concept of the market - even when partnered with 
the public sector - creates positive outcomes for some, negative circumstances for 
others and effects that are both positive and negative for some groups at the same time.  
This makes discussions of the costs and benefits (not simply in economic terms) of 
projects and their externalities very complex (Kennedy & Leonard, 2001) and often 
political.   
However, Slater (2008, p. 220) remarks that these complexities and potentials for 
positive outcomes “does not mean that gentrification is somehow ‘softer’ or less feared 
by low-income and working-class people”.  While debate over the pros and cons of a 
project and the potential externalities persists, it must be recognized that a 
disproportionate number of these costs, cons, and negatives are borne by the 
‘marginalized’ groups (Mcleod, 2002); “people without ... economic or political power” 
(Hartman, Keating & LeGates, 1982, as quoted in Blomley, 2004, p. 78).  Furthermore, 
the destruction of community that goes along with displacement is very difficult to 
quantify and therefore left out of the cost-benefit analysis of municipal development 
policies that encourage or enable gentrification and displacement.  That “bundle of 
social, familial, business, religious and ethnic ties and relationships are of subjective, 
nonpecuniary interest to a displaced individual but are undeniably essential to a 





Job creation is often used as a tool to promote developments within a region or 
community; however there are reasons to be skeptical when the employment numbers 
are being announced.  First, while urban entrepreneurial strategies and mega-projects 
can sometimes create jobs at the high end of the managerial spectrum, more often the 
positions are low-paying, sub-contracted and informal in nature:  Positions that 
exacerbate the income gap and contribute to “urban impoverishment” (Harvey, 1989).  
Furthermore, there are reasons to question whether the projects create jobs at all.  The 
partnership projects that governments are interested in promoting are those that 
contribute to or support the knowledge economy.  The employees of these firms are 
‘creative’, highly trained ‘knowledge economy’ workers and, as Ragan (2000) highlights, 
they are not often found in the local unemployment pool, but lured from other industries 
and employers.  Because of this, the net number of positions created are often far less 
than the reported.  One reason these workers may have decided to change jobs is 
because the government subsidy to the company allows them to pay higher wages than 
their competitors.  Therefore, not only are inflated net job creation numbers being 
reported, but the government program may be artificially propping up an industry 
through the incentive package provided (Ragan, 2000).  It may be argued that ‘in 
today’s global marketplace, the competition for highly skilled labour is drawing from all 
over the world’ and therefore we are stealing from a labour pool outside national 
boundaries.  Irrespective of this argument, the public-private partnership appears to be 
simply underwriting a “subsidy for ... corporations and powerful command functions to 
stay in town” (Harvey, 1989, p. 12) at the expense of the welfare of average citizens and 
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through diminished local provision for marginal or underprivileged groups.  It has been 
suggested that the creation of jobs and other supposedly positive economic factors - 
customarily used by proponents of public-private partnerships to rationalize the millions 
spent on these mega-projects - rarely materialize (Flyvbjerg, 2005). 
In sum, the implications of mega-projects and their impending outcomes (both 
positive and negative) are significant, but to what extent does the community really have 
a say in the process?  According to Marcello (2007), the propensity of the ‘public-private 
partnership’ arrangement has further abridged the already limited amount of public 
involvement that planning decisions maintain, primarily due to the “direct and private 
communication between developers and public officials” (Marcello, 2007, p. 661), that 
occurs during the initial project dialogue, before being ‘rolled-out’ and ‘promoted’ to the 
public.  These direct and private discussions, combined with the perception of increased 
participation in the process – which has depoliticized and dampened opposition (Lehrer 
& Laidley, 2009) - has created the appearance of a less disruptive and more friendly 
mega-project. 
Authors such as McLeod (2002) and Slater (2008) suggest that salvaging the 
inner city from the poor, sweeping them off the streets to create sanitized and gentrified 
spaces favouring those who can participate as full citizens (ie. own land, work, consume 
and command capital (Blomley, 2004)) is the fundamental outcome of urban 
entrepreneurial governance.  These interconnected processes of gentrification, 
displacement, revitalization, growth and progress constitute just as brutal and terrifying 
an experience as ever (Mcleod, 2002).   
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The political and economic conditions in which CBAs have emerged are 
entrenched and have become the standard by which governments of all levels are 
operating, to various degrees of intensity.  These are the conditions that the public is 
forced to take part in.  But what recourse is there to minimize or negate the harms that 
occur through mega-project development?  How can ‘marginalized’ citizens become 
part of the equation and counteract the continued ignorance and subjugation of their 
“right to stay put” (Blomley, 2004, p. 79). The next chapter explores some of the themes 
that relate to these questions.  
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
Community Participation  
As has been discussed, by the end of the 1970s urban citizens were 
demonstrating against the destruction and displacement caused by the well-intentioned 
but disastrous public works and housing mega-projects, job loss and the failing 
economy of the post-industrial economy battering the inner cities (Lehrer & Laidley, 
2009; Hall, 2002; Ho, 2008).  These activist groups were effective to some degree, in 
demanding more access to the decision-making apparatus (Mayer, 2003).  And while 
recognition of the importance of grassroots initiatives and local participation has found 
its way into the planning process (ibid.), there still appear to be many negative aspects 
accruing from the forward march of urban entrepreneurialism and the implementation of 
mega-projects.  As Ho (2008, p. 7) articulates, “traditionally, decision making power... 
reside(s) between the public and private sectors with little authority given to 
communities.” 
An article in the New York Times (Rampell, 2011) suggests that suburbanization, 
lack of funding from traditional sources, social service cutbacks, technical changes in 
the delivery of social services and a breakdown of social networks have all contributed 
to the lack of organizational power and political clout of marginalized groups, such as 
the unemployed.  In his 1981 book “City Limits”, Paul E. Petersen theorized that urban 
populations had been “turned off” of local participation for two reasons:  first, because 
the heterogeneous citizenry is too “large and distracted” to really care what happens 
locally and second, because “local political processes (both internal and external) are so 
structured as to discourage group formation” (Petersen, 1981, p. 121).  And although 
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Petersen wrote this over 30 years ago, little has changed to make the populous less 
distracted nor able to form large groups or coalitions.   Be it low voter turnout, the lack of 
media coverage and polling, lack of sustained or directed pressure, or the absence of 
“hot-button” issues and professional politicians, local groups simply do not have the 
interest, expertise, or power to truly affect change at the local level (ibid.).  As Stone 
(2005) laments, universal suffrage has not turned affairs of state into a clear and 
permeable practice influenced by citizens organizing around their important issues.   
This is not intended to imply that community efforts to alter the power dynamic do 
not exist, but that local governance policies and practices have limited the opportunity 
for, and effectiveness of, citizens to play a meaningful role in the process (Ho, 2008).  
And if Petersen is correct in his idea that this “heterogeneous” and “disinterested” urban 
citizenry aren’t encouraged or permitted to effectively take part in the process for 
whatever reason then there are interests willing to step in and set the local agenda, 
namely “the economically prosperous, the socially prominent and the bureaucratically 
influential” (Petersen, 1981, p. 129).  Promises of job creation, property tax revenue, 
and speculative spin-offs can greatly sway strategic decisions for the local polity, 
despite what community coalitions might desire or protest (Hellegers, 2001).  
Furthermore, the generic nature of the competition between cities, regions and states 
constructed on the framework of capital accumulation, compels even those “well-
intended and benevolent coalitions of class” to be “realistic” and “pragmatic,” sacrificing 
social welfare and local needs in favour of playing within the coercive yet loose rules of 
neoliberal market logic (Harvey, 1989, p. 16).  The belief in the benefit of capital 
accumulation makes it difficult for any group to oppose the “comprehensive” mega-
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projects that promise to create jobs, increase the tax base and have positive economic 
spin-offs.  All of these presumed benefits, and the lack of participation or opposition, 
provides a greater opportunity for accommodation between the state and the private 
sector and works well to silence those voices that stand in opposition.  And as Stone 
(2005) argues, the custom of cooperation between government institutions and those 
that control the local economy should not be overlooked.  “Accommodation,” he writes, 
“is a political reality” (ibid. p. 311).   
Notwithstanding these observations and trends, many groups and coalitions 
continue fighting hard to counteract the inherent problems created by the neoliberal 
policies present in the urban context throughout North America.  Ho (2008), for 
example, illustrates the dynamic at work between the public (government), private 
(development), and community (resident) sectors through an historic account of U.S. 
development policies and their effects on citizens.  Ho argues that while urban 
development policies have evolved to require more participation, policies have been 
ineffective in articulating how that can be achieved, or in practice have excluded the 
community from meaningful input because the public and private sectors viewed 
‘community’ as, “an obstacle rather than an asset” (ibid., 2008, p. 19).   
However, there are those that feel that urban agendas, under the right 
circumstances, can be set or greatly influenced by local institutions and actors, and that 
this community empowerment – facilitating meaningful participation - is essential for 
serious sustainable development planning (Baxamusa, 2008).  Klein and Tremblay 
(2010) articulated their theory of a “Quebec Model” of governance which demonstrates, 
“a partnership oriented approach aimed at bringing together private, public and civil-
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society based stakeholders and in which actors involved in the social economy play an 
important role” (ibid., p. 568).  This model is rare, in their assessment, because it 
requires as its foundation an inclusive coalition lead by “civil society-based 
organizations” who collectively “define solutions to revitalization and social exclusion” 
(ibid., p. 568).   
While the Quebec Model may provide some hope that in certain political contexts 
inclusive and participatory opportunities still exist, this may be another version of what 
Smith (2007) has labelled the procedural fix – a policy that seeks to control debate and 
make the system more predictable for capital interests.  Alternatively, Baxamusa (2008) 
argues that community empowerment is a catalyst for social transformation because by 
definition empowerment means conceding control to those that have been systemically 
disempowered.  He indicates that grassroots coalition building leads to organized 
communities, which in turn is necessary for empowerment.  This bottom-up 
transformation– from coalition to community – is crucial because historically, top-down 
approaches to participation have had disappointing results (Ho, 2008), and as Fainstein 
(2000, p. 12) states, “the aroused consciousness that puts ideas into practice involves 
leadership and the mobilization of power, not simply people reasoning together”. 
For Baxamusa (2008, p. 262), “organizing and territoriality form the bedrock of 
community”, and he describes two key factors in the emergence of ever-growing 
community groups.  The first factor is “devolution” or the deterioration of the belief that 
the state will make good decisions and take care of the public interest.  The second 
factor is the necessary development of a “balancing power” in response to strong 
partnerships between government and capital (ibid.).  The appearance of large 
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nationally connected but locally focused “think and do tanks” (Bornstein, 2007b, p. 11) 
who are, “building power and reshaping the economy and urban environment for 
workers and communities” (The Parternship for Working Families), or acting as a 
“national policy resource center for grassroots groups ... promoting corporate and 
government accountability in economic development and smart growth for working 
families” (Good Jobs First, 2010) seem to support Baxamusa’s claims. Groups such as 
the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE) and the aforementioned 
Partnership for Working Families and Good Jobs First alliances are working with large 
and small community partners in threatened neighbourhoods to help them fight for their, 
“right to stay put” (Blomley, 2004). The groups mentioned here are examples of large 
national (and international) organizations for empowerment, but they still provide 
support for those up-and-coming local associations struggling to ensure a meaningful 
seat at the table when development discussions are taking place.   
Strategies such as community impact reports (CIRs), Community Benefits 
Agreements (CBAs), cooperative housing, and non-market ownership alternatives are 
becoming more commonplace where the promises of ‘improving’ the local or regional 
economy fall short.  While planning authorities at every level are required, through an 
assortment of acts and regulations, to provide channels for the general public to 
comment on policies and projects that are taking place in their region, city, or 
neighbourhood, this sometimes is not enough (Ho, 2008).  When these opportunities 
are inadequate or fail, citizen groups may choose methods outside of the prescribed 
participatory structures to ensure they are not ignored (Bornstein, 2007a). If the affected 
populations are not a meaningful part of the planning process (i.e. changing the current 
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dynamic and/or seizing decision making power from the state) the broader community 
views that they represent will fail to be considered.  Failure by community groups to 
create that “balancing power” that Baxamusa (2008) speaks of, permits the economic 
interests of the state and the private sector to ride “roughshod” over the community 
(Klein & Tremblay, 2010) and produces development projects that do not yield the 
greatest good, value, or efficiency (Ho, 2008).   
As Camacho (2005b) argues, a more participatory regulatory process can create 
benefits, or at least safeguards, throughout the development planning process. These 
benefits are described as “fundamental premises,” and they include reducing not only 
the bipartisan negotiation (between local officials and the developer), but the 
preferential dealing that currently takes place, assisting in and promoting information 
sharing between all affected parties, producing a regulatory system that is more broadly 
satisfactory to participants and the general public, and forcing the government to be 
more accountable to a broader coalition of concerns than the current system inspires 
regarding service provision and decision making (Camacho, 2005b).  Implementation of 
some of these fundamental premises could be thought of as swinging the pendulum 
back toward a concept of managerial governance rather than the entrepreneurial 
predilection seen today. 
Unfortunately, where traditional development planning does provide some 
semblance of public participation through a legal framework (Bornstein, 2007a), the 
public-private partnership – hallmark of the entrepreneurial governance model – 
“undermines even that modicum of citizen input by fostering direct communication 
between developers and public officials” (Marcello, 2007, p. 661).  As Camacho (2005a) 
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discusses, this “shrouded, bilateral process” largely narrows civic input, producing 
projects and impacts that fail to generate the beneficial outcomes that they otherwise 
might if the public were more empowered in the planning stages.  This failure is due in 
part to the woeful ability of local government to evenly distribute wealth (Petersen, 
1981), while simultaneously “legitimizing ad hoc land use decisions,” (Camacho, 2005a, 
p. 7) circumscribing long-range community planning, and ignoring those parties affected 
by closed door decisions (ibid).  As Bezdek (2006) writes, public-private redevelopment 
of urban space must be controlled by, and directly benefit, the affected city residents so 
that the (inevitably) displaced population receives meaningful equity in the value added 
redevelopment. 
Community and Labour 
Trade unions are, at their most basic, a coalition that has a vested interest in 
development projects.  Labour organizations have been successful in raising their 
members’ working and living conditions, including salaries, pensions, safety, and other 
important gains over the last century and a half.  Unfortunately, where coalition building 
and organizing campaigns were once hallmarks of the union movement, these activities 
have become less prevalent over the last several years (Levi, 2001).  “The history of 
labor organizations in attacking poverty and building the social capital of poor 
communities is a complex one” (ibid. p. 246).  As Kennedy and Tilly (2013) indicate, the 
labour movement has shifted from representing ‘the working class’ to ‘organized labour’ 
and from there to the current specific and segmented groups (public workers, iron 
workers, auto workers, etc.), and collective bargaining units.    Its ability to represent 
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and fight generally for working class populations has thus become more and more 
limited. 
Where community coalitions and trade unions are concerned, unions have the 
raw materials (i.e. money and votes) to influence government and assist community 
groups (Levi, 2001), but these labour organizations often focus their resources on 
defending dues-paying members rather than expanding their base or building coalitions 
with other groups (Kennedy & Tilly, 2013).  And, there is a “long history of distrust 
grounded in the experiences of unions and community-based groups” (Levi, 2001, p. 
246) that keeps the two from working more closely more often. As Agnotti (1999) 
lamented, trade unions have been conservative and somewhat unconcerned with 
community issues throughout their history.  
Unions often champion urban growth (so long as the jobs are offered to them) 
and disregard the environmental and social damage done by the perpetual expansion of 
suburban development, highways and public/private mega-projects: Jobs for their 
members are often the sole focus. With some notable exemptions these groups tend to 
ignore broader social efforts, such as affirmative action for women or persons of colour, 
living wages, training programs, community improvement, as well as negative 
externalities such as displacement, gentrification, and consumerism (ibid.). 
However, the roots of mistrust cannot be pinned solely on the unions themselves. 
Community groups often follow a path of narrow self-interest, subscribing to the belief 
that unionized workers represent ‘the privileged’ and overlooking workers’ rights 
(Kennedy & Tilly, 2013) in their own organizing campaigns.  Whatever the reasons, 
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many authors agree that trust is one of the primary elements of social capital and that 
“distrust undermines coalitions” (Levi, 2001, p. 247) and “breeds distrust”(ibid.), 
contributing to beliefs that a partner organization “…has competing or hostile interests 
or is not competent (enough) to carry out the pledged action” (ibid.) 
As Rampnell (2011) suggests where community groups may be lacking in 
“organizational power and political clout,” the labour movement has precisely that.  
However, in instances where community groups, the unemployed or other coalitions 
could benefit from collaborating with labour groups, “many unions are often reluctant to 
risk damaging relationships with important policy makers who, in turn, are reliant on 
powerful business interests” (Broxmeyer & Michaels, 2013).  This may be because 
unions still perceive the hard-fought successes that their work for their members has 
achieved as somewhat tenuous and fragile: Why risk those gains to make new partners 
and begin the battle anew? “They won’t stand in the way of the bulldozer unless it’s to 
drive it themselves” (Angotti, 1999). 
However, there are examples of labour organizations being “…directly involved in 
the initiation of several associations whose role is to link organizations based in poor 
and minority communities with organizing drives and other efforts to protect the rights of 
workers and their standard of living.” (Levi, 2001, p. 254).  Smaller, internal advocacy 
groups (such as the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists, Coalition of Labour Union 
Women, Labor Council for Latin American Development, etc.) within the gigantic 
American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) is just 
one example of trade unions working to diversify, gain broader acceptance, form new 
partnerships, and gain some trust among current and new constituents across the 
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United States and Canada.  As well, many of the larger social justice organizations 
promote their broad-based membership as inclusive of the labor sector, one of the 
largest being the Partnership for Working Families, a “national network of regional 
advocacy organizations who… share a commitment to building labor and community 
power” (Partnership for Working Families, 2008a). 
The relationship between labour and community is therefore a complex one.  The 
advantages of working together may seem clear (Levi, 2001), however the history of 
distrust, competing interests, the guarding of resources, and of narrowly defining the 
union’s mandate works against it.  As Angotti (1999) suggests, “some unions have 
consistently gone beyond the narrow interests of their membership in wages and 
benefits and taken strong and principled stands on social issues. Others haven’t.”  Yet, 
as Levi (2001) observes, working together can benefit both community groups and 
labour unions, with unions providing organizing experience, finances and real 
experience and the community providing low-wage workers to expand membership, 
contribute to the finances and bridge some of the endemic mistrust that unions have 
suffered, whether deservedly or not.  If Fainstein (2000, p. 12) is correct in her assertion 
that putting “ideas into practice involves leadership and the mobilization of power”, then 
community groups that can directly engage and exploit the experiences and abilities of 
the labour movement would create a formidable coalition for winning back some of that 
power being lost to the neoliberal policies and public-private partnerships that have 
marked the slow yet certain turn toward entrepreneurial governance.  Community 
benefits agreements are one of the places that such community-labour alliances can be 
worked out, tested, and used to the benefit of the large citizen constituencies. 
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Community Benefit Agreements  
 
If public money is used to subsidize private development, then the developer has to 
guarantee community benefits like good jobs, affordable housing, child care, all the things 
that communities need. (Janis-Aparicio as cited by Marcello, 2007, p.659) 
 
The Community Benefit Agreement (CBA) is a particularly interesting tool being 
utilized by neighbourhood coalitions in their endeavours to secure real benefits from 
redevelopment and revitalization projects.  CBAs are a product of the “community 
learning” struggles that have surrounded development policies and practices since the 
1940s (Ho, 2008).  CBAs are different from other development agreements and 
community strategies because in most cases they represent a deliberation2 between a 
citizen/labour coalition and a private enterprise, which creates benefits that would not be 
realized through traditional participatory channels (Baxamusa, 2008).  The following 
chart illustrates the way that the CBA can provide direct discussion between the 
developer and the groups, which now have a circle around them which represents a 
“coordinated coalition.”  
 
                                                 
2
 Baxamusa (2008) distinguishes between ‘deliberation’ as the adjustment of one’s belief through 
education and rational argument, as opposed to the more common ‘negotiation’ used by scholars and 
practitioners to describe the CBA process.  Both words will be used interchangeably throughout this 
paper, however I concur with his statement that ‘deliberation’ is more precise, recognizing that there is 
negotiation within deliberation (Baxamusa, 2008). 
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Figure 1: Development Processes with and without CBA 
Source: Gross, LeRoy, & Janis-Aparicio, 2005 as shown in Baxamusa, 2008 
 
“The first CBA appeared in 1998” in Los Angeles, pertaining to development of 
the Hollywood and Highland Center (Salkin & Lavine, 2008b, p. 301).  That particular 
agreement between the developer and the community is credited in large part to the 
efforts of LA Councillor Jackie Goldberg, who had been lobbying investors for a 
Hollywood mega-project since her election (Meyerson, 2006).  Goldberg capitalized on 
a combination of strategy and timing to entice the developer, draw attention to grant 
opportunities and use her connections to labour and community to forge this innovative 
CBA which negotiated a living wage for workers, a first source hiring program and union 
neutrality (ibid.).  The contract created a sort of template, reproduced at the outset by 
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the “Los Angeles Alliance for the New Economy” (LAANE) and others after (ibid.), who 
have grown the CBA movement not only in California but across the United States and 
Canada.   
In 2001, three years after the Hollywood and Highland CBA, the “pioneering” 
(Marcello, 2007, p. 658), and first “full-fledged”3 (Salkin & Lavine, 2008a) CBA was 
negotiated and signed pertaining to expansion of a commercial/sports complex known 
as the Staples Center, again in Los Angeles (Gross, LeRoy, & Janis-Aparicio, 2005).  
The first phase of this residential, shopping and entertainment mega-project caused 
displacement, pollution and traffic problems and failed to deliver any of the benefits 
promised during the ‘classic’ public process (Marcello, 2007; Wolf-Powers, 2010; Salkin 
& Lavine, 2008a & b).  When expansion plans were announced, the Figueroa Corridor 
Coalition for Economic Justice brought together local community organizations under 
their umbrella, including environmental, faith-based, health, immigrant, and tenant rights 
groups (Salkin & Lavine, 2008a) to negotiate with the developer.  The developer 
required municipal subsidies, multiple rezonings, and public support to get them (Wolf-
Powers, 2010).  Therefore, the developer finally agreed to “an unprecedented package 
of concessions” (Romney, (2001) cited by Marcello, 2007, p.658) which included public 
parks and open space, recreational facilities, targeted employment geared toward area 
residents, and affordable housing (Salkin & Lavine, 2007).  The CBA was also written 
into the development agreement, making it enforceable by the city as well as by the 
contracting community groups (ibid.).  This “tremendous achievement demonstrate(d) 
                                                 
3
 As Salkin & Lavine (2008a) discuss, while this was not the first CBA, it was the first negotiated directly 
between a community coalition and a developer as a stand-alone contract. 
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the power community groups possess when they work cooperatively and support each 
other’s agendas.” (Gross, LeRoy, & Janis-Aparicio, 2005, p. 12).  It is from this point - 
around the turn of the century in Los Angeles - that the CBA movement is traced (Salkin 
& Lavine, 2008a). 
As Wolf-Powers (2010) suggests, academic literature around CBAs to this point 
has been generated primarily by the legal community, the role lawyers play in working 
with community groups (see Marcello, 2007, among others), and the validity and 
viability of creating and enforcing contracts (see Salkin & Lavine, 2008a and b, Beach, 
2008, and others).  However, authors such as Bornstein (2007a and b), Ho (2008), 
Baxamusa (2008), Wolf-Powers (2010), and others are considering CBAs through the 
lenses of sociology, urban studies and planning.   These new considerations have 
pushed the analysis of CBA’s forward, examining the problems associated with the 
assembly and maintenance of CBA coalitions, democratic processes, participation and 
representation, and other topics, (Wolf-Powers, 2010).  However, because of the 
relatively short time that CBAs have been in existence, the literature is still in its infancy 
(ibid.). 
From the practitioners perspective, advocates and “think and do tanks” 
(Bornstein, 2007b, p. 11) such as the Partnership for Working Families, LAANE and 
Good Jobs First are focusing their efforts on creating practical, transferrable materials, 
including instruction manuals, websites, training modules and  guidelines for emerging 
coalitions, political actors, and government bodies.  These materials are emerging in 
acknowledgment of CBAs’ growing reputation and effectiveness – among social actors - 
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for delivering specific and tailored benefits to communities affected by a development 
project or policy (Cummings, 2008). 
The following three sections represent the literature that forms the basis for 
analysis of my case studies.  Representation of the various interests and concerns of 
the local population, collaboration between the various groups and other strategic 
partners and the role of government in the negotiation process are themes that are 
present in most of the CBA literature and greatly influence the individual cases 
described herein. 
Representation 
Whenever a group or groups come forward claiming to speak on behalf of - or 
represent – others, questions regarding the legitimacy of that group – their 
“representativeness” – arise.  As stated throughout this work, the direct and indirect 
consequences of inner-city redevelopment projects  such as residential and retail 
displacement, traffic, pollution, increased housing costs, and rising taxes affect low 
income neighbourhoods and individuals more profoundly than do the new jobs, housing 
units, and tax base increases the redevelopment plans advertise (Wolf-Powers, 2010).  
As Camacho (2005a), and Been (2010) add, it is also these low income and minority 
neighbourhoods – neighbourhoods and citizens that have been systematically denied 
influence in local politics - that are most harmed by the bilateral negotiations between 
developers and entrepreneurial governments.  Because CBAs are intended to secure 
direct benefits for the people most affected by the projects, it is very important to ensure 
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that these benefits reach the affected, but as Freeman (2007, p. 1) argues, “there is no 
mechanism to insure that the ‘community’ in a CBA is representative of the community.” 
According to Been (2010, p. 21) “One of the most common criticisms levelled at 
CBAs is that the agreements may not represent the wishes of the community.”  There 
are those, like Altshuler and Luberoff (2003), who argue that activists themselves, rather 
than disadvantaged community residents, have been the beneficiaries in early iterations 
or versions of the Community Benefit Agreement.  Others continue to question whether 
CBAs have the direct community impact that proponents claim, citing targeted hiring 
agreements, a few living-wage jobs, and affordable housing deals for “locals” as 
problematic where public funds are being used (Wolf-Powers, 2010).  As Freeman 
(2007) articulates, “If the signatories to the CBA were simply viewed as another interest 
group, that might be ok.  But the CBA is being presented as illustrative of the 
development's community input, (and) this is not necessarily the case.” Beach (2008) 
stresses how important it is for a coalition to truly embody the impacted community 
because it is too easy for developers and public officials to discredit a coalition by 
pointing-out underrepresented community groups.  And while Gross (2008) specifies the 
importance of maintaining flexibility regarding the parties at the negotiating table, not 
restricting the number of “communities” participating in the CBA campaign, and not 
officially designating one of the groups as ‘more’ representative than another, there are 
concerns that this lack of accountability can entice a developer to focus on satisfying the 
individual needs of one particular group while ignoring the large slate of demands 




Generally, while analysis of the lack of representation in the overall planning 
process is familiar in the literature (Bornstein, 2007b; Bezdek, 2006), there is very little 
understanding of what representation means in the context of a community benefit 
agreement coalition, how to define it, or how to ensure/create it.  Authors such as Wolf-
Powers (2010), Beach (2008), Been (2010), Freeman (2007), Gross (2008) caution, 
question and critique the representative nature of CBA coalitions in their individual 
works but there is a gap in the literature regarding the challenges CBA coalitions have 
had in actualizing, proving or justifying their representativeness.  
Many of the most successful CBAs have been negotiated and signed by 
coalitions that represent dozens of groups (Bechtel D. , 2008).  Groups such as “A 
Community Coalition for Responsible Development” (ACCORD) featured a coalition of 
twenty-seven housing, labor, community, environmental, and religious groups that came 
together in an early San Diego CBA. (Salkin P. E., 2007)  The Figueroa Corridor 
Coalition for Economic Justice rallied over thirty community groups plus two larger 
broad-based groups; the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE) and the 
Strategic Alliance for a Just Economy (ibid.).  The “One Hill Community Benefits 
Coalition” in Pittsburgh boasted over one hundred local and national organizations 
(Greene, 2007) including representation from the Hill District Consensus Group, 
Pittsburgh UNITED, Find the Rivers Coalition, Central Outreach Center, Coalition of 
Black Trade Unionists, One Vision One Life, and the NAACP. (LaSalle, 2011) 
Conversely, CBAs that have been negotiated by relatively small groups or 
coalitions have been subject to scrutiny, such as the 2005 Atlantic Yards CBA in 
Brooklyn which was negotiated by only eight community groups (Bechtel D. , 2008).  
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This CBA has been called "inherently undemocratic", (ibid.) with local residents 
questioning the participation of citywide or statewide groups as the primary signatories, 
some of whom were receiving funds from the developer (Rosar & Stodolka, 2008). 
Unfortunately, identifying and creating large representative groups with a variety 
of interests is not as easy as it may sound.  Often these upstart community groups that 
have coalesced around a polarizing issue or social purpose are unprepared for the level 
of organizing and coordinating CBA campaigns require (Salkin P. E., 2007).   As well, 
“determining and prioritizing the goals shared among diverse community groups may 
lead to conflicts among constituents supporting different goals” (ibid.). According to 
Gross, LeRoy, & Janis-Aparicio (2005) creating a strong and committed coalition of 
diverse actors with assorted interests is “critical because developers will often use a 
‘divide and conquer’ strategy when dealing with community groups, making just enough 
accommodation to gain the support of one group, while ignoring the concerns of others.” 
(p. 22) 
 Though Gross (2008) agrees that it is difficult to prove representativeness 
regarding legitimacy questions within a coalition, he believes that these concerns are 
not completely warranted because, “only a broadly inclusive coalition, composed of 
organizations whose views carry some weight with the governmental decision makers, 
is likely to have any success persuading a developer to negotiate with it.  A CBA 
coalition has every incentive to bring in as many community interests as possible in 
order to build leverage” (ibid., p. 38). 
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Therefore, although the bulk of the literature stresses the necessity for 
representativeness within the group advocating for a CBA, little attempt to delve deeper 
into how the coalition built up and how they became “representative” has been 
undertaken.  How did the coalition form, add members, address questions of its 
representativeness, and function are all questions that my work will highlight and begin 
to address.   
 
Collaboration 
It is important here to note that academic and practical literature regarding 
community benefits agreements commonly refers to community coalitions, which 
Berkowitz and Wolff (2000, p.2, quoted by Baxamusa, 2008, p.262) define as a “group 
involving multiple sectors of the community, coming together to address community 
needs and solve community problems.”   Using that definition as an example, analysis 
of a community coalition could reveal it to be representative, or collaborative, both, or 
neither:  Coalition, when used in the literature, does not easily lend itself to 
differentiation between representation and/or collaboration – this is important because 
the literature frequently states that “coalition building” is integral to and a requirement of 
the CBA process (Gross, LeRoy, & Janis-Aparicio, 2005; Bechtel D. , 2008; Wolf-
Powers, 2010; Gross, 2008).  Laura Wolf-Powers (2010) specifies, CBAs generally 
begin and end with neighborhood-based groups – centred in proximity to a proposed 
development - collaborating with organized labor, affordable housing, environmental 
quality, public access, and/or other representative, larger scale organizations.   
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Notwithstanding the necessity of building a broad-based coalition, there is little 
practical information on how to go about constructing a representative and/or 
collaborative coalition.  Perhaps this is because it depends.  It depends on where in the 
class strata the group finds itself, what its broad purpose is, what ties it has to decision 
makers and local governance (Stone, 2005), and it depends on what permissions the 
developer needs in order to undertake the redevelopment project – at what level are the 
decision makers operating on?  A well-composed, broad-based coalition allows for, and 
invites, individual grassroots organizations – that otherwise may not have the efficacy to 
garner the power and establish the relationships needed to affect change - to create a 
comprehensive assemblage of issues and concerns, acting as a sort of “balance of 
power” to the “growth machine” coalition (Baxamusa, 2008; Klein & Tremblay, 2010) 
(real estate, development, entrepreneurial government, etc.) that exists in every 
jurisdiction. 
One approach that can be used as a framework for analyzing the role of different 
actors who participate in CBA negotiations is urban regime theory, a theory popularized 
by Clarence Stone (Stone, 2005; see also discussion in Klein and Tremblay, 2010).  
Stone’s (2005) article about urban regime theory advances that politics is basically the 
arrangement and control of strategic relationships in a group setting, that differentiations 
in class and social strata provide the context for group action, and that groups at the 
bottom of the social strata must “enlist allies” (ibid., p.313) who have relationships with, 
or are, those in a different (higher) social strata.  It is the idea of creating that 
partnership - or collaborating - within a fragmented and pluralistic society where 
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established relationships are preferred, that is one of the key components of the CBA 
process for Stone (ibid.). 
Typically urban regime theory is applied to analysis of the ‘growth machine’ 
coalition (Baxamusa, 2008; Klein & Tremblay, 2010), but it is useful in analyzing the 
formation of coalitions, since it postulates that the “orientation of development” depends 
on the coalitions that are constructed and the social strata each of the collaborators 
occupies (Klein & Tremblay, 2010).  How did the strategic partnerships evolve, at what 
level were the partners operating and how did these community conglomerates 
influence the development outcome? 
Klein and Tremblay, (ibid., p. 569) state that, “if social actors are not at the table 
with corporate and elitist interests, they will be excluded from meaningful decision-
making.”  Therefore, in order for well-meaning but disconnected community groups to 
impact the decision-making process they must establish and maintain strategic 
partnerships, collaborate with a variety of players, know when to mobilize certain 
elements at certain times, and identify new collaborators or partners when necessary. 
(Stone, 2005)  However, other approaches have been utilized by Klein and Tremblay 
(2010) as a complement to urban regime theory in their analysis of collaboration in the 
Montreal context, namely the “collective action and resource mobilization” approach and 
the “neo-institutional” approach.   
At its most uncomplicated, the ‘‘collective action and resource mobilization’’ 
approach focuses “on the capacity of actors to innovate by drawing on existing 
strategies or inventing new ones” (ibid., p. 569). How did the collaborators respond to 
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internal and external challenges, how did they utilize existing resources, strategically 
partner, and employ the previous practical experiences and materials that had 
contributed to previous CBAs?  Evidence of the activities that highlight this approach to 
analysis are quite evident in the cases chosen.  Each of the coalitions responded to 
external and internal challenges in interesting and novel ways, and many relied on 
previous CBA work to inform their strategic development, organizing efforts and in some 
cases their overall framework throughout the process.   
The ‘‘neo-institutional approach’’ provides a basis for analyzing the capacity of 
collective actions to influence the institutional framework (Hollingsworth, 2000).  This 
approach is concerned above all with the resolution of conflicts between actors, and the 
types of cooperation and coordination shaped by compromises and prevailing 
institutional arrangements (Klein & Tremblay, 2010).  Bechtel (2008) provides some 
direction regarding these institutional arrangements, suggesting that coalitions 
incorporate as a not-for-profit, establish rules and by-laws to govern the coalition, define 
membership and quorum, and ‘sign-on’ to overarching vision or purpose statements, to 
ensure the group continues to move in the same general direction even when conflict or 
diverging interests arise:  practical advice in line with the “neo-institutional approach”. 
As Gross (2008) recommends, in order to ensure a “broad coalition” is part of 
any CBA process, it is necessary for participants, organizers and actors to examine the 
process that resulted in CBAs of the past, which is in keeping with the “collective action 
and resource mobilization approach” utilized by Klein and Tremblay (2010).  Gross calls 
the review of previous (and current) coalitions a “fact-intensive inquiry into dynamics 
that may be open to various interpretations… (but one) that is necessary in order to 
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protect perhaps the most important value of a CBA: its inclusiveness and democratic 
nature.” (Gross, 2008)  This is also reminiscent of the work that Klein and Tremblay 
(2010) outlined, combining the three analytical approaches in their analysis of coalitions 
in Montreal.  
It is worth re-visiting here that one of the obvious potential collaborators in CBA 
coalitions are trade unions – a group that, as discussed, often has the resources, 
organizing and negotiating experience, and political clout to influence development 
agreements and public-private negotiations.  However, as Angotti (1999), Levi (2001), 
and Kennedy & Tilly (2013) stress, there is a long history of mistrust and an inability for 
trade unions and community to work together for a variety of reasons.  Notwithstanding 
these difficulties some, such as Simmons & Luce (2009), have touted the ability of 
community benefits coalitions to form and solidify labour-community coalitions and to 
overcome some of the problems that have previously plagued community-labour 
partnerships. 
As has been highlighted, strategic partnerships and coalition building are 
important, nay essential, for CBA groups hoping to gain some leverage in any benefits 
struggle.  However, thus far the literature has not looked specifically at “how” coalition 
building has been undertaken on a case-by-case basis.  Instead, generalized advice 
has been suggested (Bechtel D. , 2008) and theories for analysis have been forwarded 
(Baxamusa, 2008; Klein & Tremblay, 2010; Hollingsworth, 2000; Stone, 2005) however 
these theories have not been applied to a range of cases and still do not answer the 
basic questions such as how are coalitions formed and sustained over time, how are 
negotiations undertaken, and how do negotiators remain accountable to the various 
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collaborators and interests?  I intend to address some of these questions in the analysis 
of my cases.  
The Role of Government 
One of the more interesting debates in the CBA literature concerns the 
involvement of public officials in the negotiating process.  The most common definition 
of what qualifies as a CBA is one that restricts the label to those deliberations that take 
place directly between a community coalition and a private developer (Gross, LeRoy, & 
Janis-Aparicio, 2005) as Figure 1 illustrates.  In this example, and typical of the 
literature, the “CBA is a legally enforceable contract signed by community groups and a 
developer, setting forth a range of benefits the developer agrees to provide as part of a 
development project” (ibid.).  Public officials in this definition are wholly absent.  This 
definition, or some version of it, is cited by most articles, manuals or accounts of the 
topic.  
As Cummings (2008) suggests there are “significant disagreements about what 
counts as a CBA” (p. 5), with some practitioners and academics choosing to keep the 
definition flexible to tolerate a broad range of practices and processes to be grouped 
under the CBA label4.  Wolf-Powers (2010) demonstrates that development authorities 
and public agents are often involved in the negotiation and final approval of an 
agreement.  Local officials, she points out, frequently aid advocacy groups and 
developers in implementing CBAs and supporting them through municipal programs.  In 
                                                 
4 See Bornstein (2007a), Ho (2008), Baxamusa (2008), Wolf-Powers (2010), Epps-Addison (2012), 
Shappiro-Shellaby (2012) and the Institute for Wisconsin’s Future among others for discussions of more 
broadly applied definitions. 
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some instances what is referred to as a “CBA” is in fact the result of community groups 
convincing local officials to enact general policies that affect all future projects in that 
neighbourhood, city, or county.  As some authors (Been, 2010; Salkin P. E., 2007; Wolf-
Powers, 2010) have noted it is not unusual for an elected official or local administrator 
to initiate, organize, or motivate the community coalition, the deliberation process, or the 
CBA itself.  Some practical and academic CBA literature discusses the potential and 
proper roles of local government in the forging of new agreements. 
For example, Been (2010), articulates “three broad options” for local government 
regarding community benefits agreements, formulated through consideration of the 
legal and land use planning aspects of the agreements and their potential to create “net 
benefits” for the parties involved.  Option one is to move through the approval and 
permitting processes regardless of any community-developer pact.  The second is to 
only consider a CBA if certain criteria (as set out by Been) have been met by the 
coalition, including accountability, representativeness and demands that are specifically 
“land use” related.  The third to integrate an agreement or CBA process within the 
regulatory framework for land use planning procedures where government subsidies are 
concerned.  Been’s “broad options” fairly closely resemble the roles that Gross et. al. 
(2005) outline in their often-cited 2005 guideline document, “Community Benefits 
Agreements: Making Development Projects Accountable” which, as discussed, defines 
a CBA as an agreement between a developer and a community group.   
When the involvement of public officials is recognized in the literature, analysis is 
typically critical of government’s ability to equitably allocate resources (Bezdek, 2006) or 
decries the token and murky public-private partnership (Gross, LeRoy, & Janis-Aparicio, 
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2005).  Beach (2008) argues that their exercise of police powers leads to displacement 
and Bornstein (2007a) warns of “co-optation” potentials.  Still others criticize local 
authorities for, “controlling debate and making the development process more 
predictable for developers” (Smith, 2007, p. i).  It is far from clear, in other words, that 
local government has the desire or capacity to act in the interest of community actors. 
Authors, such as Wolf-Powers (2010, p. 15) have suggested that “local 
government is a key partner” in the creation, implementation, and enforcement of CBAs 
but that this “key partner” isn’t always accommodating or constructive.   Wolf-Powers 
(2010) goes on to highlight instances of public officials and processes, “acting as 
gatekeepers”, or outright blocking communities’ attempts to organize or influence the 
development process through CBA campaigns.  As well, the role and level of 
involvement of the government varies from case to case and over the life of a 
campaign.  
However, where Gross et. al. (2005) are focused on maintaining coalition 
autonomy, excluding local government, and (re)capturing development benefits as a 
way to counteract the exclusionary public-private partnership, Been (2010) is more 
concerned about the burden the CBA could potentially place on the government, and 
the legal implications of becoming enmeshed in the creation and enforcement of these 
private agreements.  Been (2010) summarizes that it is in local government’s best 
interest to not integrate CBAs into the development approval process, but to ensure it 
remains a separate procedure to “limit the dangers CBAs pose.” (ibid., p.35)  These 
dangers are in some ways the corollary of the warnings offered by other authors as to 
the risks of including the public sector in CBA negotiations.  This is not to characterize 
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Been’s 2010 work as suggesting public participation in the development process is 
satisfactory for all citizens, or that development projects are delivering promised 
benefits without CBAs, but simply to offer a counterpoint to the common discourse on 
the topic.   
In the end Been (2010) is as cautionary as other authors regarding the role of 
government in the CBA process, but her concerns around the collaborative nature and 
representativeness of the groups presenting themselves to the government as 
community coalitions, come from a completely different angle than other subject-matter 
experts.  So, is there a role for government in the CBA process, and if so how will it be 
defined?  Thusfar, the literature has demonstrated a varied and inconsistent role in the 
CBA process.  How has government used their power to expedite, assist, and aid the 
CBA process or, conversely, block, negate and discredit citizen coalitions and their 





Chapter 4: Research Objectives & Methodology 
Research Objectives 
This study seeks to analyze the nature and forms of public intervention with 
respect to mega- developments and public-private partnerships by examining select 
Community Benefit Agreements and how they are being employed to secure benefits 
from developments or the policies that implement them.  The overarching themes that 
my work will focuses on are representation within the coalition, partnering and 
collaboration with national groups, and the role of government as discussed in the 
literature review.  As suggested, the “recent” phenomenon of CBAs has not received 
much attention outside of legal journals, which often focus on the enforceability of the 
agreements themselves (Wolf-Powers, 2010).  More recently scholars have looked at 
aspects of the CBAs, and applied some specific and generalized theories to their 
analysis but few if any have looked closely at representation, collaboration and the role 
of government in a comparative, qualitative way. 
Methodology  
In order to build a critical analysis of contemporary urban entrepreneurialsism, 
one must concentrate on the “surface vigour of ... the projects for regeneration and the 
underlying trends in the urban condition” (Harvey, 1989, p. 16).  This work focuses on 
one of these underlying trends - the use of community benefit agreements.  The cases 
selected and the interviews conducted provide the background for cross-referencing the 
‘best-practices’ articulated in the academic and practical CBA literature.  Analysis will be 
undertaken to identify gaps in the emerging body of literature, and to highlight strategic 
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divergences that assisted or hindered the coalition(s) during their formation and 
operation.   
To undertake this investigation, I employ the multi-case method, which builds on 
single-case methodology such as that articulated by Yin (Stake, 2006).  The single-case 
method is defined as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin, 
2003, p. 23).  The multi-case method, as Stake suggests, is a research design for 
examining several cases linked together, or events at sites that have no programmatic 
relationship (Stake, 2006).  This is done to better understand what Stake refers to as 
the “quintain” – the “whole” - of which each individual case is a part (Stake, 2006).  
Multi-case analysis seeks an accurate yet “necessarily incomplete” understanding of the 
phenomenon though articulation and cross-comparison of the parts and their relation to 
the quintain (ibid.).  This is an effective method for researching Community Benefits 
Agreements (aka the quintain) because each CBA case differs immensely from one to 
another, yet each has universal traits as well.  The most common being that they are all, 
in some way, a redistribution agreement arrived at through community participation. 
In multi-case analysis, studying the phenomena for their common characteristics, 
but also their “situational uniqueness” is important, “especially complexity and 
interaction with background conditions” (Stake, 2006, pp. ix-x).  The CBA cases are the 
multiple phenomena and their characteristics and complexities are highlighted through 
my interviews, press releases and other materials generated during and after the 
campaign.  Multi-case studies make use of a range of data sources, which yield 
information that is then triangulated to converge on the final results. 
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The main methodological tool for acquiring my data was the semi-structured 
interview.  In a semi-structured interview, the researcher draws upon an interview guide 
which contains questions they have prepared, the nature of which are predominantly 
open-ended (Bryman & Teevan, 2005).  Semi-structured interviews are a suitable 
method for a descriptive and exploratory study such as this, as the interviewee is given 
freedom regarding their response(s).  This flexibility in turn allows subjects to describe 
events and processes that they consider important, rather than being limited to 
preconceived choices established by the researcher/interviewer.  The intention here is 
that subjects’ experiences generate new hypotheses about community benefits 
agreements. 
In addition to flexibility, there are numerous advantages to using semi-structured 
interviews.  Interviews in general are useful for understanding the rationale guiding 
people’s choices while taking into account context-specific information (Schoenberger, 
1991).  Additionally, interviews can reveal relationships, affiliations and connections - 
vital for understanding of social networks – that may not have been obvious or 
described if using another research method.  The open-ended/semi-structured nature of 
the interview questions helps reduce the risk of “leading the witness” which can be a 
flaw when interviewing subjects. 
Overall I undertook twelve telephone interviews and received one written 
response to my open-ended interview guide.  I narrowed down my search from thirty-
one potential CBA candidates to the ten that I have included in my work.  The cases 
were chosen based on their varying approaches to the community benefit agreement 
struggle.   Each case demonstrates a different way of getting to the end result, and 
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although they are all part of the same “quintain”, their differences are as interesting and 
important as their common elements.  Each of the community benefit campaigns 
discussed was carried out in the United States within the last fifteen years.  Each of the 
interviewees played a key role in the individual campaign or coalition and thus has 
provided primary data for the analysis.  Where necessary I have cross-referenced the 
CBA process/agreement with other sources such as newspaper articles, websites, 
reports, materials created during the campaign, as well as the agreements themselves, 
where available. 
Cases, City, Interviewee and Research Materials Used 
CBA Identity/Group City Interviewee(s) Research Materials Used 
Hill District CBA Pittsburgh, PA Carl Redwood 
- Semi-structured interview 
- News Articles 
- Coalition Website 
- Materials and presentations 
generated by association 




- Semi-structured interview 
- News Article and Report 
- Association Website(s) 
OaklandWORKS Oakland, CA 
Margaret Gordon 
Kitty Kelly Epstein 
Robyn Hodges 
Carroll Fife 
- Semi-structured interviews 
- News Articles and Report 






- Semi-structured interview 
- News Articles and Report 
- Association Website 
- CBA Agreement 





- Semi-structured interview 
- Newspaper Articles 
- Association Website 
- CBA Agreement 





- Semi-structured interviews 
- Newspaper articles 









- Semi-structured interview 
- News articles 
- Association & affiliate websites 
Faith Coalition for the 
Common Good 
Springfield, IL Shelly Heideman 
- Semi-structured interview 
- News articles 







- Semi-structured interview 
- News articles and report 
- CBA Agreement 
- Other materials and 
presentations generated by 
association 
Peninsula Compost / 
South Wilmington 
Coalition for a 
Sustainable Community 
Wilmington, DE Marvin Thomas 
- Semi-structured interview 
- Newspaper Articles 
- Association Website 
- CBA Agreement 
- Other materials and 
presentations generated by 
association 




Chapter 5: Case Studies 
This chapter turns to the case studies investigated.  The aim of the chapter is to 
introduce the various cases in terms of the agreements sought, key actors involved, the 
various goals, the negotiation and mobilization processes pursued, and the outcomes 
produced.  Analysis of representation, collaboration, and the role of government are 
discussed in the subsequent chapter.  
Pittsburgh, PA: Hill District CBA 
The Hill District in Pittsburgh, PA is a neighbourhood long familiar with 
redevelopment plans and the negative effects that go along with them.  In the late 
1950’s the neighbourhood experienced an urban renewal scheme that saw the 
displacement - through eminent domain - of over eight thousand residents to clear land 
for the Pittsburgh Penguins hockey arena and associated parking (The Carnegie Library 
of Pittsburgh, 2012).  The citizens of Hill District were determined to not let that happen 
again, so soon after redevelopment plans were unveiled regarding a new larger hockey 
arena, the One Hill Community Benefits Coalition was formed.  This group was born out 
of the existing Hill District Consensus Group which had been studying Community 
Benefit Agreements from California, knowing that, “the struggle would come to the Hill 
at some point” (Redwood, 2012).  In March of 2012, I interviewed Carl Redwood, 
chairperson of the Hill District Consensus Group and executive committee member of 
the One Hill Community Benefits Coalition. 
The One Hill Community Benefits Coalition was comprised of over one hundred 
local and some national partners, and began to gather momentum after their first 
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coalition meeting in early 2007 (Greene, 2007).  Groups involved in the coalition 
included the Hill District Consensus Group, Pittsburgh UNITED, Find the Rivers 
Coalition, Uptown Community Partners, Central Outreach Center, Coalition of Black 
Trade Unionists, Hill/Oakland Job Links, Uptown Residents Blockworth, Mon Valley 
Unemployed Committee, One Vision One Life and the NAACP (LaSalle, 2011), among 
others.  It is worth noting that Pittsburgh UNITED was aligned with the national groups 
ACORN, Sierra Club, and the Partnership for Working Families and was therefore 
backed by organized labour (Redwood, 2012). 
Throughout the process there were tensions regarding various members – who 
was to be involved, what their involvement would be, etc. - but since the successful 
implementation of the CBA, many groups have expanded their reach and formalized 
new partnerships including some union groups that did not want to work together 
previously (ibid.).   
Through several meetings and visioning sessions in the summer of 2007, the 
One Hill Coalition put together a list of community “planks.”  These planks, organized as 
part of the document “Blueprint for a Livable Hill,” included important community 
concerns such as a community-driven master plan to build a livable community, a 
community improvement fund, family sustainable jobs (i.e. living wages), first source 
career opportunities that would promote hiring and training and provide support for local 
residents, establishment of a grocery store as the local economic anchor, a 
community/multi-purpose center, historic preservation, green space, and policy 
commitments to ensure CBA enforcement (Greene, 2007). 
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Over one year was spent negotiating between the One Hill Coalition, 
representatives from the Pittsburgh Penguins, and public authorities such as the Sports 
and Exhibition Authority, The Pittsburgh Urban Redevelopment Authority and City of 
Pittsburgh and Alleghany County representatives; with some reportedly contentious 
moments described by Mr. Redwood.  With the history of “splits” in the neighbourhood, 
there were splinter groups that tried to challenge the authority of the large coalition and 
usurp power – even attending meetings as “community leaders”. This “backroom deal 
coalition,” as Mr. Redwood describes it, was in the room at the first meeting and 
derailed the talks for months, causing the City and the Developer to suggest the 
negotiations were invalid due to community squabbling and concerns about which group 
really represented the community (Redwood, 2012). 
The One Hill CBA was signed in August of 2008 and was Pittsburgh’s first 
recognized Community Benefits Agreement.  The agreement secured many tangible 
benefits for the community including; 
• $2 million donation for the creation of a 
large grocery store, which has been 
lacking in the Hill District area for years  
• Card check agreement, which prohibits 
developer interference with how the 
workers choose union representation.  
 
• Creation of a multi-purpose center for 
youth, families, and seniors with 
reduced/no fee membership for low-
income residents 
 
• First source hiring for construction jobs 
and all those employed by businesses 
contracted or leased with the Penguin’s 
Arena  
 
• Outreach for minority contractors.  
 
• Construction of first source employment 
center  
 
• Creation of the “Neighborhood 
Partnership Program,” which provides up 
to $6 million to support economic 
development, drug treatment and mental 
health services, and youth program.  
 
• Requirement that all jobs connected to 
the development will abide by the wage 
standards for each designated industry 
(ranging from $12 - $30 per hour) and 
include health benefits.  
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 Figure 3 (previous page): List of OneHill CBA benefits 
Source: (LaSalle, 2011) 
 
Along with these successes, the community ensured they would be part of the 
planning and implementation of future development in the Hill District through an 
agreement to freeze development for two years while a Master Plan was developed for 
the district.  With four of the nine members of the planning steering committee coming 
from the district, and near consensus required for all decisions of the committee (One 
Hill Neighborhood Coalition, 2008), this was a positive step for a community that had 
been traditionally shut out of participatory processes. 
According to Mr. Redwood, the ‘backroom deal coalition’ lost its legitimacy during 
the process because they did not do any community organizing and were rarely present 
at community meetings.  Therefore, the One Hill Coalition was able to demonstrate that 
they truly represented the community, notwithstanding the efforts of this other group 
(Redwood, 2012).   
Even with the involvement of Pittsburgh UNITED (backed by national labour 
interests), the developer was able to get local construction unions to speak out against 
the coalition.  In an attempt to undermine the authority of the group, unions stated that 
the CBA process takes away from their traditional benefits (Redwood, 2012).  Because 
labour unions regularly sign their own construction labour agreements on a project by 
project basis (considered by some to be a parallel process to the CBA), they are not 
typically concerned with the more broad based community goals such as the 




Washington, D.C., Shaw District Community Benefits Agreement 
The Shaw District of Washington D.C. is an historic neighborhood in central 
Washington and for almost a century has been home to a predominantly African 
American community (Juskus & Elia, 2007).  Urban renewal debacles and civil rights 
riots in the 1960s left the neighbourhood in a poor state both physically and 
psychologically, but  a 2005 city initiative created the Duke Plan (named after Duke 
Ellington) to attract new businesses to the “economically depressed district” and spur 
revival (Lavine, 2008c).  Enveloped by revitalized (read gentrified) neighbourhoods, a 
local community group – ONEDC (Organizing Neighborhood Equity in the District of 
Columbia – [‘OneDC’ hereafter]) - began to articulate how revitalization of Shaw could 
be equitable and accountable:  Guarding against the negative impacts of gentrification 
and displacement while encouraging thoughtful redevelopment that benefits the local 
residents (Moulden, 2012; Lavine, 2008c).  After undertaking an independent land 
assessment of their neighbourhood and outlining some principles for future 
development in the District, OneDC brought their value statement to the metropolitan-
wide National Capital Revitalization Corporation.  This semi-private redevelopment 
corporation was created to facilitate deals between developers and blighted lands, 
including some of those in the Shaw district (Juskus & Elia, 2007).  The public 
development corporation did not accept the OneDC statement, and it was discovered 
soon after that a partnership to develop a valuable tract within Shaw was being 
negotiated.  Quickly, OneDC reworked their principles basing them specifically on the 
redevelopment project and threatened community protests at the permit and zoning 
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hearings (ibid.).  Following years of work on the principles and a couple of years 
negotiating this specific project, OneDC signed D.C.’s first CBA with the City’s 
development corporation and a private developer (Lavine, 2008c).  On February 23, 
2012 I interviewed Dominic Moulden, the Executive Director of OneDC, which grew out 
of ‘MANA CDC’, a Washington based grassroots coalition. 
MANA - a local community advisory group - predated OneDC and focused on 
securing rights for low income people of colour around housing, land and income.  
OneDC emerged as a ‘new entity’5 from MANA to make use of CBA processes in 
combating displacement.  Group strategies centred on resident led organizing and local 
economic development to foster community control over the processes of gentrification 
and displacement (Moulden, 2012).  In the end the coalition did not feature many 
partnerships with other local or national non-profits, organizations or external 
supporters, but focused primarily on long-time residents to create their neighbourhood 
alliance (LaSalle, 2011).  National advisory groups including ‘PolicyLink’ and ‘Good 
Jobs First’ were contacted during the assessment phase, before the development plans 
for the district were announced (Juskus & Elia, 2007).  While a leadership group worked 
to arrange meetings and keep things moving forward, the agenda, the actions and the 
decisions were all made by consensus through the community at large at bi-weekly 
meetings.  Everyone was a volunteer – there were no paid positions – and the group 
was continually canvassing the neighbourhood trying to bring more people in.  
According to Mr. Moulden one of the strengths of the group was its diversity (Moulden, 
                                                 
5
 A new entity officially, though members of the group had been locally active since the early 80’s and 
working on CBA materials since 2003 (Moulden, 2012).  This was, in essence, a name change. 
 64 
 
2012).  “Diversity ... was both a strength and a weakness”, because everyone was 
welcome at the meetings but this sometimes made the process slow or difficult because 
of the array of interests.  “In the end the big issue ends up being a class issue” (ibid.).  
Local churches, a family-support collaborative, and the ‘United Planning Organization’6 
were involved during the community building process (Juskus & Elia, 2007).  
There were a few moments of conflict, such as when the advisory neighborhood 
commissioner (see footnote 3, next page) dropped out of the OneDC committee 
because he felt that the newer (largely white) residents were not being represented, as 
OneDC was admittedly focused on the long-time residents.  However, according to Mr. 
Moulden there are many within OneDC who are white – even some meetings that 
featured all white residents – so the group stood by their mandate and pushed forward 
without this “little mayor’s” (Moulden, 2012) support.  Others tried to question the 
legitimacy of the group as being representative, but this did not stand up to scrutiny 
because those who actually lived in the community were familiar with the group and the 
faces of the organizers – some had been working locally since the early 80’s – so the 
question of representation was not difficult to overcome with the people who mattered 
(ibid.). 
Another point of contention was realized over time.  When the coalition began 
they had the support of over 17 groups and foundations across Washington, but in the 
end there were only four.  This erosion was due, according to Mr. Moulden (2012), to 
                                                 
6




statements that OneDC were not working in the interests for the advancement of the 
greater city.  Questions also arose regarding the group’s tactics of a City Hall ‘sit-in’ and 
a demonstration at the Mayor’s house, among their activities that did not sit well with the 
partner organizations; they did not want to see “poor people exercising their power” 
(ibid.). 
The group was structured around the main points described in the CBA; 
affordable housing, creating jobs for local people, small business improvement and a 
community fund. The community fund was introduced because the developers were 
receiving “so much money from the government, we wanted to ensure that a portion of 
the money went to address community issues in the neighborhood (ibid.).  
 The negotiations featured representatives of the developer, the 
government (who owned the land and were providing subsidies), the elected ‘advisory 
neighbourhood commissioner’7 and OneDC – based on their long-standing presence in 
the community.  The group at the table on behalf of OneDC was big; chosen by the 
entire coalition primarily based on tenure and knowledge with each member 
representing hundreds of community members in their respective groups (Moulden, 
2012).  All decisions were brought back to the larger group where one member gets one 
                                                 
7
 The Advisory Neighborhood Commissions (ANCs) are a form of ‘neighborhood democracy’ in place to 
consider a wide range of policies and programs affecting their neighborhoods, including traffic, parking, 
recreation, street improvements, zoning, economic development, police protection, sanitation, etc. 
(District of Columbia, The).  They are represented by locally elected neighbourhood leaders - “little 
mayors” (Moulden, 2012) - who sit on an advisory board made up of all the neighborhood leaders 
citywide. The ANCs are the body of government with the closest official ties to the people in a 
neighborhood (District of Columbia, The). 
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vote, however the “leadership group” did make decisions based on direction from the 
group at large and community strategy created previously.  
 At the beginning of the negotiation process - between the articulation of 
principles, the shift to the actual development and the signing of the eventual CBA – 
local officials were supportive of the work of the coalition.  However, by the end the 
newly elected Mayor (not in power during talks) did not want to honour the negotiated 
agreement, and the same Deputy Mayor who had worked on the negotiations publically 
lied about agreeing to some of the terms in the CBA (Moulden, 2012).  The government, 
developer and other community leaders imagined OneDC were going to give up, or give 
in, because the neighborhood had changed so much: new middle-class residents, 
displaced people and the time involved in volunteering and negotiating.  However the 
actions by the elected officials strengthened the resolve of OneDC to work even harder; 
stepping up their organizing and exercising their power to change the local government 
policies (ibid.). 
In 2005, as stated, Washington D.C.’s first Community Benefits Agreement was 
signed between OneDC, the developer and the City.  The agreement features many of 
the equitable-development principles that district residents had originally proposed 
including affordable housing, employment opportunities and job training, local business 
space and the community development fund (Juskus & Elia, 2007). 
However, as OneDC’s Executive Director, Dominic Moulden has some criticisms 
of the CBA.  He does not believe that this particular document is perfect and it could be 
improved upon; for one, the document does not have enough enforcement clauses 
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and/or ways to seek compensatory damages.  It needs more restitution regarding the 
social impacts of development, for oversight, enforcement and penalties for violation.  
As well, Mr. Moulden laments the fact that the volunteers and organizers of OneDC 
haven’t been paid for any of the work that they’ve done. While it makes the process 
more difficult – finding volunteers, working long hours, etc. he does recognize that it 
“keeps our hands clean, because no money is going to the committee members or 
organizers.” (Moulden, 2012).   Finally, it is not likely that OneDC will be signing on to 
subsequent CBA’s “because it’s just too much work” (ibid.).  “You need a full time legal 
team to counteract all the loopholes that the government and developers can find to get 
out of the agreement, or to manipulate the language in the agreement and the 
enforceable clauses” (ibid.). However, according to a 2008 Washington Times article, 
groups like OneDC, who help residents to keep their homes in the face of 
redevelopment pressures, are helping the neighbourhood realize its potential while 
allowing local residents to benefit from the change (The Washington Times, 2008). 
Trying to provide opportunities for residents to stay in the neighbourhood proved 
challenging because of differences in income calculations being used by the 
development corporation and OneDC.  The government always used “area median 
income” to set the affordability number, but that median is $106 thousand dollars - way 
too high for most of our long-term low income residents, whose median income is closer 
to $35 thousand/year.  The City’s idea of affordable, based on their inflated median 
income, was set around $1 100/month to rent 500ft2 units – again, this was way too 
expensive for most of the people in the neighbourhood, but the inflated numbers arrived 
when the calculation included the surrounding, gentrified neighbourhoods.  The OneDC 
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number was based on the low income community need, not the average of all area 
residents (Moulden, 2012). 
OneDC was informed during the negotiations that the developer would be 
receiving approx. $12 million dollars in funding from state and federal agencies through 
tax increment financing and a rental housing subsidy.  In the end, the developers 
actually accessed upwards of $25 million, and OneDC were not made aware of this 
during the negotiations; according to Mr. Moulden, the committee would have raised 
their benefit demands if they had have known this (ibid.). 
Finally, when asked if the Shaw District Community Benefits Agreement had 
reduced displacement, Mr. Moulden answered and emphatic, “No”.  
“The CBA has not slowed or stopped displacement.  However if an enforceable 
document, with the proper clauses and compensation penalties, with proper language 
around the affordability calculation was drafted, this could definitely stop displacement.  
It’s the poorest of the poor that are being displaced.  If we do another CBA, it will have 
to be a city wide policy document that makes statements about all public land, all public 
spaces and development throughout the city where these investors are receiving huge 
amounts of public money.” (Moulden, 2012). 
 
Oakland, CA: Army Base Redevelopment/OaklandWORKS 
The enormous Oakland Army Base closed in 1994 and the land was turned over 
to the city of Oakland and the Oakland Port Authority in 2006 by the U.S. Federal Base 
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Reuse Authority.  The redevelopment plans include an expansion of the existing port - 
already one of the world’s largest – a rail terminal, warehouses and potentially an office 
park. (Kerr, 2010) The reuse of the Army Base had been discussed with developers and 
a labour-cum-community group called ReviveOakland (ibid.) when then Mayor Ron 
Dellums heard about the meetings.  Mayor Dellums sent a staff member over to 
observe: She discovered “approximately 35 white men in the room discussing how ... 
the redevelopment was going to be about community” (Epstein, 2012).  But nobody was 
there representing the visible minorities (African-Americans, Latinos, Southeast Asians) 
who make up such a huge portion of Oakland and specifically West Oakland (ibid.).  
When the Mayor heard about this he suspended the meetings and demanded inclusion 
of actual community representatives.  The City of Oakland had already stated publically 
that “social equity and balanced contracting ... [as well as] a community benefits 
component MUST be included in any Base reuse or redevelopment project” (Hodges, 
2012), when the land was acquired.  It was evident to Mz. Epstein and many others that 
the “community needed an independent voice that addresses issues of not being 
employed, and not getting those jobs” (Epstein, 2012).   
From there OaklandWORKS evolved; a West Oakland based advocacy alliance 
whose mission is to organize in conjunction with Oakland’s underrepresented and 
underserved communities in the areas of economics, social, and environmental justice, 
focused primarily on the redevelopment of the Army Base lands (OaklandWORKS, 
2011).  My interviews included four members of the OaklandWORKS coalition; Robyn 
Hodges; co-founder, strategist, researcher and representative for OaklandWORKS, 
Margaret Gordon; Co-Director of the West Oakland Environmental Indicators Project 
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and OaklandWORKS member, Kitty Kelly Epstein; Author, Instructor at Holy Names 
University and PUEBLO member (see below) and Carroll Fife; then a student volunteer 
with OaklandWORKS.  
The OaklandWORKS coalition was formed in 2009 by many volunteers and 
existing groups including representatives from “Leadership Excellence”, “PUEBLO”, 
“West Oakland Environmental Indicators Project”, “Oakland Black Caucus”, “John 
George Democratic Club”, “NAACP”, “Oakland Natives Give Back” and “Oakland 
Parents Together” (OaklandWORKS, 2011).  While these are the principle groups 
involved in OaklandWORKS, according to sources there was another ‘community group’ 
present during CBA discussions.   
“Another group at the table [name withheld by interviewee] was working with 
contractors, business owners and those institutions that have historically restricted 
people of color from certain positions in Oakland.  They were doing the same type of 
grassroots organizing, but with the completely opposite strategy.  Saying the same 
things as [OaklandWORKS], but ... working to maintain their own interests and not 
worry about the outcome for the community.  They were diametrically opposed to the 
mission of OaklandWORKS”. (Fife, 2012) 
As Margaret Gordon states, ReviveOakland were still at the table because “the 
Mayor did not want to split one group over another”, though we knew that they were not 
working for the community (Gordon, 2012).  ReviveOakland is a sub-group of the East 
Bay Alliance for a Sustainable Economy (EBASE), who according to their website 
“address the root causes of economic injustice by developing strategic alliances among 
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community, faith, and labour to build power and create change with low-income workers 
and communities of color.” (East Bay Alliance for A New Economy).  One of the 
overarching statements made at the new meetings was that no person or entity would 
financially benefit from any agreement made regarding the Army Base Redevelopment 
(Hodges, 2012); this was likely intended at the coalition groups, and not the developer. 
Overall, OaklandWORKS sought to remedy the under-representation of the West 
Oakland community in the City’s planning process, the developer/labour/city 
discussions regarding the Project Labour Agreement and the ‘local’ hiring of individuals 
or firms.  As well, the prime contractor was known to the community and had a 
reputation for not engaging local firms and by-passing community opposition when 
securing public subsidies for projects.  Environmentally, OaklandWORKS sought to 
ensure buildings would be LEED certified and comprehensive strategies would be 
created to combat pollution and possible public health issues during the cleanup, 
construction and operation of the expanded Port of Oakland (Hodges, 2012). “The 
(OaklandWORKS) coalition was formed around the idea of jobs; jobs in the community, 
jobs for the community (Latino, Black & Southeast Asian)”, (Epstein, 2012). 
After the initial meetings between ReviveOakland and the Port Authority were 
suspended and their work rebuffed, renewed meetings now included OaklandWORKS, 
ReviveOakland, a developer and the Port Authority; these were facilitated by an 
Oakland Council member.  There was also a jobs task force within the greater group 
who would discuss the finer details and bring them back to the negotiation table 
(Epstein, 2012).  Negotiations continued for approximately nine months and what finally 
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went to City Council was the negotiated agreement; with consensus from the group at 
the table (ibid.). 
On February 7, 2012 Oakland City Council passed “guiding principles” for the 
redevelopment of the former Army Base. The principles include important items such as 
work hours dedicated to Oakland residents and first priority hiring for West Oakland-ers.  
25% of apprenticeships and operations jobs reserved for low income, formerly 
incarcerated or other “disadvantaged” workers and employees are free to unionize if 
desired without employer interference (Bechtel M. , 2012), among other items.  
Subsequent negotiations will be undertaken to discuss the PLA and the actual 
Community Benefits Agreement, at which time both OaklandWORKS and 
ReviveOakland will be part of the negotiations from the outset. 
This is an interesting case because of the complicated nature of the “community 
representation” aspect:  Labour groups backing ReviveOakland, the former Mayor’s 
office involved in OaklandWORKS, actors and participants that don’t speak of the 
‘overall’ struggle (ie. no mention of OaklandWORKS in ReviveOakland’s press).  One of 
the reasons for the divide was the traditional position that labour unions have with 
regard to negotiating and signing a “Project Labour Agreement” (PLA).  
OaklandWORKS pushed instead to craft a ‘community labour agreement’ to encourage 
the hiring of low income residents and people of colour which, according to Margaret 
Gordon, “would change the whole paradigm of how these labour groups worked”.  In 
fact, she continues, “We did a lot of strategic planning [reports, analysis, ideas], which 
confused a lot of folks at the table, allowing us to challenge a lot of the [traditional] 
thinking during the negotiations.  A lot of people also didn’t know that this would be such 
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a long, drawn-out process.  We surprised a lot of folks with our level of preparation and 
expertise once [OaklandWORKS] got to the table.” 
 
Minneapolis, MN; Longfellow/Purina Mills CBA 
In February of 2008 the Greater Longfellow Community Council Executive 
Director Melanie Majors signed the “Purina Site Development Community Benefits 
Agreement” on behalf of the coalition, along with the developer of the site Capital 
Growth Real Estate (Majors, 2012).  This long abandoned dog food factory sits beside 
three stops of the City of Minneapolis’ “Hiawatha” light rail corridor.  Because light rail is 
intended to spur development, the City rezoned the former factory lands to “Transit 
Oriented residential Development (ibid.).  In January of 2012 I interviewed Melanie 
Majors – the Executive Director of the Greater Longfellow Community Council – for her 
synopsis of the process that lead to the Minneapolis’ first enacted CBA. 
The Greater Longfellow Community Council (LCC) represented the four 
surrounding neighbourhoods to the former pet food facility; Longfellow, Cooper, Howe 
and Hiawatha.  Each of these neighbourhood associations had equal representation on 
the Council’s Board of Directors and worked together to craft and implement the 
agreement for reuse of the site.  The developer had articulated his vision for the site, “a 
model of transit oriented development”, but the community wanted to be part of the 
process; the Community Council knew the development vision could be better (Alliance 
for Metropolitan Stability, 2008). According to Majors (2012), the LCC reached out to 
other organizations and groups who had undertaken the CBA process, but never 
 74 
 
formalized any relationships and because CBAs were relatively new, there wasn’t a lot 
of support available.  Nearby ‘Harrison’ neighbourhood was also approached to 
participate, but aside from offering some academic advice did not join the coalition (see 
Harrison, below).  The alliance came together rather effortlessly, with issues of trust 
focused more on the development itself rather than between neighbourhoods or council 
members because the residents and the neighbourhood associations “all have the 
same thing at stake” (Majors, 2012).  There was some assistance provided by the 
Alliance for Metropolitan Sustainability regarding the CBA process, etc. 
For the developer, because Federal and State grants for site redevelopment 
were expiring, Capital Real Estate Investments needed the support of the LCC in order 
to ensure the grants were available, as well as for support at subsequent hearings 
before Minneapolis Council (Majors, 2012).  Therefore, the developer was willing to 
pursue this CBA.  For the LCC, the CBA idea was always about affordable housing, 
cleanup and reuse of the abandoned site (ibid.). 
The Executive Director and the Board Members of the LCC were also the de 
facto “CBA Advisory Committee” who negotiated the deal with the developer.  At-large 
community meetings, advertised throughout the neighbourhoods, discussed the items 
addressed by the negotiating team (CBA Advisory Committee) and put them to a vote.  
There was also a Community Council derived “technical advisory group” of architects 
and landscapers that worked directly with the developer, at the behest of the 
community, to provide input into the proposed designs (Majors, 2012).  Negotiations 
were open to whoever wished to attend, but there is no recollection of anyone, aside 
from City and State observers, attending. 
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In essence, the Executive Director was given the mandate to move forward in 
articulating and entering into the CBA with the developer.  The Board gave the ED this 
directive, but all decisions had to be vetted through the community before they were 
added to the draft CBA (ibid.).  The only real ‘sticking point’ during the negotiations was 
the idea of tying the CBA to the land title as a deed restriction.  The community felt that 
this was the one place the agreement would have any teeth – the idea that when the 
developer sold building lots, CBA components would be tied to the deeds;  in the end 
the developer did not agree to this.  Following a two-year negotiation period the CBA 
was signed and notarized in 2008.  Interestingly, Majors suggests that the CBA can 
eliminate some of the need for trust between the developer and the community because 
you are negotiating the agreement and putting it down on paper, rather than listening to 
the developer make promises and then not keep them (Majors, 2012). 
The purpose of this CBA was to specify the goals of the coalition in order to 
maximize the benefits of the “Purina” site during construction through to operation 
(Majors, 2012).  This included that at least 30% of the total units constructed be 
affordable rental units (exceeding City requirements (Alliance for Metropolitan Stability, 
2008)), and no more than 60% of the units in any one building may be “affordable rental 
units.”  The CBA also stipulates living wage standards, forbids “big box” retailers and 
requires 30% local “Twin City” retailers and 10% “Community Based Small Businesses” 
(by retail square footage), also defining these terms (Rosar & Stodolka, 2008; 
Longfellow Community Council, 2008).  The Longfellow CBA also included provisions in 
case it is broken, an Implementation Committee that oversees and monitors the CBA 
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components, and a binding arbitration clause directing parties to seek an injunction if 
“irreparable harm” is done (Longfellow Community Council, 2008). 
Unfortunately, the developer went out of business in 2009 and was unable (and 
not required) to fulfill any of the obligations requisite of the Community Benefits 
Agreement, including paying LCC members $7,500 to attend meetings on their behalf 
with the City, after the agreement was signed.  Because the CBA was not tied to the 
land or the development agreement, and because the City was not a signatory (by its 
own design) a CBA would have to be renegotiated in order for the community to gain 
the direct benefits outlined in the original agreement.  The lands were subsequently 
acquired by a locally known developer with solid financial backing and a “stellar track 
record”, who decided that he would work with the Community Council even though he 
had a certain level of trust in the community, and in Minneapolis generally (ibid.).   
Managing expectations and selling the idea of a CBA to the community was 
something that Mrs. Majors described as a key role during the process:  The fact that 
you’re asking the community what it wants and involving them based on that ideal and 
that the developer may have something else in mind, may be forced to do something 
based on financing, or may have some regulatory hurdle to overcome that restricts or 
eliminates what the community has asked for.  “In the end they (the community) still get 
what is possible rather what it imagined or envisioned” (Majors, 2012).  As Dale Joel, 
partner with Capital Growth Real Estate (the project developer) echoed, “community 
groups expect developers to make promises on issues that, in the end, we don't have 
complete control over. A lender could throw a requirement at the developer at the end of 
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the process that may conflict with a CBA that's already been negotiated and signed” (as 
cited in Gerber, 2007). 
Another observation Majors makes is that during the negotiation process there is 
no shortage of information, and that this needs to be controlled because too much 
information can risk turning people off of the process – just by the sheer volume that 
disseminates from the research, negotiations, etc.  “We really need to ensure we only 
release critical or pertinent information” (Majors, 2012).  
 
Los Angeles, CA; Los Angeles Airport (LAX) CBA 
The $11-billion dollar expansion (Salkin & Lavine, 2008a) of the world’s 5th 
largest airport – LAX – had been planned for some time, and in 2001 the Environmental 
Impact Statement was released to the public (Baxamusa, 2008).  The airport is situated 
near South-Central Los Angeles, which saw rioting in 1992, due in part to Latino and 
Asian immigration into low income African-American neighbourhoods (Bergesen & 
Herman, 1998).  Los Angeles airports, including LAX, are administered by Los Angeles 
World Airports (LAWA); a department of the city of Los Angeles which is governed by 
an appointed Board of Airport Commissioners (Baxamusa, 2008).  Due initially to 
community health concerns over an expanded airport – with 34 schools within one mile 
of LAX - the City of Los Angeles reworked the proposed expansion plans and added 
several regional public hearings to promote the alternative (ibid.).  Over the next few 
years, community, environmental and labour groups – along with neighbourhood 
residents - became more conscious that their individual concerns were not being 
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addressed by LAWA through the additional hearings and workshops (ibid.).  When a 
representative from the Los Angeles Alliance for the New Economy (LAANE) suggested 
to the Mayor that a Community Benefits Agreement may alleviate some of the problems 
associated with airport expansion planning, negotiations for the LAX CBA were 
underway (ibid.).  Revered William D. Smart Jr., director of training and outreach for 
LAANE, and chief negotiator with the LAX Coalition (Smart, 2012) agreed to speak with 
me about the Los Angeles Airport CBA in March of 2012. 
The LAX coalition for Economic, Environmental and Educational Justice was 
formed generally along the lines of school, environment and job quality concerns 
(Baxamusa, 2008) as their name suggests.  This multi-ethnic group crossed many 
persistent boundaries coalition-forming often encounters, incorporating community 
members, environmental activists, school administrators, political organizations, various 
religious associations, and labour representatives (Gross, LeRoy, & Janis-Aparicio, 
2005) into their group.  The coalition was a multi-racial, multi-topical coalition that 
featured between 22 and 27 representative associations (see Baxamusa, 2008; Gross, 
LeRoy, & Janis-Aparicio, 2005; Salkin & Lavine, 2008a and b; Smart, 2012).  When the 
group was assembled there were no “national CBA organizations” but the coalition did 
enlist the help of some broad organizations such as the coalition for clean air and 
national unions like the SEIU (Service Employees International Union) and the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Smart, 2012).  As well, veteran advocacy 
group LAANE were involved from the beginning, having crafted the pioneering Staples 
Centre CBA (Marcello, 2007) and other Los Angeles agreements, their experience and 
familiarity with the CBA process, the City of Los Angeles and many of the coalition 
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members made them essential to the group-building and strategic planning process 
(Smart, 2012).  It was through months of one-on-one organizing throughout Los 
Angeles communities and groups that the coalition formed.  
Recognizing early the amount of work necessary to bring all of the issues and 
voices together, LAANE took the lead in arranging the structure of the coalition which 
featured a steering committee and a negotiations committee, as well as the broader 
coalition.  Each steering committee member represented two or three coalition groups 
that they had to report to, to relay information.  The coalition wanted a process where 
they could agree on things quickly and to ensure that the members of the steering 
committee were aware of what the subgroups wanted or needed (Smart, 2012).  They 
formed subcommittees and working groups divided by themes such as ‘environment’, 
‘community’, ‘education’, and ‘jobs & employment’ committees, each of whom worked 
on their own and then would come back together to discuss their findings and needs.  At 
the steering committee level, Reverend Smart represented several ministerial groups.  
There were others who represented several environmental groups, community groups, 
etc. and according to Rev. Smart the negotiating committee had all of the steering 
committee members on it.  And there were full time staff dedicated to the project.  In the 
end the entire coalition (not just steering committee or negotiating team) agreed on the 
benefits agreement. (Smart, 2012). 
Throughout the process, according to Reverend Smart, more and more groups 
and individuals wanted to join - some of whom didn’t join initially (local politicians, etc.) - 
thinking that this struggle was going nowhere.  These late-joiners, toward the end, 
almost became obstructions but the coalition did a good job of engaging and educating 
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the general population through various town hall meetings and activities throughout the 
process.  At various points the legitimacy of the coalition itself was questioned; random 
people, politicians or unaffiliated individuals asking who (the Coalition) represented, etc.  
This was dismissed by the paper (email) trail that that LAANE and the LAX Coalition 
could produce, demonstrating that the group had at least attempted to contact everyone 
- including a particular neighbourhood that had already voted to be relocated to allow for 
the expansion plan (Smart, 2012) – they were part of the group as well. 
Two points about the coalition are also worth mentioning.  The first was the 
conflict that was apparent between the environmental and labour groups in the early 
formation of the coalition: This was the first time the two had “sat down together” and it 
was believed that they may have some mutually exclusive interests.  However, 
according to Reverend Smart, one of the attributes of the CBA is that, as long as the 
self-interests of each group are known, the differences can often be overcome (Smart, 
2012).  This was the case here, and once individual wants and needs were “on the 
table”, the agreement was crafted to ensure that both groups got what they needed from 
the process.  As well, one of the first neighbourhoods approached, both by the airport 
when the expansion was announced, and by the coalition when it was forming was 
opposed to the Airport expansion all-together.  The “Westchester” neighbourhood group 
was not made part of the coalition because the LAX group felt that this was an 
irreconcilable division (Smart, 2012) – “there will be no benefits provided under the CBA 
if the project doesn’t move forward” (Gross, LeRoy, & Janis-Aparicio, 2005, p. 18).  The 
feeling was mutual (Smart, 2012) 
 81 
 
The LAX Coalition entered negotiations with a list of approximately 140 
articulated ‘wants’ (Smart, 2012) generated by all the sub-groups and vetted by the 
entire coalition to LAWA (Baxamusa, 2008) that was whittled down to about 80 through 
the negotiation process (Baxamusa, 2008; Smart, 2012).  While no examples of items 
left off the list were available or provided, according to Reverend Smart the negotiations 
were successful and most of the LAX Coalition’s demands were met – despite the fact 
that 60 items were dropped from the initial list.  As mentioned, the initial concerns 
regarding the health of vulnerable populations within proximity of the airport and under 
flight paths, quality jobs and environmental concerns were the main rallying points for 
this large coalition (ibid.). 
The LAX Coalition negotiating team was divided between the principle groups 
(education, environment, labour) whose general membership elected two 
representatives each to the committee; six representatives in total.  During the 
negotiations, certain issues or points would be ratified by the larger body by the group 
agreeing to cease discussions, leave the table and take the decisions back to the larger 
coalition.  According to Reverend Smart (2012), present at the negotiations was the 
Mayor’s representative, the LAX Coalition negotiating committee, the LAWA 
negotiators, lawyers for each side, Reverend Smart and the LAX Coalition researcher. 
The negotiations were made even more difficult because of Federal Aviation 
Authority [FAA] rules, most notably a “diversion” law prohibiting airport revenues from 
being spent on purposes unrelated to airport operations (Gross, LeRoy, & Janis-
Aparicio, 2005; Smart, 2012).  This hindered the discussions because the FAA were not 
directly involved, and there are some “hazy” areas around this law, so LAWA could not 
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agree to certain items because they had to interpret the FAA’s ‘future judgement’ 
(Gross, LeRoy, & Janis-Aparicio, 2005).  Finally, Rev. Smart said, “Let’s do a deal, and 
we (the LAX Coalition) will go with you to the FAA together to get their input afterward” 
(Smart, 2012).  A successful strategy according to the Reverend (ibid.) that also saw the 
structure of the CBA tailored to this “future judgement” through flexible language 
intended to guard against negative FAA rulings on certain negotiated items (Gross, 
LeRoy, & Janis-Aparicio, 2005).    
In 2004 the LAX Coalition and LAWA signed, what is to date, the largest 
Community Benefits Agreement (ibid).  Along with provisions covering job training, first-
source hiring for nearby residents and living-wage requirements, the LAX CBA also 
secured significant concessions toward mitigating the environmental impacts.  Local 
improvements such as “soundproofing local schools, city buildings, places of worship 
and homes, and fund(ing) studies on air quality and community health” (Salkin & Lavine, 
2008a, p. 24) and environmental controls pertaining reduced engine idling and 
emissions, and the use alternative fuels for airport vehicles (ibid.) were part of the 
landmark agreement. Another positive that came from the signed agreement are 
provisions that require all airport contracts, lease agreements, and licensing or 
permitting agreements to adhere to the agreement which in essence passes down the 
responsibility to any contractor, concession or operator who utilizes the airport (ibid.). 
Since the signing, it has taken some time for some of the benefits from the 
agreement to come to fruition, such as school funding (Smart, 2012), some of the 
soundproofing and reengineering. However, construction routes, air quality monitoring, 
and many of the negotiated items are in place (ibid.).  In terms of implementation there 
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is an ongoing committee who meet to discuss the continued implementation of the CBA, 
and there was a negotiated process regarding conflict resolution that the Coalition and 
LAWA have adopted that features three stages; meet and discuss, followed by outside 
arbitration, then the court system.  Neither party has yet used the outside arbitrator 
(Smart, 2012).  Items such as soundproofing, studies and the implementation 
committee were intended to be paid for by LAWA, through “increased revenues from 
concessions, parking, passenger charges, airline landing fees and terminal rents” 
(Baxamusa, 2008, p. 265).   
 
Buffalo, NY; Canal Side Redevelopment/Canal Side Community Alliance 
The Erie Canal Harbor Development Corporation (ECHDC) is a subsidiary of 
Empire State Development, whose mission as a New York State public agency is “to 
promote a vigorous and growing economy ... through the use of loans, grants, tax 
credits and other forms of financial assistance ... to enhance private business 
investment and growth to spur job creation and support prosperous communities across 
New York State” (New York State, 2010 [a]).  Focused primarily on revitalizing Buffalo’s 
inner and outer harbors, an “aggressive approach to waterfront development” has been 
undertaken by the ECHDC since its formation in 2005, which has resulted in “significant 
progress over a very short amount of time” (New York State [b]).  According to Buffalo 
Mayor Byron W. Brown, the near $300 million promised by the ECHDC and other public 
entities for waterfront renewal is vital to Buffalo's renaissance (Sommer, 2010).  
"Waterfront development is key, the central element in the economic revitalization in the 
City of Buffalo and Erie County. You can't get any of it done without the resources to 
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make it happen, and today the resources are here" (Brown, as quoted in Sommer, 
2010). 
In 2008 the Buffalo Coalition for Economic Justice (CEJ), in conjunction with 
Buffalo’s Partnership for the Public Good (PPG) undertook their own “aggressive 
approach to waterfront development”, advocating along with their community partners 
for a community benefits agreement to ensure that specific local benefits would 
materialize in the wake of the enormous public subsidy for the Canal Side project 
(Coalition for Ecnonomic Justice).  In early 2010, both groups played a role in creating 
the Canal Side Community Alliance whose mission is to negotiate a CBA with the State 
development agency – ECHDC - to improve the canal redevelopment project and 
ensure benefits for adjacent communities and all of Buffalo (ibid.).  A formal interview 
was conducted with Micaela Shapiro-Shellaby - a community organizer with CEJ for the 
past seven years - and an informal discussion was held with Sarah Bishop, Executive 
Director of BuffaloFirst, a coalition member, both in 2012. This is an ongoing CBA 
campaign that is currently active in its attempts to bring ECHDC to the table to discuss 
community benefits.  
The Canal Side Alliance (CSA) was formed in 2010 and is comprised of 
approximately sixty member organizations.  Affiliates such as VOICE-Buffalo, 
BuffaloFirst and the CEJ are also made up of many member organizations and 
partners.  The CEJ for example is aligned with national “Jobs with Justice”, a U.S. wide 
network of “labor (sic) unions, faith groups, community organizations and student 
activists fighting for working people”, (Jobs with Justice).  BuffaloFirst is comprised 
primarily of local businesses and individual members from the Greater Buffalo Area, and 
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VOICE-Buffalo, made up of several local faith based organizations and also a member 
of the national grassroots Gamaliel organization.  The local affiliations bring 
representative legitimacy to the local CBA campaign and the national connections to 
labour, environment or faith organizations brings experience and clout to back up the 
coalition.   
The CEJ, according to Shellaby, already had a lot of strong relationships so 
building the initial group (CSA) was very easy to do because the people were familiar 
with their work.  However, there were others in the community who weren’t so familiar 
with the idea of a CBA or economic justice and it was more difficult to inform them of 
what the Alliance was trying to achieve and get them on board (Shapiro-Shellaby, 
2012).  The coalition was symbolically solidified by signing a form that included values 
determined by the group in a very early planning meeting.  The CSA came up with 
these core benchmarks that Shellaby formalized which people and organizations signed 
on to, “therefore it wasn’t just this sort of random thing, but we have something to hold 
people to their word a bit more; to coerce them to the meetings” (ibid.).  Core strategy 
sessions, while not exclusive, required more of an obligation than the general meetings.  
Those interested in participating in strategic planning therefore committed greater 
resources which consisted of “a myriad of things; some people can bring money, some 
people can work on organizing or turnout, some could commit full-time staff” (ibid.) or 
other skills, which created the six person “strategy team” of the Alliance,  which is fluid, 
depending on the urgency required (ibid.). 
The large coalition attempted to be completely inclusive, however according to 
Shellaby, there were still those who tried to undermine the coalition’s efforts, some who 
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even signed the original value statement.  She chalks this up to lack of patience in 
consensus building or a lack of strategic thinking, awareness that a coalition needs to 
be as inclusive as possible to address this development project “that affects all of us” 
(ibid.).  The Canal Side Alliance also reached out for assistance from national groups 
such as the Partnership for Working Families and the California based LAANE, taking 
advantage of their literature and online information.  But it was another “rustbelt” city 
CBA – the Pittsburgh OneHill campaign - that the Buffalo Alliance felt most reflected the 
Canal Side struggle (ibid.). 
According to Shellaby, the ultimate goal of the Canal Side Alliance is the 
negotiation and implementation of a Community Benefits Agreement.  The agreement 
would ensure quality jobs, environmentally friendly building and operations, local 
independent businesses, mixed income housing, and targeted hiring objectives for 
construction and permanent jobs.  As indicated as well, Buffalo adopted a living wage 
policy for any city projects, so CSA were lobbying for living wages from the beginning of 
this project, as well as support for minority and female-owned businesses. (Shapiro-
Shellaby, 2012). 
An early focus of the coalition was around “Bass Pro Shops”, a big-box outdoor 
store that had identified the Canal Side Development as an opportune location for a 
mega-store.  Possibly persuaded by the $35 million public subsidy, the CSA actually 
discovered through their research that these millions represent the direct subsidy from 
the State - further investments that the local government had to make, for infrastructure 
demands of Bass Pro, were not being reported:  “This happens wherever Bass Pro is 
located” (Shapiro-Shellaby, 2012).  As established by the Public Accountability Initiative 
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during the negotiations, “Bass Pro has demonstrated to be a failure in cities where it 
anchors economic development” (Kevin Conner as quoted by Sommer, 2010).  
Eventually Bass Pro Shops decided that, due to “numerous critical reasons” (Richert, 
2010) they would not be participating in the Canal Side Development after 
approximately ten years in the making.  The Alliance considered it a victory, however 
Mayor Brown felt that “This (was) inexcusable and an example of a few obstructionists 
... stop(ping) progress” (Brown as quoted by Richert, 2010) and an editorial in the 
Buffalo News called the Community Benefits Agreement a “job killer” that imposes 
“wage (and) other inappropriate requirements on the private sector”, rendering these 
saviours of the sagging economy non-competitive and therefore not interested in Buffalo 
(Buffalo News Editorial Page, 2010). 
 The Alliances’ fight continued after this initial ‘victory’, but there have also 
been difficulties and disappointments during negotiations.  First, the way the 
redevelopment plan was designed by the Canal Development Corporation actually 
removed the four existing affordable housing projects, adjacent to the former industrial 
canal, from redevelopment plans (Shapiro-Shellaby, 2012).  This makes organizing 
efforts more difficult because there aren’t actually people being displaced by the 
redevelopment. “Not to sound cold, but it’s difficult to rally people around the struggle 
when there isn’t this sort of human side to it.  People are a little more detached from this 
process than those (CBAs) which feature a local community or a (direct) displacement 
component” (ibid.).   
Another challenge for the Alliance is the fact that they are working with a large 
public authority rather than a developer.  Shapior-Shellaby (2012) suggests, “it’s like 
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negotiating with a ghost, the board appointments are made by state legislature and 
there are no term limits on their appointments.  They are a very difficult group to work 
with, and it takes a different type of political power to move them.”  Furthermore, the 
composition of the ECHDC changed almost completely during the campaign, and the 
new members, save for two, don’t have knowledge of the negotiations nor what has 
already been agreed.   
A further setback was the loss of the “living wage” component during the 
negotiations – even though the City of Buffalo passed living wage legislation for city 
projects in 1999.  According to Shapiro-Shellaby (2012), “this was a major blow to our 
organization”.  One more impediment came when the Mayor publicly reconsidered 
selling any of their Canal Side lands.  This came some time after Buffalo’s Council 
agreed to a CBA in principle and promised not to transfer any land to the ECHDC until 
the agreement was in full force - this was essentially the CSA’s leverage with the 
Development Corporation.  The fact that if the land was going to be sold, it was to be 
sold with the CBA registered on title:  Now, the dynamic has totally changed (Shapiro-
Shellaby, 2012). 
While the outcome is still not decided, a number of things are becoming clearer 
as the discussions continue to move forward.  In the end, according to (Shapiro-
Shellaby, 2012) this agreement will not be contractual, but instead would be passed as 
a policy of the Erie Canal Harbour Development Corporation (ECHDC).  However, the 
Alliance hopes that this type of arrangement will prove to be more far reaching, not just 
affecting inner harbour redevelopment, but including redevelopment of the outer 
harbour, which is significantly larger and planned for the future.  This could conceivably 
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set a foundation for future development which the CSA believes is very positive.  The 
downside however is that it is not a contractual agreement, the CBA signatories cannot 
take the Development Corp. to court to resolve disputes or force compliance.  In her 
opinion, this was due to another agreement in New York City that was going to court. 
“Everybody suddenly became acutely aware of what was going on and wanted no part 
of that sort of (contractual) agreement, based on what was happening with the 
armouries CBA in the Bronx.” (Shapiro-Shellaby, 2012).  So, what the Canal Side 
Alliance has crafted essentially is a “Waterfront Consensus Agreement” which is 
considered by them a more goal oriented policy for the ECHDC to adopt (ibid.).  
In March of 2012 it was announced that “Bass Pro money” – State funds that had 
been earmarked to subsidize the super store – had been re-purposed to construct 
historically aligned ‘replica canals’ at the waterfront redevelopment.  The creation will 
provide temporary construction jobs and costs less than the original $35 million subsidy 
promised to Bass Pro (Precious, 2012). 
According to (Shapiro-Shellaby, 2012), there is still some hope about getting the 
“Waterfront Consensus Agreement” signed, depending on who the new ECHDC Board 
chair is.  There is still some leverage with the Buffalo common council, and some 
confidence around our efforts (ibid.).  It should be noted that there is no mention of the 
agreement, the negotiations, or public funds being allocated for community benefits on 





Milwaukee, WI; Park East Redevelopment Compact (PERC) 
Following demolition of a downtown Milwaukee freeway, pro-growth entities in 
the public and private sector proclaimed the new development opportunities would bring 
the “young professionals, empty nesters, and high-end service employers back into 
central Milwaukee after a long decline” (Wolf-Powers, 2010, p. 11).  Alternatively, 
nearby neighborhoods that had absorbed displaced citizens when the freeway was built 
in the 50’s, along with community groups, saw an opportunity to relieve some of the 
pressure of Milwaukee’s “sizeable low income population” (ibid.).  Labour groups sought 
to increase union hires for the new construction projects (ibid.) on the revealed land.   
While community benefits as a concept was an engaging subject to the Institute 
for Milwaukee’s Future, the group wondered collectively why benefits should not apply 
on a broader level, rather than project by project, negotiation by negotiation (Epps-
Addison, 2012)?  Soon after, the coalition “Good Jobs and Liveable Neighborhoods” 
(GJLN) lobbied the City of Milwaukee to have a benefits agreement written into the 
municipal development plan for the ‘new’ lands (Epps-Addison, 2012; Lavine, 2008a).  
Failing by one vote at the municipal council over concerns that the CBA would inflate 
construction costs and the legality of including provisions in a land use document, the 
redevelopment plan was approved without conditions in June of 2004. 
Somewhat surprised that a 17 000 member coalition of [primarily] labour interests 
did not have enough clout to sway City Council – especially in Wisconsin which was 
considered a mainstay of union power (Wolf-Powers, 2010) - the coalition broadened 
their base and took their campaign to the County (Epps-Addison, 2012).   With 16ac 
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(64, 752m2) of developable Downtown land, decidedly less than what the City or the 
private enterprises already owned, the County recognized the agreement as an 
opportunity to return some benefit directly to the taxpayers and citizens who would in 
essence be providing the development subsidies (ibid.).  Therefore, the County Board 
passed the Park East Redevelopment Compact (PERC) to ensure that future 
development on County owned lands would include the Community Benefit provisions 
that were legislated within the compact. 
A March, 2012 interview with Jennifer Epps-Addison, Economic Justice Program 
Coordinator with Citizen Action Wisconsin, provided some further insight into the efforts 
to sign this Community Benefits Agreement in Milwaukee.   
According to Epps-Addison (2012), there were a number of groups brought 
together under the banner of “Good Jobs and Liveable Neighborhoods” (GJLN) that had 
not worked together nor knew much about Community Benefits Agreements.  The larger 
County-focused coalition included a broad spectrum of community partners, including 
faith-based, labour, environmental, advocacy, neighborhood, and other progressive 
groups (Institute for Wisconsin's Future).  In all approximately seventeen different 
organizations came together, each of whom represented even more people at various 
levels.  One particular church group (MICAH) represented 27 churches throughout the 
region, and the allied building trades and the Milwaukee area Labour Council all 
represent a variety of labour unions.  According to Wolf-Powers (2010) it was the 
Milwaukee Labour Council, the labour backed Institute for Wisconsin’s Future and 
MICAH that really spearheaded the GJLN coalition, and Epps-Addison credits “about 12 
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really strong groups” (2012) for the success of the PERC.  The group solidified around 
five basic tenets or questions;  
1. What is a good job?  (ie. Not minimum wage, allows unionization, helps 
support and create the capacity for minority or female owned businesses that 
help get people out of poverty, and allows Milwaukee workers to enter the 
‘middle-class’). 
2. What is affordable housing in these developments? (Make this a priority). 
3. Local hiring. 
4. What are important environmental concerns? 
5. Community Accountability 
 
Signing on to the GJLN coalition meant agreeing to these terms, which became an 
important tool during negotiations with both the City and the County.   
As Gross, et. al. (2005, p. 76) have suggested, the campaign for this project is 
noteworthy because “it featured a close and effective collaboration between community 
groups and building trades.”  While labour unions in Wisconsin are, as Wolf-Powers 
(2010) suggested, very strong, in Milwaukee they have a tenuous relationship with the 
black community, and within that community there’s a lot of distrust with the unions 
based on historic divisions and policies (Epps-Addison, 2012).  “The unions are not 
particularly diverse even today, and the coalition and the community had to spend a lot 
of time building trust to show the community that we (the coalition) had a real interest in 
benefiting the community and not just more talk” (ibid.).  The GJLN group needed to 
prove that they wanted to transform the community. At one point there was a frank 
discussion regarding the coalition “just trying to get more jobs for the labour unions – 
you don’t really care about people in the city” (Epps-Addison, 2012), regarding the 
prevailing wage issue.  There was a lot of work that went into demonstrating that GJLN 
wanted the people in the city not only to get these jobs, but that these jobs are going to 
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help you earn a family sustaining wage and help you ‘move into the middle class’ (Epps-
Addison, 2012). 
There were also times when the representative nature of the coalition was 
challenged as well, admits Epps-Addison, but according to her there are always 
concerns about not being representative.  “Looking back at the protests and the photos, 
it’s evident that the events were attended by primarily whites, and very heavily union 
represented, and clearly that is not the demographics of the City of Milwaukee.  
(Milwaukee is) a majority “visible minority” city, and in terms of people of color they have 
a very low union membership.  There were times when that was used as a wedge issue, 
saying we weren’t representative” (ibid.).  In fact, according to Epps-Addison, there 
were times when elected officials would suggest, “People in my neighborhood would be 
happy to make $8 an hour and you don’t really understand what these people want” 
(Epps-Addison, 2012 paraphrasing).  This idea was dispelled by the policies GJLN were 
pushing for, according to Epps-Addison.  Policies to be implemented in the 
redevelopment plan, such as 25% participation from minority businesses, a 5% female-
owned businesses, a living wage for all workers, and in particular first source hiring 
programs so that Milwaukee residents would be the first considered for jobs created by 
and throughout the development.  “Do we need to work harder on diversity and bring in 
the people most affected into the coalition? Absolutely; however, when you look around, 
it was obvious that the coalition had the best interests of everyone at heart” (Epps-
Addison, 2012). 
 As indicated, the GJLN Coalition was broad-based and featured a number of 
different, traditionally disconnected, groups that were able to pull together based around 
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mutual values to push for legislative change in Downtown Milwaukee.  With labour 
looking for guaranteed, union based jobs, community groups seeking affordable 
housing and micro-economic interests arguing for local, minority and feminine-owned 
business opportunities, Epps-Addison really credits the ‘5-point value statement’ as the 
glue that held everything together.  She continues, “We have grown up thinking, or 
being told that we should be grateful and thankful for anyone wanting to do business in 
our City, and (that) we should not put inhibitors on people doing business here because 
they’re doing us a favor by doing business (in Milwaukee) because of the state of the 
city” (Epps-Addison, 2012).  The idea of a CBA, for Milwaukee, was revolutionary.  It 
was the community rallying together to demand some sort of reinvestment back into the 
community (ibid.).  This should not be, according to Epps-Addison, some far out idea 
but a common sense one to simply demonstrate that those who subsidise the project 
should be able to expect some of the subsidies to flow directly into the community – “It’s 
a tool of “the 1%” that we should be grateful for whatever table scraps that they give us.  
However, they are only wealthy because of what we invest in their projects through tax 
money and subsidized infrastructure, etc.” (ibid.). 
Because of the nature of the PERC – legislated rather than truly negotiated – 
there was No formal negotiating team, but there were two key people that did a lot of 
the communication and policy writing strategy (Epps-Addison, 2012).  In the view of 
Epps-Addison, the major difference in this kind of CBA is that you are trying to maintain 
and grow the coalition on one side, and convince the 15 Councillors at the City and/or 
the 17 County Councillors that what you’re doing is worthwhile.  GJLN had to find what 
constituency had the greatest influence over each of the elected officials and 
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strategically target the various politicians (and voting blocks) when necessary (ibid.).  
Similar to the way politicians have a list of targeted demographics, GJLN would call 
groups or individuals that had ‘influence’ with the Council-member and inform them of 
the coalition’s campaign.  In turn, GJLN would urge the individual or group to contact 
their local City or County Councillor regarding the compact, and when the issue was up 
for vote the representative had (hopefully) been made aware of the importance of this 
issue to his/her constituents (ibid.).  This strategy proved to be trying at times for the 
individuals who agreed to ‘engage’ their representative for reasons that Epps-Addison 
calls “capacity”.  “Residents often had challenging lives; underemployment, 
unemployment, single parents, economic issues and educational challenges.  
Furthermore, playing politics is very much an “insider game” and some participants felt 
overwhelmed about the process of going to City Hall to “testify” or meeting with 
Councillors” (ibid.)  After a while GJLN adapted their strategy to instead train individuals 
to prepare them for the challenges, to allow them to enter into the discussion safely and 
at an equal level.  One successful strategy was to hold alternate meetings prior to the 
City Council meetings, where local political allies and Council members would attend 
and GJLN would record the testimonials from the residents to be submitted at the 
Council meetings rather than having the residents come into that large and sometimes 
hostile chamber (ibid.). 
As with most North-American cities, people are not very engaged in local politics 
(very low local turnout) so it wasn’t easy to keep people involved and interested over the 
years that this campaign unfolded (ibid.).  Another GJLN engagement strategy centered 
on door to door canvassing and ‘events’ that again urged people to take direct action 
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with their local representative.  MICAH (the faith-based organization) had a number of 
activities in their places of worship on particular days, and the unions used the strategy 
of engaging people at the hiring halls, indicating that there would be more jobs if we 
passed the PERC (ibid.).  According to Epps-Addison the actions of the individual 
residents, through the various coalition members phoning, knocking on doors or signing 
petitions were really important.   
During the campaign there were instances where individual coalition members 
were approached by public officials to make a deal to drop one of the goals in order to 
cut a deal.  However, because of “good organizing and ... stating their values” (Epps-
Addison, 2012), the group was able to overcome these challenges, stick to their values 
signed value statement and pursue the legislation that they sought. 
In 2004 the County Board passed a legally binding resolution establishing a 
range of community benefit requirements for the series of redevelopment projects 
planned for the 16ac of County owned land where the Park East highway once stood 
(Gross, LeRoy, & Janis-Aparicio, 2005).  The PERC requires potential developers to 
grant ‘living wage’ construction jobs, implement job training programs and to include 
green design elements into all buildings. The compact also obliges the County to 
provide affordable housing and contribute to a range of community programs including 
training and apprenticeship opportunities.  Finally, the agreement established a 
“Community Economic Development Fund”, financed through county land sales and 
intended to pay for an ongoing oversight committee to monitor the implement the PERC 
(Lavine, 2008a).  Contextually, the Park East Redevelopment Compact is considered 
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the first CBA to be legislated rather than negotiated between the developer and 
community (ibid.). 
To date there has not been any development on the county owned Park East 
lands for various reasons.  However, these community benefit experiences in 
Milwaukee (including a subsequent living wage ordinance not discussed here) have 
benefitted the city, according to Epps-Addison (2012), in changing the dynamic and the 
conversation around what local governments should be doing to address the problems 
in urban areas.  “Years ago we would just throw money at developers hoping that their 
projects would help city residents and interests – which they never did” (ibid.). 
Since these major campaigns, much less time is needed to educate the general 
public regarding community benefits and what can be expected and demanded.  These 
campaigns have had a lasting effect on the knowledge and understanding of this 
process.  Today, as a subsidiary of Citizen Action of Wisconsin, the GJLN coalition is 
still together, encouraging Milwaukee to adopt a “clawback” policy to ensure that 
developers are held accountable for the promises they make when securing public 
financial assistance (Epps-Addison, 2012). 
 Interestingly, a January 2011 article from Expressmilwaukee.com asked 
County Council candidates at a debate why, in their opinion, none of the County land 
had been sold while all of the City land had.  While many of the candidates gave 
“political” answers, Republican Jeff Stone was quoted as saying:  
“What we’ve done and what we’ve seen in the county, we’ve piled on 
requirements above and beyond what the market requires or will allow. So the property 
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sits there, unused, underutilized, wasting an opportunity for our taxpayers and the 
people who want jobs and to work in this community. I will work with anybody. But you 
can’t continue to create regulations that don’t allow for the development or investment in 
this community” (Stone, as quoted by Kaiser, 2011). 
 
Springfield, IL; High Speed Rail / Faith Coalition for the Common Good  
In March of 2012 an interview with Shelly Heideman, Executive Director of Faith 
Coalition for the Common Good (FCCG) provided details regarding an ongoing 
Community Benefits Agreement discussion that began in Springfield Illinois and is 
hoping to spread throughout the state.  The group coalesced following an 
announcement by the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDot) regarding a high 
speed rail  project, designed to create “greater mobility options” (Illinois Department of 
Transportation, 2012 [a]) for passengers along the Chicago to St. Louis corridor.  The 
initiative is based on a 2009 U.S. Federal government announcement, calling for “a 
collaborative effort among the Federal Government, States, railroads, and other key 
stakeholders to help transform America's transportation system through the creation of 
a national network of high-speed rail corridors” (Illinois Department of Transportation, 
2012 [b]).  Springfield, Illinois is the approximate half-way point between Chicago Illinois 
and St. Louis Missouri. 
According to Heideman (2012) there are three tracks that run through Springfield.  
One of them – the 10th street corridor – is the “imaginary dividing line” between the 
lower income and predominately African American families and the “rest” of the 
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population of Springfield.  Other options include corridors that run in front of the state 
capitol or a line further east, deeper into the lower income neighborhood (Heideman, 
2012).  The city and the county prefer the existing 10th street corridor for the rail line, but 
the coalition fears that they’ll improve the capacity of the railway there, “then suddenly 
have no money for the real improvements – green space, multi-modal station”, etc. 
(ibid.).  The FCCG anticipates that through their work they can implement a community 
benefits agreement based on the impact of the high speed rail project. 
FCCG Springfield is a member of a state-wide network “Gamaliel of Illinois”, and 
therefore part of the nationwide Gamaliel coalition who operates, as one of its national 
subgroups, the Transportation Equity Network (TEN) (Heideman, 2012).  TEN mentored 
the FCCG rail task force regarding CBAs and high speed rail with the intention that what 
they’re doing in Springfield is something that can be replicated around the country, 
based on community benefits and the introduction of high speed rail, through the TEN 
network and other Gamaliel societies across the country (ibid.).   
Locally, following FCCG task force members TEN meeting, they trained 180 
people from the original member “churches” in Springfield, who in turn went back to 
their congregations and trained leaders within their groups.  The Faith Coalition for the 
Common Good’s first public meeting was held in October of 2009, determining with the 
trained leaders, and the general public, the four key issues which it would address in the 
coming years.  “It was a very powerful meeting” (Faith Coalition for the Common Good, 
2012), attended by 225 people, asking them to join one of four groups; the immigration 
task force, city service task force, family services task force, and the rail issue task force 
(ibid.).  The Coalition boasts 18 organizations and was incorporated in 2009.  As a 
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community organizing coalition the foundation of their group, according to Heideman, 
comes from one-on-one meetings with community members and factions to identify self-
interests and determine how those motivations can be brought into the coalition’s efforts 
– “it’s very simple on the surface, but a lot of work” (Heideman, 2012).   
As a Faith Organization, it might be anticipated that differences may stem from 
the different beliefs, however, according to Heideman (2012), when the FCCG formed, it 
was agreed by members that it would not address “moral issues”, and would only work 
on matters that the whole group could agree to.  Furthermore, there was no discussion 
about not inviting some groups:  It was not easy to get the groups involved that they 
have (Heideman, 2012).  According to Heideman, one-on-one meetings with the local 
faith groups did not always yield a participant.  “One in particular suggested that the 
people in his congregation drive their kids to soccer games and they’re ‘too busy’, so 
(he didn’t believe) people in (his) congregation would be interested.  That was a 
challenge” (Heideman, 2012).  This was not uncommon during the recruitment phase, 
with various pastors indicating that they’re already overwhelmed and couldn’t imagine 
adding something else to their plates (ibid.).  What the FCCG explains is that the reason 
they should join the coalition is that they will train local leaders within the organization 
who can help the beleaguered pastors with their leadership (ibid.).    
Initially, the FCCG had no representation from the large labour unions, however 
as Heideman (2012) explains, since the group has received some success, they’ve 
been joined by the (rail) operating engineers, the teamsters, the labourers, the 
carpenters, SEIU and other large national labour groups.  Furthermore, construction 
trades that have worked with FCCG have assisted in drafting a document called 
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“changing the face of tomorrow” which seeks to bring in more women and people of 
colour into their various apprenticeship training programs (Heideman, 2012): “That will 
tie in nicely with the CBA” (ibid.).   
When asked about individuals participating in the coalition – such as those that 
were not already part of a religious group, union or other recognized partner, Heideman 
indicated that they “really try to encourage individuals to work with their church or other 
organization, to bring in the greater association, because there is more power in 
numbers” (ibid.).  Regarding neighborhood associations, Heideman responded, “The 
faith based associations seem to have more power, membership and participation than 
the neighborhood associations do – interested citizens seem to be part of, and identify 
with, their local congregation rather than through more loosely associated neighborhood 
associations here in Springfield.” (Heideman, 2012).  That being said, according to 
Heideman (2012), nobody has questioned the legitimacy of the group as representative, 
most have said it’s amazing the amount of work FCCG has done to bring the community 
together. 
Within Springfield there was a lot of discussion, and some anger, around the idea 
of consolidating rail operations along 10th street – creating an even more impermeable 
and divisive line and barrier.  Therefore, because a number of the members of the 
FCCG are African American churches east of the 10th street corridor and on the east 
side of Springfield, the FCCG never articulated which corridor was better or worse.  “We 
didn’t want to enter into the fight, so we focused on ensuring that regardless of where 
this ‘improved line’ is located, the community being impacted will actually receive some 
benefits from the investment” (Heideman, 2012).   
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The FCCG does require an annual membership fee to be paid to it, depending on 
the size of the organization.  For a church is depends on how large the congregation, 
and unions or not-for-profits pay a certain fee with the money used for office supplies, 
the salary of the Executive Director, and other expenses incurred by the not-for-profit.  
Everyone in the organization outside of the Executive Director is a volunteer. 
The FCCG website outlines the platform of items that they hope to achieve from 
their Community Benefit struggle.  It reads as follows: 
Relocation Assistance – adequate relocation assistance must be provided for 
all homeowners, renters and small business owners who are targeted for 
relocation. Affordable housing must be made available within a reasonable time 
for all those who must relocate.   
Jobs – 30% of the construction jobs should be reserved for low income people, 
minorities and women. 
 
Training money – 1% of the project budget should be directed into job training 
and support programs. 
 
Green Space – the station, rail ways, and surroundings should promote and 
include green space. 
 
Small Business – the rail plan should include support and encouragement for 
the development of grassroots business owners. 
 
Safety/Noise – the plan should adhere to every possible safety concern for 
those who live near or will be crossing railroad tracks. Noise abatement must be 
a priority. 
 
Planning/Monitoring committee – faith groups, community organizations, 
unions, business owners and others affected by the construction of a high speed 
rail station must be represented on a monitoring committee that will hold public 
meetings to report back on the station plan every six months. This committee will 
also be intimately involved in the formulation of all ‘request for proposals’ that are 
formulated by IDOT and other entities for construction, training and other related 
plans for the project. In addition, FCCG will continue to monitor legislation which 
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may impact fair compensation for sale of property and the cost of moving and 
finding new living facilities. 
Figure 4: List of platforms sought by FCCG 
Source: (Faith Coalition for the Common Good, 2012) 
 
As Heideman (2012) states, jobs, apprenticeship training, and job training were the 
highest priorities for the campaign. 
Once the FCCG, it’s partners and community members had drafted their platform 
and the basis for the CBA document, the FCCG took the results to local and state 
officials to get buy-in.  Because this is another example of a “legislated” CBA – where 
the “developer” is a public entity – there are not true negotiations but more action to 
pressure elected officials to enact the demands of the coalition’s CBA document.  The 
FCCG also used their connections to meet with the IDOT secretary in Washington DC 
and others, to get their signatures.  As Heideman explains, FCCG contacted Senator 
Dick Durbin, and the other state representatives, then spent almost two years working 
with I-DOT and the main railroad company - Union Pacific – to craft the language 
around how the development would unfold.   “(FCCG) spent a lot of time speaking with 
decision makers, then even more time sitting down with the I-DOT council, going 
through each of our CBA points to ensure they were things they could agree to.  There 
was an attorney involved to craft the legal language written into it” (Heideman, 2012).  
Thusfar Senator Durban supports it, but will not sign until the three Republican 
Representatives sign it.  Unfortunately, according to Heideman (2012), the CBA is 
mixed up in the larger bi-partisan battle over the funding of high speed rail, but the 
FCCG has received signatures from the Mayor of Springfield, the County chair, and US 
congress-member Kim Johnson, who sits on the Federal Transportation and 
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Infrastructure Committee. The IDOT commissioner has publicly endorsed it (Heideman, 
2012). 
As Heideman admits, the CBA developed by the FCCG is more or less a moral 
document which utilizes contract language.  The FCCG are also working on a labour 
agreement, and both documents have had the benefit of legal advice paid for through 
their affiliation with the TEN organiztion.  Therefore, the main and critical work to do, 
according to Heideman, involves IDOT and those that control IDOT in actually signing 
on to and implementing the CBA.  The Coalition is also hoping to export their work to 
other communities along the high speed rail line, including Chicago and St. Louis.  
Furthermore, they’re hoping that their legally crafted template can be taken up in other 
communities struggling with CBA’s around transportation infrastructure projects.  
Articles in the State-Journal Legislature (Stroisch, 2011) and the Illinois Times 
(Dillemuth, 2011) outline the Faith Coalition’s strategy for acquiring State and Federal 
signatories, and question why officials have been slow to sign the document. 
As Heideman concludes, “It’s so important to develop relationships with decision 
makers and though it’s a lot of work, it’s amazing to see how the people in the 
community can come up with great ideas and move forward with them.  Our state-wide 
and national affiliations help us to realize that we are working on something bigger than 





Minneapolis, MN; Bassett Creek Valley/Harrison Neighborhood 
The Harrison Neighborhood Association has been working with the Bryn Mawr 
Neighborhood Association, local businesses, residents and the city of Minneapolis to 
develop a master redevelopment plan for the Bassett Creek Valley; a 230-acre, largely 
industrial site that borders both the neighborhoods (Aliance for Metropolitan Stability, no 
date).  An interview with Larry Hiscock, twelve-year President of the Harrison 
Neighborhood Association (HNA), provided background for the benefits they are 
seeking surrounding the Bassett Creek Valley Plan put forth by the City of Minneapolis.  
The interview was conducted by telephone and digitally recorded, with permission, on 
March 4, 2012.  Originally outlined in 1998 and approved by Minneapolis City Council 
on January 12, 2007 (City of Minneapolis, 2012), the Bassett Creek Valley Master Plan 
“advocates redevelopment of this outmoded industrial landscape into more than three 
thousand housing units, 2.5 million square feet of commercial space and the 
establishment of nearly 40 acres of new open space ... [which] represents an increase 
in the Valley’s real estate value from roughly 50 million dollars today to well over 1 
billion dollars after redevelopment” (Hoisington Koegler Group, Inc., 2007, pp. ES-1).  
As the Aliance for Metropolitan Stability suggests, while the Master Plan may bring jobs, 
housing and economic development opportunities to the inhabitants of the adjacent 
neighborhoods, there is also general skepticism about what redevelopment of the valley 
will really mean for the community, and a need to make sure this is not business as 
usual (Aliance for Metropolitan Stability, no date). 
According to Hiscock, these communities have been active for a long time, 
working with business owners - sometimes in conflict with the owners - and there have 
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been previous proposals for Valley redevelopment that have not included community 
input, protested by area residents. The city eventually initiated a “Master Planning 
Process” which the community had been asking for for many years.  There were three 
basic stakeholders, described by Hiscock (2012), the Harrison neighborhood (low and 
moderate income, 70% visible minorities), the “Bryn Mawr” neighborhood (upper middle 
class, homogeneous, primarily white), and the valley business owners association.  
There were others on the formal “Redevelopment Oversight Committee” (ROC) 
(Hoisington Koegler Group, Inc., 2007), representing various wards around the City on 
the planning board, but these three were the ‘real’ stakeholders.  This ROC advisory 
group was convened by the City of Minneapolis to implement the Bassett Creek Valley 
Master plan. 
The HNA had an “alternative” process as well, outside of the City sanctioned 
ROC, Harrison was working throughout the city partnering with strategic allies that could 
put their political clout, and technical expertise, behind the HNA: As Hiscock suggests, 
this gave the neighbourhood coalition more “power” to influence decision makers, 
“especially the faith-based groups” (Hiscock, 2012) like MICAH and ISIAH, for turnout 
and support.  They represented influence outside the neighborhood, with other 
Councillors throughout Minneapolis.  The immigrant groups were a great benefit as well, 
helping to spread the message, and the Alliance for Metropolitan Stability provided 
technical expertise regarding CBAs and connecting with resources (Hiscock, 2012).  
These allies were not technically part of the ROC because that process was reserved 




Breaking down the coalition into the subgroups was based on people’s interests 
and abilities, skills and background; people gravitated to where they were comfortable 
or experienced (ibid.).  HNA had a negotiating team of neighborhood residents that 
came together from a variety of backgrounds and technical assistance from all over the 
City (ibid.).  The HNA coalition didn’t choose to exclude anyone from the group 
necessarily, however as Hiscock (2012) explains, there were some business interests 
that “self-selected themselves out of the process”, by not agreeing to the values that the 
community had articulated, or dealing directly with the developer to attempt to secure 
beneficial labour arrangements.  Furthermore, the Bryn-Mawr neighborhood did not 
participate much outside of the “formal” channels because “they really believe in the 
‘trickle-down’ component, that if you just work hard and encourage development, 
something’s going to happen for you.  Ideas of community support or job linkage did not 
appeal to them.  Their concerns were around bike trails and green space” (Hiscock, 
2012). 
Generally, the HNA looked to work with minority and low income residents within 
their own, and adjacent neighborhoods.  “Throughout Minneapolis”, states Hiscock, 
“we’re seeing a pattern of disinvestment and a very weak link between public 
investment and real improvement in the existing/surrounding communities. This promise 
of benefits, which developers and the public sector have failed to deliver in Minneapolis, 
has made people much more demanding regarding development plans and what 
benefits they (the community) look to secure” (Hiscock, 2012).  “Ensuring those benefits 
actually appear ... is what we (HNA) are hoping to achieve” (ibid.).  For a further 
explanation of the goals of the coalition, see Figure 5 on page 125.  
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The developer (Ryan companies) refused to sit down with HNA for over nine 
months.  They were working with the City to secure exclusive development rights for the 
area, but did not have plans for what they were going to build.  HNA did a lot of 
background research and educating within the coalition, so that when they finally spoke 
directly with the developer, the coalition had a good level of understanding regarding 
how the process worked.  Deliberations continued for nine months, mostly around 
concepts, because the developer was seeking support from HNA without concrete 
development plans, end users, etc. and was reluctant to talk about hiring practices, 
wages and these kinds of benefits (Hiscock, 2012). 
The group never actually got to the point of having “final negotiations” with Ryan 
Companies or the City, and they were not negotiating the particulars that will/would 
require much more community input (Hiscock, 2012) because Ryan Companies had still 
not put forward a real development plan.  Based on HNA’s background organizing, and 
the fight for inclusion in the public process that had taken place over the previous 
decade, it was unnecessary to go back to the community for every decision.  At the 
negotiating table, Hiscock was the most consistent face:  the City did not really 
participate in these talks for a number of reasons.  First, according to Hiscock, the City 
maintained that they “already do community benefits (through the sanctioned ROC), so 
we (the City) don’t need to be part of the CBA process”.  Second, for legal reasons, they 
didn’t want to be “bound up” in the procedure, and as Hiscock states, “it made (City 
employees) feel bad to think that they weren’t doing their jobs well, or didn’t know how 
to do them”,(ibid.) that the community wanted to negotiate separately with the 
 109 
 
developer.  The Bassett Creek Valley Master Plan, in the Executive Summary, sums up 
the CBA experience in this way:  
Ryan Companies has partnered with the community, investing significant time, expertise and 
dollars over the past 18 months, to create this master plan. The ROC, as representatives of 
the Harrison and Bryn Mawr neighborhoods recommends that Ryan Companies be named 
Master Developer for Bassett Creek Valley. Ryan Companies is prepared to immediately 
begin work with the ROC, the community and the City on implementation, as well as act as 
liaison on the different aspects of the development with the development community. 







Figure 5: (previous page) Chart comparing outcomes to priorities regarding Bassett Creek CBA 
Source: created by Larry Hiscock, January 12, 2009, (used with permission) 
 
Hiscock describes feeling lucky regarding the experience that HNA went through, 
both in the ROC and in the “external’ process, because they did not have to compete to 
be heard with a number of different stakeholders or interest groups.  The HNA, 
representing the social justice component, were the only ones looking out for this 
(Hiscock, 2012).  As stated, Bryn-Mawr was advocating for the green space, etc. and 
they weren’t really at the table in terms of a coalition “making noise” (ibid.).   
Finally the ROC (including Harrison Neighborhood) and the developer came to 
an agreement with the Bassett Creek Valley Master Plan.  The City rezoned the lands to 
reflect that plan - including rezoning the former valley rail yard to ‘office/residential’, and 
had both the plan and zoning ratified by the regional planning body (Hiscock, 2012).  
However, another layer of frustration arose following the agreement, rezoning and 
ratification of the Master Plan: The County, though they had been notified of the CBA 
continuously over the nearly two-year process, had simultaneously undertaken their 
own transit planning process (ibid.).  Making decisions as to where they are going to 
store the regional commuter rail cars/trains to the west of the downtown, there are two 
existing yards; Linden and Cedar.  Cedar yards is owned by the county and adjacent to 
a very affluent neighborhood, and the Linden yards are Municipally owned, adjacent to 
low income Harrison neighborhood, and already rezoned for ‘office/residential’ land 
uses.  The County has determined that the Linden yards is the best place for the 
commuter rail switching and storage: “nobody wants to put the rail yard there near the 
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rich folks” (Hiscock, 2012).  This is the current discussion going on between the City, 
County, Harrison Neighborhood Association, developer and other stakeholders. 
In describing some of the coalition partners, Hiscock makes an interesting 
observation.  While all organizations involved in the process are familiar with negotiating 
to some degree, for some immigrant organizations the idea of negotiating something 
with the government, or over development, isn’t a regular occurrence (Hiscock, 2012).  
The Laotian, Somali and other immigrant citizens groups in Minneapolis found it strange 
to negotiate with the government, or anyone, regarding development because this is not 
something that typically happens in their home countries.  In the end they were 
supportive and understanding of the reasons, as well as what a CBA was, and their 
support was quite important throughout the process. 
Hiscock provided an interesting anecdote regarding a vote at the City, whether 
the Council would support the CBA in principle and pass the Master Plan: “For the vote 
we had about 70 people turn out, of which about 20 were from the Southeast Asian 
community.  These are people that don’t speak a lot of english, but they know they have 
to be there to make a difference (ibid.).  The mayor, frustrated that in his opinion the 
immigrant groups “didn’t really know why they were there” made further comment that 
“these people can’t even vote” (Hiscock, 2012)!  Others accused HNA of using people 
as props. 
Finally, because of the hybrid nature of the agreement, a City sanctioned 
negotiation of principles between the community coalition and the developer, with the 
outcome adopted by Council in the Master Plan, but not truly a “negotiated agreement” 
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in the purest sense, a strategy not unlike other more “legislated” agreements needed to 
be employed.  Hiscock (2012) explains that in Minneapolis there is an underlying 
agreement that as Council members don’t vote against the local Councillor when it’s an 
issue in their ward.  So, “you have to work very hard to make sure the (elected official) 
in your ward really understands what it is you’re trying to achieve and is on board with it” 
(Hiscock, 2012). 
 
Wilmington, Delaware: Peninsula Compost/ South Wilmington Coalition for a 
Sustainable Community CBA 
Southbridge is an historic residential neighbourhood in Wilmington, DE that has a 
predominately African American population today and large tracts of vacant land 
(Thomas, 2010).  The Southbridge Civic Association became proactive around the idea 
that the community should have some input as to how potential developments in 
Southbridge would unfold, rather than just “being consumers” of them (Thomas, 2012).  
Through an introduction, Marvin Thomas – President of the Southbridge Civic 
Association – began speaking with Julian Gross (Partnership for Working Families 
Legal Counsel) about the idea of Community Benefits Agreements.  From there, the 
“South Wilmington Coalition for a Sustainable Community” (SWCSC), was created as 
an opportunity for provider agencies, community organizations, unions and faith based 
organizations to come together to discuss community benefits. The Southbridge Civic 
Association was one of these groups (Thomas, 2012).  Around this time discussions 
had begun around a local commercial development, and Julian Gross agreed to provide 
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a half day workshop for the newly minted coalition, along with representatives of the 
City and State governments and local academics.  A failed first attempt at negotiating a 
CBA with the commercial developer, who “just stopped meeting with us” (Thomas, 
2012), following the community’s desire to restrict some businesses from becoming 
tenants did not faze the coalition.  Soon after, SWCSC was approached by a developer, 
at the behest of the City, who intended to open a large composting facility on another 
vacant Southbridge parcel. 
The South Wilmington Coalition for a Sustainable Community was comprised of 
a diverse network of Wilmington community groups, service providers, faith 
organizations and labour unions, many of whom were active in the Southbridge 
neighbourhood.  Coalition members include:  
o The Southbridge Civic 
Association 
o Neighborhood House Inc. 
o Henrietta Johnson Medical 
Center 
o Mt. Joy United Methodist Church 
o New Calvary Baptist Church 
o Martin Luther King Center 
o International Longshoreman’s 
Association 
o Local 199 Labour Union 
o Wilmington Housing Authority 
o Southbridge Resident Council 
o Be Ready Community 
Development Corp. 
o New Millennium Development 
Corp. 
o Global Solutions 
Figure 6: List of SWCSC members 
Source: (Thomas, 2010) 
 
Members of the coalition had not previously worked all together, though some 
had partnered, and most were at least aware of the other (Thomas, 2012).  According to 
Thomas there was a “commitment letter” which each member signed.  A commitment to 
the goals and objectives of the coalition, which the member organizations drafted in 
concert.  This statement had to be reviewed by the individual boards of each member 
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organization prior to their signing, to ensure it reflected the perspective of the 
organization and not just the individual who was signing. 
As far as organizing or coalition building, the member organizations did not 
spend a lot of time phone canvassing or letter writing because, according to Thomas 
(2012), the civic associations and other groups involved already had a very good 
network of community involvement, based on the longstanding work done prior to the 
formation of the coalition, in their respective communities.  Within the coalition, as far as 
administration, there were no paid positions.  Work was done strictly voluntarily, though 
some of the member organizations do have paid staff. 
When coalition organizers first identified which groups should be included in the 
faction, Union’s participation brought concerns from both sides, according to Thomas 
(2012).  However, it was decided collectively that because union members are part of 
the Southbridge community and that it would be more beneficial to have them there 
than to lose them altogether, the SWCSC decided to involve both Local 199 and the 
Longshoremen (ibid.).  As Thomas (2012) suggests, “It’s important to have them there 
so that later no one will ask – why aren’t they at the table?”  The unions were 
questioning their involvement because the construction of the facility was not going to 
be done by union labour.  With concerns over the coalition splitting, the SWCSC 
brokered a meeting between the compost facility and the local union representatives 
where they could discuss their differences and work them out.  Following this meeting, 
the union returned to the coalition and said they were now happy (Thomas, 2012).  




Because Southbridge is the smallest community in Wilmington - according to 
Thomas (2012) “a very tight knit group” – they, “know when they are being 
representative” (ibid.).  Therefore, there were never any challenges to their legitimacy or 
representativeness.  Furthermore, despite the compost facility being a regional facility, 
no other groups came forward to join the coalition.  Southbridge, and the coalition, are 
the only groups in the State of Delaware who have been successful in negotiating and 
implement Community Benefits Agreements (Thomas, 2012). 
Prior to the commercial development or the compost facility negotiations, the 
SWCSC created mission/vision/values statements and goals for the coalition; 
o Mission = Ensure that economic development and land use planning decisions 
affecting South Wilmington bring measurable, permanent improvement to the 
lives of residents. 
o Vision = A vibrant, thriving community attainable for low to moderate income 
families by advocacy for living wages, employment, economic  and business 
ownership opportunities. 
o Values = Equity, Accountability, Integrity, Inclusiveness, and Empowerment 
And the Goals included: 
o Negotiating CBAs with private and public sector developers. 
o Securing the use of union labour and labour entities that incorporate training and 
apprenticeship opportunities. 
o Livable wages for jobs created with a preference for full-time, permanent jobs to 
be located in the community. 
o Advocating for environmentally sound policies and practices. 
Figure 7: SWCSC mission, vision and values 
Source: (Thomas, 2010, slides 8 & 9) 
 
Marvin Thomas became one of the three local residents who formed the 
“negotiating team” for the CBA discussions.  Looking back to the SWCSC’s first attempt 
with the commercial developer illustrates some of the goals and problems with the 
process.  According to Thomas (2012), initially the discussions went fine, but during the 
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process the SWCSC and the developer hit a roadblock.  As stated, the community 
wanted the ability to negotiate businesses that they did not want in the new strip mall, 
and both parties had agreed to this point.  Southbridge, which is statistically, a low-
income, visible minority community with high unemployment, low graduation, 
predominantly female-headed households and 25% of the community in low-income 
housing, did not concur with the developer when informed that a principle tenant of the 
development would be a payday loans business.  “The community absolutely did not 
want this type of predatory business in the neighborhood”, (Thomas, 2012), and the 
developer just stopped meeting with SWCSC after this roadblock. 
In Wilmington, as in many municipalities across North America, part of a rezoning 
application requires that the proponent meet with the community.  This is to attempt to 
get the support of the neighbourhood prior to going to the zoning board for a hearing.  If 
the community supports the development, they provide a written letter that is submitted 
to the zoning board and put into the minutes of that hearing:  “If we’re opposed, we do 
the very same thing” (Thomas, 2012).  This means that the government is not involved 
in the meeting or negotiations prior to the community providing their support or not.  In 
fact, according to Thomas (2012), Julian Gross of the Partnership for Working Families 
emphasized that local government must not be involved in the CBA negotiation process: 
Just the developer and the coalition.   
So, when the SWCSC was approached by the Peninsula Compost Facility to 
discuss with them their intentions and to garner community support, according to 
Thomas (2012) it was an entirely different process.  There was no public money 
involved – the compost facility needed zoning approval, but was receiving no incentives, 
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tax breaks or other money, to Thomas’ knowledge (ibid.).  There was some 
unwillingness by community members to have this type of facility in their neighborhood 
– according to local Councillor Hanifa Shabazz, “the citizens of Wilmington didn’t want, 
what they felt was, a luxury garbage dump in their backyard” (Shabazz, 2010).  The 
developers took community members on a tour of their existing facilities to ensure they 
were comfortable with what they were getting in to. 
Zoning approval for the compost was granted on February 27, and the 
Community Benefits Agreement was signed on February 28, 2008 (Lavine, 2008b).  
The agreement was legally binding between the coalition and Peninsula Compost 
Company (BioCycle Regional Roundup, 2008).  The Community Benefits included: 
o 20% local hiring requirement  
o 20% minority hiring requirement  
o Creation of a 24-hour community 
hotline for residents to file 
complaints against any element 
of the construction process  
o Ban on construction trucks using 
local residential roads  
o Funding for a job training 
program  
o Requirement to employ only local 
contractors  
o Neighborhood parking lot 
 
Figure 8: Community Benefits won through Peninsula Compost CBA 
Source: (LaSalle, 2011) 
 
According to Thomas (2012) the compost facility CBA success is partly due to 
the developer wanting, or at least believing, in the CBA as much as the community.  
The facility itself has done some promotion for Community Benefits Agreements, 
presenting their experiences at the Tulane University conference – “Win-Win-Win; The 
Advantages of CBAs for the Community, Developers, Government, and You!”, in 2010.  
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Since negotiating with the compost facility the SWCSC has signed on to three 
more area CBAs (Thomas, 2012).  Therefore, in Thomas’ opinion, he doesn’t believe 
that the CBA process hinders local development, as some critics have suggested (ibid.).  
Finally, as Thomas states, “Each time, the process has become less and less 
controversial or difficult because we’re developing a track record of negotiating in good 
faith” (ibid.). 
The following table provides a summary of the cases including the approximate 
year the work began, the year the agreement was signed or brought into force (if 




Case Study Summary 













- $2 million for the creation of a 
grocery store  
- Prohibition of developer 
interference with how workers 
choose union representation.  
- Multi-purpose center for youth, 
families, and seniors 
- First source hiring for construction 
jobs and jobs contracted or 
leased with the Arena 
- $6 million to support economic 
development, drug treatment and 
mental health services in 
neighbourhood  
- Adherence to wage standards for 
each designated industry, 
including health benefits. 
OneDC (Washington 
DC) 
Shaw District/ “Duke” plan 
redevelopment 
2005 2011 
- affordable housing 
- first source hiring 
- job training 
- community development fund 
OaklandWORKS 
(Oakland, CA) 
Oakland Army Base 2009 2012 
- local hiring 
- disadvantaged hiring 
- living wages,  
- restrictions on temporary worker 
usage 






Purina Mills Factory 
Redevelopment 
2005 2008 
- 30% affordable rental units 
- no more than 60% of units in any 
one building may be “affordable” 
- living wage 
- 30% local retailers  
- 10% “Community Based Small 
Businesses” (defined in CBA) 
- Implementation Committee that to 
oversee CBA 
- Binding arbitration clause  
Los Angeles Alliance for 
the New Economy 
[LAANE] 
(Los Angeles, CA) 
Expansion of Los Angeles 
Airport (LAX) 
Circa 2002 2004 
Approx. 80 “wants” (Smart, 2012) 
- job training 
-  living-wage requirements 
- Soundproofing of local schools, 
city buildings, places of worship 
and homes 
- air study funding,  
- emissions reductions  
- Incorporation of CBA provisions 
within all airport contracts 
(contractors bound to CBA) 
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Canal Side Community 
Alliance  
(Buffalo, NY) 
Erie Canal/Buffalo Harbour 
Redevelopment 
2008 2010 
- Environmentally friendly 
construction and operations 
- Support for local independent 
businesses 
- Mixed income housing 
- Targeted hiring objectives for 
construction and permanent jobs.   
- Living wages  
- Support for minority and female-
owned businesses as commercial 
tenants 




Demolition of Expressway 
opening up development 
lands owned by the 
County 
2002 2005 
- Living wages for construction jobs 
- Implement job training programs.  
- Affordable housing 
- Training and placement for 
minority workers 
- Community and Economic 
Development Fund, with money 
from land sales, to fund the 
Community Advisory Board to 
oversee and monitor 
implementation of the CBA 
Faith Coalition for the 
Common Good [FCCG] 
(Springfield, IL) 
High speed rail 
development 
2009 2011 
- Relocation Assistance 
- Local Hiring 
- Money for job training 
- Equal Opportunity for workers 
and for consultants 

















- Avoid displacement 
- create affordable housing 
- Hire locally 
- Include meaningful community 
involvement 
- Redevelopment Oversight 
Committee 
- Environmental Stewardship 
South Wilmington 







- 20% construction for minority 
contractors 
- 20% jobs, fulltime/part time for 
local area residents 
- Designated truck route, $500 fine 
if violated 
- 24-hour toll free hotline 
- Funding for a job training program  
- Requirement to employ only local 
contractors  
- Neighborhood parking lot 




Chapter 6: Analysis of Three Themes 
Representation - Creating a Solid and Diverse Base  
As illustrated in the literature review, the key academic warnings and concerns 
regarding CBAs have focused almost entirely on representation and legitimacy.  
Concerns were also raised that in some cases the organizing activists themselves could 
be the beneficiaries of the CBA rather than local residents (Wolf-Powers, 2010), and 
that a representative coalition could remove this apprehension. However, aside from 
stating that it was important or essential, there was very little discussion regarding how 
that was to be achieved.  As Gross (2008) states, it is in the best interest of the 
community coalition to involve as many people as possible, and that only a broadly 
representative group of local actors would have the ear of government to be able to 
influence the process and sign a CBA.   
In many of the interviews it was indicated that the coalitions were questioned, 
both internally and externally, regarding their legitimacy and representativeness.  Most 
of the time these concerns were “easily addressed” because coalitions could present 
lists of participant addresses, local residents knew the faces of the people on the 
various committees, and most of the groups interviewed indicated that they spent a 
great deal of time knocking on doors, hosting information dinners and ‘postering’ the 
neighbourhoods that they felt would be affected.  As the coalitions grew locally, word- 
of-mouth would attract those residents who were initially reluctant and those groups that 
initially didn’t want/need to participate.    
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In the case of both the Hill District in Pittsburgh and the Port/Army Base 
Redevelopment in Oakland the coalitions were surprised to find other groups claiming to 
represent the community either negotiating in advance of the community coalition or 
taking a seat at the bargaining table when the negotiations began.  In Pittsburgh a 
group that had been assembled by the government and the developer were claiming to 
be representing the community.   After some political wrangling - including a televised 
public burning of an arranged CBA document signed by the “backroom coalition” 
(Redwood, 2012), the developer and local government – the OneHill coalition were 
invited to participate in the creation of the CBA.  According to Redwood (2012) it wasn’t 
necessary to “prove” representation of the coalition as the people who lived in the 
neighbourhood knew that OneHill was comprised of people who they knew from the 
area:  People that had been knocking on their doors, sharing information and inviting 
them to participate.  Therefore, because OneHill had spent time doing grassroots 
organizing it was not, according to Redwood, difficult to demonstrate that they were 
really the ones representing the community, at least to the community.   
Similarly in the Oakland Army Base/OaklandWORKS campaign, a group of 
developers and trade unions were negotiating a labour agreement for the 
redevelopment when a City employee was invited to join them.  When she arrived, “to a 
group of about thirty-five white men sitting around a table making a deal” (Epstein, 
2012), she informed the mayor who ensured that future discussions included 
OaklandWORKS.   Once OaklandWORKS arrived, the previous arrangements – made 
by the developer and trade unions – were re-negotiated with the community group 
present (Epstein, 2012).  In the case of the Los Angeles Airport expansion the 
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legitimacy of the group was challenged by local politicians, some individuals, and a 
neighbourhood group that had chosen not to participate in the CBA.  LAANE had 
reached out to this group repeatedly but the neighbourhood association did not what to 
join.  In the latter stages of the CBA process the association publicly questioned if the 
LAANE-led CBA group was representative.  However, LAANE had a trail of letters and 
emails that proved the group was asked to participate and decided not to.    Here again 
it was the initial grassroots organizing and early work (flyers, website, door knocking, 
meetings) that ensured the members of the community were familiar with the local 
residents claiming to be representative.   
As Reverend Smart (2012) states, it’s hard to get individuals to participate 
without them being part of a larger group.  The best way to get individuals out is through 
door to door campaigning (ibid.).  Going door-to-door was a common theme in many of 
the coalitions examined, such as Oakland, Washington DC, Milwaukee and Springfiled.  
However, the Springfield example is quite interesting because they were a faith based 
coalition – the “Faith Coalition for the Common Good” (FCCG) that did one-on-one 
organizing but encouraged people to join through their church or other faith-based, 
political, or environmental groups (Heideman, 2012).  The FCCG then trained 
approximately 180 representatives from the various groups (around grassroots 
organizing and community benefits agreements) and had those individuals return to 
those they represented to further train and organize them. 
In Oakland it was stated that the group had trouble engaging youth groups, and 
specific immigrant populations such as the SE Asian community and the Latin 
community, though it wasn’t for lack of trying (Gordon, 2012).  In Washington, Moulden 
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(2007) stated that they don’t have strong representation from the middle-class black 
population because in his mind they just want change but aren’t concerned with the 
nature of the change.  Epps-Addison (2012) was candid in her admittance that, “the 
events (protests, rallies, etc.) were attended by primarily whites and very heavily union 
represented and clearly that is not the demographics of the City of Milwaukee.” 
Milwaukee, according to Epps-Addison is a city where people of colour make up the 
majority and they are underrepresented in the unions.    
As mentioned in some of the coalitions there were groups that just outright did 
not want to participate in the early stages, but oftentimes these groups would come 
back to the table (Smart, 2012; Epps-Addison, 2012; Fife, 2012).  Fife (2012) suggests 
that it’s difficult to get people to come out for the early coalition building, planning and 
determining the structure – the “unsexy work”, but that there’s a noticeable difference in 
the number of people out supporting the cause when the “cameras are on” (ibid.).  
However, these late joiners and publicity seekers are usually welcomed because it’s 
difficult to build and sustain these coalitions (Epps-Addison, 2012).  The representative-
ness of the groups is often measured by sheer numbers, signatures, addresses and 
maps that demonstrate who is involved when questions of legitimacy arise. 
Based on my interviews it is apparent that although coalition building was 
undertaken strategically, when questions of legitimacy arose the coalitions often let their 
organizing efforts speak for themselves:  They knew when they were representative and 
were not hesitant to demonstrate it through their collected communications, town hall 
meetings and referendum votes, and by simply pressing on, and continuing the struggle 
even when questioned.  The literature (Been, 2010; Gross, LeRoy, & Janis-Aparicio, 
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2005; Wolf-Powers, 2010) supports these findings to the extent that most authors 
specify the necessity of a broad and representative coalition.  As well, Gross (2008) 
identifies, and the cases herein corroborate, it is in the best interest of the coalition to 
involve as many people/groups as possible to help build leverage.  As Moulden (2012) 
states regarding the OneDC coalition, “everyone is welcome at our meetings, we don’t 
exclude any people or groups.” 
As suggested by the existing CBA literature, the cases that I have analyzed 
demonstrate the amount of effort organizers put forth to ensure their coalitions are 
considered representative, particularly where a missing element or weak link was 
identified.  This was necessary as there was evidence of attempts to “divide and 
conquer” through the signing an agreement that would benefit certain groups and 
exclude other (Gross, LeRoy, & Janis-Aparicio, 2005) and/or “cherry-picking” groups 
that could be easily swayed or easy to negotiate with (Been, 2010) while avoiding the 
difficult groups.  Obviously Pittsburgh and Oakland are very salient examples of this 
phenomenon, however the experience of the Harrison neighbourhood in Minneapolis is 
also of interest.  As discussed, the City of Minneapolis had ordained a “Redevelopment 
Oversight Committee” to implement the Bassett Master Plan.  The committee included 
two neighbourhood associations and the valley business association, among other 
individual representatives, and City staff.  And while the Harrison neighbourhood – the 
most racially diverse and economically distressed of the three participants – contributed 
to the ‘official’ process, they continued their efforts to organize, inform, educate, and 
solicit support for a community benefits agreement outside of the confines of the City 
process (Hiscock, 2012).   In fact the City was not interested in a community benefits 
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agreement at all, stating that they “already do community benefits” (ibid.) and therefore 
don’t need to have a formal agreement.  In this instance the City did not want to directly 
engage the Harrison neighbourhood and instead set up their own process, choosing to 
cherry-pick those groups that were easier to work with and attempt to minimize the 
impact of the Harrison neighbourhood. (ibid.) 
As Epps-Addison (2012)indicates there were attempts in the Milwaukee case to 
use the white/unionist appearance of the coalition to try and drive a wedge between the 
compact and the community they were fighting for, as an argument to dodge the CBA 
discussion.   However, the policies the Milwaukee coalition was arguing for supported 
minority and female hiring and a living wage for all. “The coalition had the best interests 
of everyone at heart” regardless of their skin colour or socio-economic background 
(ibid.).  This raises an interesting question, one that Micaela Shappiro-Shellaby (2012) 
indicated that the CanalSide coalition was asked directly, “what gives you the right to 
represent the community?” As indicated during our interview, “I have not come up with a 
perfect answer, but (the coalition) legitimately does represent local labour, local 
business, local community and faith groups” (ibid.).  In her mind the question points to 
the bigger issue of, “what community or who is being affected by the development?”  
“It’s always a struggle (to answer)” (ibid.) when questioned about the 
representativeness of the group.   
In each case, not only did the coalition keep advocating and fighting for what they 
believed to be in the best interest of everyone, but they expanded beyond their local 
networks and enlisted larger groups with more political clout to get their message 
across.  Ensuring their group was viewed as representative, but also collaborating with 
 128 
 
strategic partners, that could enlist many supporters and, who had experience with 
these sorts of organizing efforts. 
 
Collaboration – Punching Above Your Weight 
A community group’s ability to win a CBA is directly related to how much 
power it has organized (Gross, LeRoy, & Janis-Aparicio, 2005, p. i).   
A key strategy employed by the community groups in the cases I have identified 
was to partner with other actors functioning at a regional or national level; i.e. actors 
with broader connections and resources.  This corresponds with urban regime theory 
which posits that groups that are more marginalized need to recruit partners operating 
at various levels to affect the decision making process (Stone, 2005).  This multi-layered 
collaboration was evidenced in almost all of the cases. 
One of the primary nationwide collaborators is an organization known as The 
Partnership for Working Families (PWF) which is a “national network leading regional 
advocacy organizations” (Partnership for Working Families, 2008a) that helps, 
“organize, negotiate, and implement precedent-setting community benefits agreements 
(CBAs) around the country,” (Partnership for Working Families, 2008b) among other 
efforts.  While little historical information is available about this group, the PWF have 
been directly and indirectly linked to numerous CBA agreements across the United 
States and to several of the cases I have examined.  In Pittsburgh it was the Hill District 
Consensus Group’s partnership with Pittsburgh United - another group aligned with the 
Partnership for Working Families - that allowed them to gain access to some CBA 
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funding when they formed OneHill with Pittsburgh United and the other coalition 
members (Redwood, 2012).  The Harrison Neighbourhood received assistance from 
faith based group ISIAH – an affiliate of the Partnership for Working Families – and, 
according to Hiscock (2012) the group “really benefitted from a strong network of other 
organizations”, not only for resources but for helping with turnout to events, etc.  In 
Wilmington, DE it was the direct involvement of Julian Gross – lawyer, author and oft-
quoted CBA expert - whose conversations with Marvin Thomas lead to the formation of 
the South Wilmington Coalition for a Sustainable Community (SWCSC) and who visited 
to speak regarding “capacity building” and community benefits in general. (Thomas, 
2012)  Gross has written for and been linked to the Community Benefits Law Center, 
which is an off-shoot of the Partnership for Working Families.  In Buffalo the Canal Side 
Community Alliance received advice and used the resources of the PWF and other 
“enlist(ed) allies” (Stone, 2005, p. 313) 
Another important consideration in creating these regional and national 
partnerships is to align strategically with networks that have experience dealing in the 
general (or specific) subject area of the CBA struggle.  For example, the Faith Coalition 
for the Common Good (FCCG) in Springfield, IL was focused on a state-wide high-
speed rail project that would link Chicago and St. Louis.  The group’s regional and 
national coalition building focused on partnering with the Illinois Department of 
Transportation (I-DOT) and the Transportation Equity Network (TEN) – which is 
comprised of more than 350 grassroots organizations spanning 41 states, seeking to 
establish an equity-based national transportation system. (Transportation Equity 
Network, 2014).  As Heideman (2012) explains, it was the mentorship of TEN that really 
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helped the FCCG focus, organize, and train their community champions.  The LAX 
coalition for Economic, Environmental and Educational Justice used resources and 
experiences from some of the first California CBAs and partnered early on with the Los 
Angeles Alliance for the New Economy (LAANE) who had worked on other early 
California CBAs.  As Smart (2012) indicates, “at the time (of the Los Angeles Airport 
CBA) there were no national CBA groups” however, the group enlisted national 
environmental groups such as the Coalition for Clean Air and labour unions including 
the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) and the Teamsters in order to 
provide them with some political clout and organizing capacity.   Since that time LAANE 
has become a member of the Partnership for Working Families and have been known to 
collaborate with and provide resources for other smaller-scale groups such as 
CanalSide in Buffalo. 
Another key theme was the need to solidify the central position of the community 
organization within the broader coalition, particularly in relation to unions.  It should be 
noted that the previously discussed Partnership for Working Families has a direct 
affiliation with national labour unions (Epstein, 2012) and therefore working with them is 
equated by some groups as working directly with trade unions.  As revealed through my 
interviews with OaklandWORKS, the group did not work with PWF explicitly for that 
reason.  “We specifically did not get assistance from the Partnership for Working 
Families because they are affiliated with national labour organizations.  If you involve 
them, then they tend to have their needs met first,” explained Epstein (2012).  As 
discussed in the literature review, tensions and distrust are well established between 
community-groups and trade unions (Levi, 2001).  As the cases herein demonstrate, 
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aside from the OaklandWORKS example and despite these relationship strains, unions 
play a role in almost all CBA negotiations but it is important for the grassroots 
organization to establish their goals, policies and ‘wants’ prior to collaborating with the 
highly organized and politically connected national labour and trade unions.   
In the Milwaukee PERC, because the coalition had come together on behalf of, 
more so than with, the affected community, a lot of time was dedicated to building trust 
between the community, the coalition and one of their key strategic partners, a large 
construction union (Epps-Addison, 2012).  “Unions in Milwaukee have a very tenuous 
relationship with the black community, and within that community there’s a lot of distrust 
with the unions based on historic divisions and policies.  The unions are not particularly 
diverse even today.” (ibid.)  The ability of the coalition to get the union’s buy-in, even if 
the coalition members were not seeking jobs for unionists, demonstrates how a strong 
core position - seeking to improve the lives of all people in Milwaukee through policies 
that benefit everyone who works on those sites; union or otherwise – can cajole the 
support of all types of strategic partners.  Notwithstanding their alliance with Pittsburgh 
United, who in turn were aligned with the Partnership for Working Families, the OneHill 
coalition, “…had a lot of pushback from the construction unions, who sign their own 
construction agreements and therefore don’t want anyone else getting benefits that 
might take away from their construction agreements.” (Redwood, 2012)  In both the 
Pittsburgh and Buffalo cases the developers were able to get the unions to come out 
against the coalitions, who were aligned – at a different level – with the unions 
themselves, or with different unions. (Shapiro-Shellaby, 2012; Redwood, 2012)  “It 
wasn’t that we didn’t want them involved,” Redwood (2012) indicates.  “We were trying 
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to get as many groups and people involved as we could; our main objective was to 
involve people from the neighborhood, but equally crucial was to get allies from outside 
the neighborhood involved.”  As Shapiro-Shellaby (2012) specifies, “when it comes to 
coalition building you need to include (the trade unions) but you have to have some sort 
of timeline for them, otherwise they’ll just go and sign an agreement themselves.”  
Therefore, having a strong central campaign and representative coalition prior 
collaborating with regional and national partners helps to ensure that the demands of 
the core group are not overrun, once they become more powerful and connected. 
The benefits derived from these partnerships are quite varied.  Oftentimes it 
revolves around influence and clout – which is where national orgaizations such as the 
Partnership for Working Families or Gamaliel (Springfield, Buffalo) can lend their 
‘weight’ to a small local coalition.  Sometimes it can involve access to money for 
research or legal representation, such as the partnership between OneHill and 
PittsburghUNITED.   From time to time these collaborations are formed as a way to gain 
knowledge about past experiences and strategies.   Examples include the Harrison 
neighbourhood in Minneapolis who benefitted from the resources and organizational 
power of their various collaborators (Hiscock, 2012) and the OneHill coalition’s alliance 
with PittsburghUNITED (and in turn the PWF) allowed them to access some national 
funds that were earmarked for community benefits agreements (Redwood, 2012).  It 
was a local University Professor’s connection to Julian Gross – CBA author and 
founding partner of the Community Benefits Law Center that put the Wilmington 
Deleware coalition in touch with the necessary knowledge and resources to push their 
efforts forward (Thomas, 2012). 
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Bechtel (2008) sets out some guidelines and best practices, related to the “neo-
institutional approach” articulated by Klein & Tremblay (2010), to be carried out by 
coaltions to help alleviate conflict from within – a problem that can arise when 
assembling collaborative partnerships (Salkin P. E., 2007).  The neo-institutional 
approach is used in analysis of the cooperation and coordination, which is shaped by 
compromises and prevailing institutional arrangements, that contributes to conflict 
resolution (Klein & Tremblay, 2010).  Bechtel (2008) recommends that coalitions 
establish by-laws and rules of governance, define what it means to be a member, and 
sign-on to overarching vision or purpose statements.  Furthermore, establishing a new 
legal entity which the various collaborators become members of may help to alleviate 
concerns surrounding cherry-picking and divide-and-conquer strategies discussed 
previously.  As Bechtel (ibid., p.146) suggests, “structuring efforts early on can 
significantly bolster the credibility and perhaps the long-term success of the effort.”  The 
following table provides some insight regarding the various coalitions and their adoption 
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Figure 10 – Chart outlining general coalition structure 
*Note: OaklandWORKS advocates for, “underrepresented and underserved communities in the areas of 
economics, social, and environmental justice” (OaklandWORKS, 2011) and was one of the signatories to 
the recently approved CBA.  Though they are a legal entity, they did not partner with REVIVEOakland or 
other signatories to form a coalition:  They created their own coalition. 
 
The preceding table demonstrates that a majority of the cases analyzed have 
implemented – whether consciously or otherwise – many of Bechtel’s (2008) suggested 
structures in some way or another.  It should be noted that Behctel’s recommendation 
that coalition(s) establish by-laws and rules of governance (ibid.) is in my opinion the 
natural outcome of becoming a legal entity, getting sign-on, establishing membership 
requirements and agreeing to a decision making process.  Therefore a separate column 
was not included.  These examples could be analyzed using a neo-institutional 
 136 
 
approach based on findings herein.  More detailed investigation of the individual cases 
and early structuring efforts would be necessary for a comprehensive discussion, but 
the cases I have examined demonstrate at least rudimentary implementation of what 
has been postulated by Bechtel as best practices for coalitions seeking to improve their 
accountability and success. 
In summary the cases described herein support the literature with regard to the 
emphasis on the necessity of partnering and collaboration.  While all of the CBAs 
examined demonstrate a willingness and ability to work together with other groups, 
actors and participants operating at a range of scales and across fields, each case 
illustrates the variety of ways this partnering and collaboration actually takes place – 
which is something the literature does not break down.  Groups select their 
collaborators for a number of different reasons including political clout, specific technical 
knowledge, to access certain resources or populations, for organizing power, etc.  The 
benefits agreements analyzed also demonstrated an adherence to the neo-institutional 
best practices outlined by Bechtel to assist with conflict avoidance and resolution.   The 
definition of a core or central position/mission for the group also helped to avoid conflict 
when dealing with and involving partners with different capacities and at different 
scales.  
 
The Role of Government 
Another area that has been discussed but not comprehensively explored in the 
academic literature is the role that local government plays in the community benefit 
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process.  This could be due to the common definition of “CBA” which speaks to the 
direct, bilateral relationship between the community and the developer (Gross, LeRoy, & 
Janis-Aparicio, 2005), because their role continues to be wrapped up in the articulated 
and fixed public process, or possibly because government responses to CBA efforts 
have been radically varied (Wolf-Powers, 2010), and inconsistent (Been, 2010), making 
it difficult to define a concrete position.   
The cases described herein each provide evidence of a varied and inconsistent 
response to the CBA process, and feature an interesting and diverse response from, 
and role for, government staff and elected officials.  For example, in Oakland, Mayor 
Dellums and his staff broke up the closed-door discussions that were going on between 
the Port of Oakland (public entity), labour groups and developers to ensure 
OaklandWORKS - a coalition of local area residents - had a place at the table and a 
voice in the deliberations (Epstein, 2012; Gordon, 2012).  In Wilmington, DE a local 
council member helped point the South Bridge Civic Association toward the CBA 
process and encouraged coalition building with other like-minded, local, faith and labour 
groups; then stepped aside so that the group could follow the advice of Julian Gross 
who stressed to them that “local government should not be involved” (Thomas, 2012).   
At the other extreme, there is the experience of the Park East Redevelopment 
Compact (PERC) in Milwaukee whose coalition of labour and business groups were 
turned down in their petitioning of municipal government for broad, general community 
benefits to be included in all downtown redevelopment policies was turned down by one 
vote at Council.  Fortunately for them, “county supervisors, responding to the political 
power and moral arguments of (the coalition)” (Wolf-Powers, 2010, p. 15), memorialized 
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the CBA measures regarding development on county owned lands (Epps-Addison, 
2012) shortly after.  Overall, seven of the ten case studies contained herein 
demonstrate at least a willingness of the local government to listen to, and in some 
cases work with, the coalition in an effort to better secure and distribute the identified 
benefits.  That being said, aside from Wilmington compost facility example, none of the 
community coalitions described their experience with the local government as 
straightforward.  Educating, lobbying, demonstrating, and pressuring local politicians 
and administrators throughout the CBA campaign was commonplace for coalition 
leaders and members.  However, the experience of the coalition regarding the 
Pittsburgh Penguins Arena could be described as an outlier – at least in the cases I 
have identified.  
The City of Pittsburgh - who had exercised their powers of eminent domain when 
the original Penguins arena was constructed in the 60s – this time attempted to put 
together their own community coalition, calling on local leaders and unions to participate 
in planning for the new public-private partnership for a new hockey arena: Plans that 
were already all but formalized. (Redwood, 2012)  Then, the City suspended these 
discussions due to what was described as community “bickering” and uncertainty 
around who was representing the community (ibid.).  Next, the city and the developer – 
the Pittsburgh Penguins hockey team – produced what they branded a community 
benefits agreement, a document that was composed during the “suspension” of the 
talks (ibid.).  This agreement was publicly denounced, and then physically set ablaze 
(Redwood, 2012; Young, 2008a), to make a statement that this was a contrived 
document that featured “nothing but vague promises and general concepts,” (Young, 
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2008a) not informed by community input (Redwood, 2012).  This time, the publicity of 
the “CBA burning” forced local government back to the table with the newly created 
OneHill Community Coalition.  As Redwood (2012) indicates however, the developer 
was rarely present because the City of Pittsburgh had already signed off on the stadium 
deal.  There was little incentive for the developer to be involved in the discussions 
(Young, 2008b).  Eventually the deal was signed by the OneHill coalition, the developer 
and the government, however the way that it is structured the benefits being delivered 
to the community are all reliant on the government.  With state and municipal subsidies 
estimated by the coalition at approximately $1 billion over the life of the agreement, the 
Penguins investment $1 million total into the community (Redwood, 2012) seems paltry.  
As for the idea that the local subsidies will trickle down to the community, Redwood 
states that the “players don’t pay tax locally and neither does the ... owner, and the 
employees (at the stadium) are barely making enough – part time and low wage – to 
make a living and not contributing much to the local taxes” (ibid.).  An example of 
government doing whatever it takes to attract and support the elements of capital 
production and investment, “blocking and covering” (ibid.) for the developer and working 
against the community. 
In Washington, Moulden (2012) attributes the decline in coalition support during 
their lengthy CBA process to comments by the local government that the group was not 
working in the greater interest of the city.  Collaboration from strategic partners dipped 
from 17 groups at the beginning to just 4 in the end, however community participation 
did not wane.  Furthermore, a change of Mayor during the 5-plus-year CBA campaign 
saw a supportive Mayor ousted and a newly elected official that was not interested in 
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the community benefits process (ibid., 2012). This lead to a sit-in at the Mayor’s office, a 
demonstration as his residence and other conflicts. 
With regard to the literature it is evident that government response to CBA 
campaigns is inconsistent (Been, 2010) and variable (Wolf-Powers, 2010).  These 
cases provide examples of government partnering with coalitions, governments being 
receptive to CBA requests, and governments acting as sabateurs throughout the 
process.  Gross et. al. (2005) speak to the preference and/or necessity of government 
removed from the CBA process, favouring bilateral agreements between communities 
and developers, only the Wilmington, DE compost facility example provides evidence 
that a hands-off approach by local government can be considered a key to success.  In 
all other examples the municipal government was either directly or indirectly involved in 
the process – either positively or negatively.  As Epps-Addison (2012) states, these 
(Milwaukee) experiences have changed the dynamic regarding what local coalitions can 
ask for and what local government should be doing to aid urban areas.  Moulden (2012) 
describes the local government as being one of the necessary targets of a CBA 
campaign, to ensure they’re doing what they can to assist the coalition in achieving their 
goals.  As Hiscock (2012) says, “there can and should be a role for government.  When 
(you) get to the point of agreement with the developer, these (benefit agreements) 
should be mirrored in the City development agreement.”  Memorializing the CBAs into 
the development agreement, as some herein have done, ensures that the neogitiated 
promises have some sort of teeth and political backing.  This view suggests that 
government’s role can be a central one, and that its place witin any CBA process, often 
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overlooked in most accounts, should be better integrated into existing and future 
analyses.  
The Role of Government 
Coalition Name (City) Nature/form of 
Gov’t Involvement 




- At negotiating table 
- Providing subsidies to 
developer and set up 
Development Corporation. 
- Acted in public against 
coalition, including 





but grew adversarial 
- Initially supportive but 
changed during CBA 
campaign 
- Providing subsidies to 
developer/own the land 
- At the table as Development 
Corp. 
- Group demonstrated in 
front of Mayor’s house 
and staged “sit-in” to have 
CBA recognized 





- Initially Mayor greatly 
interested 
- *Army base lands controlled 
by government for 
redevelopment 
- Development Corporation 
- Election mid-campaign 
changed local 
atmosphere but former 
assistant stayed on to 
help coordinate 








- Group negotiated directly with 
developer 
- Some helpful city staff, but 
little direct involvement w. 
coalition 
- City did not memorialize 
CBA in development 
agreement 
Los Angeles Alliance 
for the New Economy 
[LAANE] 
(Los Angeles, CA) 
Mostly cooperative 
- Airport an “arms length” org. 
of City 
- Mayor’s representative at 
neg. table 
- Public infrastructure project 
(no overt subsidies, but 
taxpayer money) 
- Councillor involved, 
Mayor involved, 
presentations to City 
Council/Committee 
- Generally supportive 
- Change of power mid-
campaign meant some 
changes to CBA 




- ECHDC is State Dev. Corp.  
- Hard to “negotiate” with due 
to agenda, power level 
- CBA part of canal lands 
development 
policy/agreement. 




City – adversarial 
County - 
Cooperative 
- City land not part of CBA 
- County land memorialized 
CBA 
- Negotiations directly w. 
City/County as no developer 
announced 
- CBA part of PERC 
development 
policy/agreement. 





- FCCG “negotiating” with 
local/state government 
- Subsidies provided at all 
levels of gov’t,  
- project announcement, not 
specific land development 
- CBA part of Springfield 
High Speed Rail initiative 








- Subsidies, tax incentives, etc. 
re. redevelopment of valley 
lands. 
- Negotiations w. private 
developer. 
- Little interest in separate CBA 
as valley plan viewed as 
parallel by City. 
- CBA elements/promises 
included in the Valley 
Plan. 
- Copied some structure 
from CBA btwn. Coalition 
and developer into Dev. 
Agmt.  
South Wilmington 





- No public money involved 
- City not part of negotiations 
- SWCSC and Compost 
Facility signed 
agreement, then SWCSC 
gave “blessing” at 
rezoning hearing. 




Chapter 7: Conclusion 
As noted in the introduction, large-scale developments, particularly those that 
can increase immediate and surrounding land values, remain a key component of 
economic development strategies today and are congruent with the latest in neoliberal 
policy spreading throughout North America.  As Petersen (1981) describes, land is the 
one “factor of production” that a city controls, dictating what that land may be used for, 
exercising “eminent domain”8, and providing infrastructure for uses that it prefers.  And 
what are local governments expected to do?  When 75% of their revenue opportunities 
come from property tax, they have little choice but to maximize the assessed value of its 
real estate and compete for those things that help raise the assessment value (Bezdek, 
2006). Unfortunately, the competitive pursuit of economic interests by local government 
can and does come at the expense of those less powerful, influential and “well-heeled” 
citizens, to benefit the few.   
Community Benefit Agreements are being touted (and used) as a means for 
returning the marginalized and disenfranchised to the table, forcing development 
projects and government policies to consider the effect of their collective works on a 
broader cross-section of citizens than previously considered.  The ability for the CBA to 
ensure real benefits are bestowed upon those populations that are most affected by a 
public-private mega project is their greatest strength.  However the agreement that is 
the end result of the CBA process reveals little of the struggles and strategies that are 
articulated through the interviews I have conducted.  CBA literature speaks of best 
                                                 
8
 Eminent domain is that power of a public entity (city, etc.) to take private property for public use (U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2012). 
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practices to ensure the “winning of a CBA” (Gross, LeRoy, & Janis-Aparicio, 2005), 
ensuring grassroots coalitions are representative of the local population, recommending 
strategic partnerships and key collaborators are brought into the fold, and defining a role 
for government.   
This work demonstrates that the success of any particular CBA is tied to a 
community organization's ability to mobilize the local and non-local resources and 
alliances that can best support their context-specific needs, and to illustrate the varied 
means by which this mobilization is achieved.  The literature lays out that 
representation, collaboration and strategic partnerships should help to ensure CBA 
success, and analysis of the cases herein reveals that these three elements are present 
in any campaign, generally.  However, it is the varied means by which the organizations 
achieve the end result, weave and integrate, pursue and implement these themes that 
has not been closely explored.  Perhaps this is because the movement, and therefore 
the literature, is a comparatively recent phenomenon but there appears to have been 
less effort dedicated to analyzing the unique relationships and innovative paths taken by 
the individual coalitions and actors in achieving the final agreement.  I believe that the 
multiple case study analysis I have undertaken here, through the use of semi-structured 
interviews, contributes to the understanding of CBA coalitions by drawing the cases 
together on the basis of their universal traits and also bringing forward some of the 
“situational uniqueness” and “background conditions” (Stake, 2006) that differentiate the 
cases selected. 
As discussed in the literature review, regime theory proposes that differentiations 
in class and social strata provide the context for group action, and that groups at the 
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bottom of the social strata must “enlist allies” who have relationships with, or are, those 
in a different (higher) social strata (Stone, 2005). With regard to urban regime theory, I 
have only been able to scratch the surface of the intricacies of the relationships 
established, the level at which the collaborators were operating, and the evolution of the 
relationships between them.  But, I believe that there is evidence of the applicability of 
urban regime theory to the cases and the CBA phenomenon overall. This is apparent in 
the strong ties between the local coalitions and national organizations such as the 
Partnership for Working Families, Gamaliel, etc.  Similarly, there is evidence of 
prevailing institutional arrangements and compromises shaping coalition interaction and 
contributing to conflict resolution (ibid.) but I have only been able to provide evidence of 
this occurring in my cases and would need to undertake more analysis to determine the 
extent to which it has happened.  The early indicators include the willingness of union to 
partner with the community coalitions (in some instances), the way the faith based 
groups set aside moral arguments to work together for local improvement, and the use 
of the mission, vision, value statements to keep otherwise conflicting groups on the 
same page.  There is much more work that can be done with regard to analysis of 
Community Benefits Agreements and the accompanying literature. 
According to some, CBAs should not be thought of as an inclusive way to 
undertake development planning, notwithstanding their ability to get new and different 
voices to the negotiating table.  As Freeman (2007) warns, using the CBA as a 
substitute for an inclusive planning process can reinforce the system that it was 
designed to counteract – entrepreneurial governance strategies that eliminate public 
participation and assume that all development is good development.  It runs this risk 
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because it is becoming an alternative and specialized process outside of the traditional 
(admittedly broken) participatory system.  Bornstein (2007b, p.12) suggests that the 
“collaboration and confrontation” that are part of any CBA struggle, “are simply 
moments in the longer process of challenging conventional approaches to 
development.”  As Been (2010) writes, the arrival of the CBA phenomenon should be a 
signal to local government that current processes are not sufficiently addressing the 
needs of the general population.  Municipalities must refine land planning procedures to, 
“ensure a more effective and satisfying role for community input early in the approval 
process” (ibid., p. 65).   
Epps-Addison (2012) would agree with Bornstein (2007b) and Been (2010) 
because as she describes, the CBA campaign in Milwaukee had the effect of “changing 
the dynamic and the conversation around what local governments should be doing to 
address problems in urban areas.” I would agree with Freeman (2007, p.2) that “we 
should not allow developers or politicians to use CBAs as fig leaves for the lack off a 
truly democratic planning process,” but there is evidence to suggest that it can be used 
a foundational base around which to mobilize actors, resources and new institutional 
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